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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the perfonnance of different models of public-
private partnerships in the provision of tuberculosis treatment, and explore incentive 
mechanisms for private sector participation. It makes recommendations to policy-
makers in South Africa and elsewhere on the best way to approach a policy on the 
enhanced role of private sector providers in tuberculosis treatment in light of the 
HIV I AIDS epidemic. A common framework is used to analyse the nature of the 
models, their perfonnance in tenns of cost, effectiveness and quality of care, and 
incentives for private participation. Multiple research methods are employed in order 
to fully investigate complex situations and to validate the findings. Both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are used. 
The study found that the quality of care is superior in both models of public-private 
partnerships when compared to the purely public sector model of delivery, and 
shows that increased collaboration with private providers through partnerships could 
potentially improve the quality of care and increase access to care. The results of the 
cost-effectiveness show that, in comparison with the purely public provision, the 
public-private partnership models could significantly reduce costs to both the public 
health sector and patient, and increase cost-effectiveness of tuberculosis treatment. 
Private providers in the existing and potential partnerships have both financial and 
non-financial motivations and incentives for participation in partnership. 
Overall, these pUblic-private partnerships show that there is a strong economic case 
for expanding the private sector involvement in tuberculosis treatment in South 
Africa. Expansion may require increased investment in the pUblic-private 
partnerships, but they seem to be capable of delivering important improvements in 
the affordability and efficiency of tuberculosis treatment, and improving the South 
African health system's capacity to cope with the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In developing countries, health sector reform aims to strengthen basic health services 
and emphasises the shifting of scarce resources to primary care and prevention 
(Cassels and Janovsky, 1995). A key feature of health reforms is questioning the 
belief that the government should provide all citizens care, regardless of their level 
of income (Cassels, 1995). It is argued that aside from their regulatory role, 
governments in developing countries should assume responsibility for ensuring the 
provision of a cost-effective package of basic services for the poor, preferably 
leaving it to other actors to finance and provide health care for other income groups 
(Culyer et aI., 1988; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; World Bank, 1993; World Bank 
2003). Whether the services for the poor are funded by the government but provided 
by others is left for country decision-makers to decide (Cassels, 1995). 
Tuberculosis control is a classic example of a public health activity that is important 
for the whole society and is therefore appropriate for government to have a dominant 
role (World Bank, 1993; Musgrove, 1996; Jack, 2000; 2001). Treatment of 
tuberculosis has been identified as one of the most important basic health care 
interventions for the government to finance (Murray et aI., 1991; World Bank, 
1993). This traditional view that tuberculosis control is a public health concern for 
which the government has a prime responsibility stems from observed market 
failures in the health sector. Given significant externalities, there are strong 
economic grounds to argue that the public sector must play an essential role in 
tuberculosis control (Jack, 2001). Tuberculosis surveillance, knowledge generation 
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and cross-border control of transmission can all be considered global public goods 
(Chen et aI., 1999) worthy of public finance within reform programmes. 
However, more recently it has been argued that tuberculosis control has to be viewed 
within the context of health sector reforms, which include strengthening of the 
government's role in providing information, overseeing of regulation, and financing 
of public health interventions in partnerships with the private sector (Uplekar et aI., 
2001). Tuberculosis services, which have been demonstrated to deliver one of the 
most cost-effective health interventions in developing countries (Murray et aI, 1991; 
World Bank, 1993; De Jonghe et aI, 1994; Creese et aI., 2002), are a particularly 
good vehicle through which to measure the impact of the health sector reform 
process (Cassels, 1995). The long-term care required in the successful case-
management of tuberculosis cases is a very sensitive indicator of the ability of the 
health sector to deliver adequate services more broadly (Weil 2000). 
The motivation for this thesis arises from a growing concern expressed in the health 
economics literature about the respective roles of the public and private sectors in 
health care provision and financing. This has been one of the central issues in health 
sector initiatives in a range of developing and developed countries. The debate has 
essentially been about changing the public-private sector mix, and particularly about 
mechanisms for increasing the role of the private sector. The concept 'public-private 
nlix' is used to describe the share of the public and private (for profit and non-profit) 
sectors in the provision and financing of health services in a given country (Hanson 
and Bemlan, 1998). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly seen to be a 
way of promoting co-operation among public and private health care sectors in 
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developing countries (Bennett, 1992; World Bank, 1993; Gilson and Mills, 1995; 
Reich 2000). Numerous definitions have been proposed to characterise what 
partnership means, focusing on objectives, responsibilities and gains. Partnership 
implies "a commitment to a common goal through the joint provision of 
complementary resources and expertise, and the joint sharing of the risks involved" 
(Ridley, 2001). Such partnerships may either involve affiliation with international 
organisations (i.e. public sector programmes with private sector participation) or be 
legally independent not-for-profit bodies. In the health sector, partnership is seen as 
a means to "bring together a set of actors for the common goal of improving the 
health of populations based on mutually agreed roles and principles" (Kickbusch 
and Quick, 1998). According to the World Health Organisation, "partnership with 
the private sector could offer some promise of higher case finding rates, improved 
patient acceptance of directly-observed treatment, and a degree of long term 
sustainability" (World Health Organisation, 2001 b). This study evaluates PPPs as a 
mechanism for reducing the role of government whilst increasing the private sector's 
involvement in the delivery of public health services. 
1.1 Theoretical and empirical background 
Market failure is the economic rationale for ongoing government intervention in 
health care where the private sector operates or has predominated (Akerlof, 1970; 
Arrow and Lind, 1970; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Culyer, 1991; Musgrove, 1996; 
Stiglitz, 2000). Some economic theorists argue that few health services have 
characteristics of a 'public good' and therefore cannot be provided by the market 
(Arrow, 1963; Atkinson and Stem, 1974; Stiglitz, 1989; Donaldson and Gerard, 
1993; Jack, 2000). 
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Neo-classical economics' theoretical rationale for a limited role of the government 
stems from its market competition theory (Rosen, 1995). Under this theory, 
government intervention is not necessary as a properly functioning competitive 
economy generates a Pareto efficient allocation of resources, and a shift to the 
private sector ownership may lead to efficiency gains (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). 
However, it is widely recognised that perfectly competitive markets do not exist 
(Arrow, 1970; Akerlof, 1970; Rorthchild and Stiglitz, 1976). New institutional 
economic theory, which compares different organisational forms and different 
institutional regulations in relation to their effect on economic efficiency, suggests 
that, unlike public sector providers, private providers (due to the profit motive) have 
an incentive to behave efficiently and to be responsive to consumers (Hodgson, 
1988; Hart, 1990). The new institutional economics theorists argue that the lack of 
property rights in the public sector leads to inadequate incentives for efficient 
behaviour and suggests that private ownership, and the incentives associated with it, 
may stimulate competition and result in efficient service (Bennett et aI., 1997, Turner 
and Hulme, 1997). According to the 'new public management' framework 
government should move away from the direct provision of health services to more 
indirect roles such as contracting for health services or regulating private providers 
(Stewart, 1993; Jackson and Price, 1994; Walsh, 1995). Whatever form they take, 
contracts involving the public sector are a response to public choice and property 
rights theories' diagnosis that government has failed in the efficient provision of 
quality services, and contracting out is seen as a means of benefiting from private 
sector efficiency, while maintaining control over what services are to be provided 
and to whonl (Mills, 1997). The key feature of the new public management 
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framework is that the role of the government is not necessarily one of direct service 
provision, but rather policy making (Hood, 1991; Russell et aI., 1999). 
In addition to the theoretical arguments, there are also some pragmatic arguments in 
favour of private sector development in health care. The World Bank (1993) 
suggests that the private sector may expand access, reduce the administrative and 
financial burden upon government, and possibly increase overall sectoral efficiency. 
In the World Development Report (World Bank, 1993), considerable emphasis was 
placed on the potential of private sector providers to playa complementary role in an 
overall strategy defined by public interest. The public sector should provide the 
'essential' cost-effective services, while the private sector could provide less cost-
effective services (World Bank, 1993; 1997; 2003). 
Private health care providers in developing countries play an important role in 
providing care for people with diseases of public health importance, including 
tuberculosis (Berman, 1995; Bennett et aI., 1997; Swan and Zwi, 1997; Brugha and 
Zwi, 1998; Uplekar et aI., 2001; Mills et aI., 2002; Uplekar, 2003; Newell et aI., 
2004). Studies from India have shown that about 60% of TB cases had visited 
private practitioners when they first developed chest symptoms, and more than half 
had been diagnosed by private doctors (Juvenkar et aI., 1995; Uplekar and Rangan, 
1996; Uplekar et aI., 1998; Uplekar, 2000; Murthy et aI., 2001; Arora et aI., 2004a). 
Studies from Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam have shown that about half of all TB 
patients had sought help in the private sector, and up to 40% of all TB cases had 
been treated in the private sector (Lonnroth, 2000~ Lonnroth et aI., 2001). In areas of 
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high TB prevalence, it is estimated that expenditure on TB in the private sector 
outweighs that in the public sector (World Health Organisation, 1994). 
The main reasons for consulting private sector providers for the provision of TB 
treatment are better geographical accessibility, shorter waiting time, longer or more 
flexible opening hours, greater availability of staff and drugs, greater confidentiality 
in dealing with diseases such as TB which carry social stigma, and the perception 
that private service providers are more considerate, caring and sensitive to client 
concerns (Aljunid, 1995; Uplekar and Rangan, 1996; Lonnorth et aI., 2001; Arora et 
aI., 2004b). The positive aspects of the private practitioners' TB related practices are 
countered in developing country contexts by practices such as excessive reliance on 
X-rays for diagnosis, their disregard of recommended drug regimens, their virtual 
inaction with regard to treatment default and their failure to keep even minimum 
essential records (Uplekar, 1997; Hurtig et aI., 2000; Uplekar et aI., 2001; Lonnorth 
et aI., 2001; 2003). 
Most of the available evidence on the private sector's involvement in the provision 
of TB treatment comes from Asia. There are a few tried and tested models of 
effective interventions to encourage private providers to deliver good quality 
tuberculosis services through pUblic-private mix projects in India, the Philippines, 
Vietnam and Nepal (Murthy et aI., 2001; Mantala, 2003; Quy et aI., 2003; Newell et 
aI., 2004). However, these different pUblic-private mix approaches with respect to 
tuberculosis treatment are small scale and empirical data on their performance is 
limited. Whilst much of the understanding of the private sector and their 
involvement in TB treatment comes from Asia, there are extremely limited empirical 
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data on the involvement of private providers in the provision of TB treatment, and 
even less available evidence on their performance, in Africa. 
Effective involvement of the private sector in the provision of TB treatment requires 
an understanding of the motivations of private providers, their capacity and the 
existing institutional and organisational capacity to support the interaction. The 
available evidence supports the call for an increased role for the private sector. 
However, previous experience and economic theory suggest that, because of 
differences in motivation between public and private sector actors (the classic 
problems of agency relationships), broader involvement of private actors raises 
additional issues of appropriate incentive mechanisms that can be used to achieve 
converging public-private interests than if we were just looking purely at a public 
model of delivery alone (Mills et aI., 2001). There is not much evidence, however, 
on how to motivate private providers to provide health care services that are in the 
public interest. In addition, there is a lack of evidence on the most appropriate 
incentives in a public-private partnership for delivering TB treatment at the right cost 
and quality. 
1.2 Thesis aim and outline 
This study aims to evaluate the performance of different models of pUblic-private 
partnerships in the delivery of TB treatment in South Africa. It also aims to explore 
incentive mechanisms for private sector participation in public-private partnerships, 
in order to make recommendations to policy-makers in South Africa on the best way 
to approach a policy on the enhanced role of private sector providers in TB 
treatment. 
~o 
The specific objectives of the thesis are: 
1. To understand the nature of pUblic-private interaction in TB treatment in the 
African context in light of the HIV / AIDS epidemic. 
2. To describe the nature of TB treatment delivery including models of public-
private partnerships, in terms of what they are, the nature of partnerships and 
who is responsible for monitoring them in South Africa. 
3. To evaluate specific public-private partnership models of delivery of TB 
treatment in terms of cost, effectiveness and quality of care, and to compare 
their performance with that of public sector providers. 
4. To explore motivations of partners within existing partnerships, incentive 
mechanisms attributable to different models of public-private partnerships, 
potential partners in the provision of TB treatment, and incentive structures 
for broader public-private partnerships. 
5. On the basis of these findings, to make recommendations on how policy-
makers in South Africa and elsewhere could best approach a policy on 
different ways of involving private providers in the provision of TB 
treatment. 
Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews both theoretical and empirical literature on the role of government 
and the private sector in the health sector, and more specifically for TB treatment. It 
also presents evidence on the performance of different pUblic-private arrangements 
for the provision of TB treatment in developing countries. The chapter is divided 
into two parts. Part one focuses on public-private mix and incentives in the health 
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sector, presenting different economic theories on the role of government in health 
and discussing public-private mix in the health sector, and the incentives for private 
participation. Public-private mix arrangements for TB treatment that exist in TB 
high-burden countries are discussed. Part two looks at the burden of tuberculosis in 
light of the HIV / AIDS epidemic, and tuberculosis treatment in the private sector. 
The literature review identifies a number of key gaps and unanswered questions 
concerning private sector involvement in the provision of TB treatment and public-
private mix. The literature review also notes the potentially important role played by 
context in the performance of public-private partnerships. 
Chapter 3 provides background and context in which the public-private partnerships 
examined in this study are operating in South Africa. The public-private mix of the 
South African health sector, the emerging TBIHIV epidemic, and information on the 
policy context of the South African situation are discussed. The background and 
context of the pUblic-private mix suggest that the public sector in South Africa 
cannot effectively control TB epidemic without drawing on the private sector. One 
response is to find effective ways to manage rising TB caseloads through 
strengthened pUblic-private partnerships in the provision of TB treatment. 
Chapter 4 describes and justifies the case study approach and methods that were used 
for the study. Key concepts of relevance for this study arising from the literature 
review are presented in a theoretical framework by which different pUblic-private 
partnership models for the provision of TB treatment can be evaluated. The research 
design including the choice of a case study approach, design of the case study, and 
choice of qualitative and quantitative methods is presented. Research process (i.e. 
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site selection, data collection methods, and data analysis) and more detailed methods 
specific for each objective of the study are explained separately in chapters 5 - 8. 
Chapter 5 reviews the public-private mix in the provision of TB treatment in South 
Africa, focusing on the characteristics of different service providers. It identifies and 
defines the main providers of TB treatment and their roles and responsibilities to TB 
treatment. The chapter starts with an overview of the National TB Control 
Programme focusing on the public sector provision of TB treatment. It then goes on 
to discuss the nature of the private sector provision of TB treatment. Whilst the 
public sector is the main provider of TB treatment in South Africa, there are three 
major types of private providers that provide TB treatment (with or without public 
financing). The chapter ends by describing existing partnerships for directly 
observed TB treatment between the public and private sectors. 
Two particular models of the partnerships reviewed in chapter 5 are chosen for 
further evaluation, and then compared with the public sector provision of TB 
treatment, which is the focus of chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 evaluates the 
performance, in terms of quality of care, of two different models of public-private 
partnerships for the provision of TB treatment. This includes findings on technical, 
process, and outcome quality. The ways in which the partnerships operate are also 
described. Chapter 7 evaluates the performance of the two public-private partnership 
models in terms of cost-effectiveness. It examines whether, in light of the TBIHIV 
epidemic, increased collaboration with private providers through partnerships could 
potentially improve cost-effectiveness of TB treatment. It also explores the role of 
the public sector financing in each of the models. 
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Whilst the findings in chapters 6 and 7 support the call for an increased role for 
private providers in the provision of TB treatment, previous experience and 
economic theory suggest that appropriate incentive mechanisms should be in place if 
partnerships are going to be efficient. Chapter 8 focuses on understanding 
motivations to consider actual and potential participation of pUblic/private partners 
for the provision of TB treatment, and based on the motivations, incentive structures 
suitable for different current and potential providers. It also looks at obstacles to 
private provision of TB treatment. 
Chapter 9 discusses findings of the study, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
methods used. Findings highlighted by a comparison between the models, and 
incentive mechanisms attributable to different models of public-private partnership, 
are then discussed. This chapter also situates the findings of the study in a broader 
context of public-private partnership policy discussions in South Africa. 
The concluding chapter reflects on what has been presented in the preceding 9 
chapters and draws lessons from the theoretical and empirical information that have 
broader relevance for TB treatment. It presents major conclusions about each of the 
models reviewed, discusses the nature of generalisability of findings, and explains 
how they fill in the knowledge gaps identified in chapter 2. It makes 
recommendations on how policy-makers in South Africa could best approach a 
policy on the private sector involvement in TB treatment. Areas for future research 
are then outlined. 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
For many low-and middle-income countries a dual TBIHIV epidemic has emerged. 
The latest UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic indicates that an 
estimated 4.8 million people become infected with HIV in 2003, around 37.8 million 
adults and children were living with HIV/AIDS in 2003, and over 20 million have 
died since 1981. Approximately one-third of people living with HIV worldwide are 
co-infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis, of whom 70% live in sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNAIDS, 2004). Tuberculosis is the leading cause of death among HIV-
positive people, and HIV has been responsible for a global surge in the number of 
cases of active tuberculosis. It has been estimated that in 2000, around 8.2 million 
TB cases occurred worldwide, with the sub-Saharan African region having the 
highest incidence rates of about 300 per 100 000 population on average (Corbett et 
aI., 2003). In the same year, around 1.8 million deaths occurred, with around 95% of 
those deaths in Asia and Africa (World Health Organisation, 2000a). About 130/0 of 
these people were also infected with HIV (Corbett et aI., 2003). 
Macroeconomic reforms and structural adjustment programmes, coupled with 
increased morbidity, mortality and disability due to the HIV I AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria epidemics, have led to health sector reforms in many developing countries. 
Health sector reform is concerned with "defining priorities, refining policies and 
reforming the institutions through which those policies are implemented" (Cassels, 
1995). Within the context of health sector reform, the private sector is seen as a 
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solution for many health system problems, ranging from inefficiency to poor quality 
services (Birdsall and James, 1992; World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 2003). 
The primary economic rationale for introducing or expanding the role of the private 
sector in the health system, in instances where the public sector provides most health 
care, is the promotion of allocative and technical efficiency (Jackson and Price, 
1994; Bennett et aI., 1997; Turner and Hulme, 1997). The desired public-private mix 
is often assessed as a matter of balancing efficiency and equity considerations where 
the private sector is typically seen as being more efficient, and the public sector as 
more equitable (Rosenthal and Newbrander, 1996). In addition to creating incentives 
for technical efficiency, it is argued that there will be better allocative efficiency if 
the private sector provides care for certain groups because it will release resources 
for the public sector to provide services to the underserved (World Bank, 2003). 
The private health sector in developing countries has grown considerably in the last 
few decades (Uplekar, 2000). Many Asian countries, accounting for over half of the 
global burden of TB, have large and growing private health sectors. While the need 
for government funding of major public health activities and government leadership 
in regulation remains widely accepted, there is also a need for better use of private 
providers who are supplying services of public health importance (World Bank, 
1993; Mills et aI., 2002). 
The aim of this chapter is to review both the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the role of government in the health sector and the rationale for involving private 
providers in the delivery of public health services. It starts by reviewing economic 
theory on the need for government's intervention in health. It then looks at the 
private sector and pUblic-private mix in developing countries. Public-private 
partnerships in health care, and more specifically for tuberculosis treatment, are 
discussed in the context of health sector refonn. Economic theories of incentives and 
incentive mechanisms that can be used to encourage different private providers to 
collaborate with the public sector in the provision of public health services, and more 
specifically TB treatment, are then reviewed. The burden of tuberculosis is 
discussed. Lastly, gaps in the evidence-base on public-private mix in health and 
more specifically on pUblic-private partnerships in the provision of TB treatment are 
highlighted. 
2.2 Public-private mix and incentives 
2.2.1 Arguments for government intervention: neo-c1assical economic theory 
Neo-classical economic theory suggests that market failures explain the role of 
government (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 2000; McPake et aI., 2002). The market 
for health care is characterised by many failures that prevent consumers from 
allocating their resources efficiently, and, therefore, justifies government 
intervention (Arrow, 1963; Stiglitz, 1989; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). These 
failures can be classified into four types: externalities and public goods, imperfect 
information, risk and uncertainty, and market structures. 
Externalities and public goods are the most commonly cited aspects of market failure 
used to motivate government intervention (Arrow, 1963; Akerlof, 1970; Atkinson 
and Stem, 1974; Birdsall, 1989; Jack, 2000). Externalities occur when the behaviour 
of one party affects other parties but is not taken into account in market transactions. 
Certain forms of health care have positive externalities, implying that other people's 
consumption benefits our own welfare. The existence of an externality causes the 
market to fail because it prevents the individuals involved in the transaction from 
incorporating all of the social costs and benefits of their transaction (Hammer, 1997; 
Musgrove, 1999; Jack, 2001). This means that consumption of some goods (e.g. 
immunisation against disease and completion of curative therapy) that directly 
benefits a private decision-maker also provides benefits to others, but private 
individuals will underestimate societal benefits and this will lead to an 
underconsumption of TB treatment from a societal perspective. Governments can 
induce individuals to consume more by subsidising the price of the good (e.g. 
offering free anti-TB drugs) or by reducing costs associated with travel and waiting 
(Jack, 2000). 
Public goods 1 are those goods whose consumption is non-rival - consumption by one 
person does not reduce its availability for consumption by others, and non-
excludable - people cannot be excluded from benefiting (Stiglitz, 2000). In a 
competitive market, providers would not be able to make profit (or at least cover 
their costs) and would thus not produce the good. However, the number of purely 
public goods in health is small. For instance, although consumption of TB drugs and 
preventative measures might be in the public interest, and some aspects of TB 
I Economic theory distinguishes between public goods and merit goods, the latter being defined as 
"private goods and services that are considered to be of such importance that they ar~ financed an~ 
provided by the public sector in addition to the quantities produced and purchased m the market 
(Musgran? 1959). 
control have the attributes of global public health goods, they do not constitute 
public goods because of rival consumption (Jack, 2001). 
Whilst insurance resolves some problems related to health care, insurance markets 
sometimes do not work efficiently because of imperfect information. Imperfect 
information between patients and providers can lead to the existence of supplier-
induced demand, while the presence of uncertainty has contributed to the 
development of health insurance markets. There are two main ways in which health 
insurance causes market to fail: 'moral hazard' and 'adverse selection'. Moral hazard 
is reflected in excessive use of medical services by insured individual and it arises 
when consumers face zero prices at the time of use (Pauly, 1968; Zeckhouser, 1970; 
Pauly, 1986; Weisbrod, 1991). One of the ways of controlling moral hazard is by the 
introduction of co-payments (Strong and Waterson, 1987). Adverse selection refers 
to a process by which only the worst risks purchase private insurance, and arises 
where low-risk individuals are able to opt out of the risk pool (Akerlof, 1970; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Strategies to address the problems of adverse 
selection include regulation of the insurance market, for instance by introducing 
compulsory insurance (McPake et aI., 2002). The private market does not provide 
insurance for many important risks that individuals face and, therefore, there is a 
good reason for public intervention (Musgrove, 1999; Jack, 2001). Publicly provided 
insurance is often defended both on equity and efficiency grounds, providing all 
citizens with protection and avoiding some of the market failures that characterise 
private insurance markets (Jack, 1999). 
These attributes of health care also apply to TB treatment, and thus, there arc 
potentially many causes of market failure in TB control activities. Jack (2001) argues 
that there are some strong reasons to favour public intervention due to the specific 
characteristics of tuberculosis. First, there are positive externalities associated with 
detection and treatment because of its infectious nature. Second, individuals may not 
be well informed about the need for diagnosis because the symptoms of TB are 
similar to those of other less serious health problems. Third, because of the long-
term nature of TB treatment, treatment is often incomplete contributing to drug 
resistance and associated costs. Fourth, public intervention in TB detection and 
treatment could represent an anti-poverty approach to development, as the majority 
of TB patients are poor (Jack, 2001). Finally, tuberculosis treatment is often 
excluded from health insurance policies (Jack, 2000). The specific characteristics of 
TB and the non-existence of insurance for TB treatment lead to market failures in the 
detection and treatment that justify the role for the government to finance, but not 
necessarily provide TB treatment. 
The severity of market failure will depend upon the specific features of the country 
and health care system under consideration (Jack, 2001). Some critical external 
factors that affect the severity of market failures include (Bennett at aI., 1996): (a) 
the epidemiological profile within the country; (b) sophistication of care provided; 
(c) professional ethics and regulation; (d) organisation and development of the 
business sector; (e) education; (f) the media and civil society; and (g) social values. 
Thus, economic theory suggests that the appropriate roles for the government are 
context specific and depend upon a precise specification of the service under 
consideration. Furthermore, the existence of market failures alone does not justi fy 
total public financing and delivery of health care (Culyer et aI., 1988; Bennett et al.. 
1996). Firstly, the range of market failures implies rather specific roles for 
governments, e.g. externality and public good characteristics imply public subsidy of 
services, as opposed to public production or public funding. Secondly. the 
characteristics of health care which give rise to market failures are also likely to 
cause government failures. For example, problems of asymmetric information 
equally enable public sector doctors to pursue their own interests rather than the 
welfare of the patient; they may have different incentives to private sector doctors 
but these are not necessarily better (Bennett et aI., 1996; Jack, 1999). 
It is recognised that the health sector does not meet the neo-classical conditions of a 
market under free competition (Bennett and Zwi, 1993; Bennett at aI., 1997). The 
failures result in inefficiencies which may take any of three forms (Bennett at aI., 
1996): 
• demand inefficiencies (i.e. incorrect consumption decisions due to consumer 
ignorance; insurance or free rider effect); 
• 
• 
supply inefficiencies (i.e. lack of incentives for provider efficiency III 
production; lack of a perfect agent for the patient; duplication of services)~ 
lack of attainment of a social goal (i.e. equity concerns about access and 
types of services available). 
Government intervention occurs through financing of health services (i.e. pro\-ision 
of insurance, subsidies or vouchers); production of provision of health services: 
and/or subsidizing the purchase of productive factors (i.e. controlling the supply of 
health personnel through training or control of technology inputs). Although neo-
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classical economic theory provides guidance as to which generic roles government 
should perform (financing, provision, regulation, transfers), it appears unable to offer 
much of the understanding of the precise form this intervention should take. 
Externalities and public goods do not necessarily suggest extensive government 
provision of services; pure public goods are few and externalities may require only a 
limited degree of subsidisation (Bennett et aI., 1997; Jack, 2001). While neo-
classical economic theory suggests that governments should finance services that fall 
into category of public goods, such as vector control and immunisation (Musgrove, 
1996), it also assumes that agents are perfectly informed. However, in reality this is 
rarely the case, and this is where new institutional economics challenges neo-
classical economic theory. 
2.2.2 New institutional economics perspective on the role of government 
The problem of imperfect information between patient and provider is a key problem 
of the health care market (Arrow, 1963; Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976; McPake et aI., 2002). The theory of perfect competition assumes that 
consumers have perfect knowledge about the goods and services that they consume. 
In the health sector, however, there is an asymmetry of information between 
providers and patients. Patients are not in a position to diagnose their illness or to 
assess whether a prescribed treatment in necessary or appropriate. In is inefficient for 
each patient to seek all the relevant information and obtain 'second opinions'. 
Providers (such as doctors, pharmacists, dentists) therefore operate as agents for the 
patient and make decisions on the patient's consumption. This relationship between 
patient and provider is known as a principal-agent relationship, where the patient is 
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the principal and the provider acts as the principal's agent (Pratt and Zeckhauser. 
1985). 
There are many reasons why health care providers may be imperfect agents. For 
example, they may wish to maintain a certain level of income (Bennett et aI., 1997). 
If providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis, there is an incentive to over-provide 
services - such supplier-induced demand is facilitated by the asymmetry of 
information between health care providers and patients. 
Many transactions within the health system involve a principal-agent relationship 
where a principal delegates responsibility to an agent to act on hislher behalf. For 
instance, there is an agency relationship between the Ministry of Health and a health 
authority. Regulatory agencies can be seen as agents to government. There is an 
agency relationship between a hospital manager and hospital employees. Economic 
theory suggests that problems are likely to arise in any principal-agent relationship 
as the agent is tempted to pursue hislher own goals at the expense of those of the 
principal (McPake et aI., 2002). 
Though the problems of principal-agent relationship are unavoidable in health care, 
creating appropriate incentives for agents and monitoring and sanctioning of agent 
behaviour are some of the ways for solving the market failure (Mills et aI., 2001). 
Recognition of 'imperfect agency' gives policy makers important opportunities to 
influence the behaviour of health care providers (e.g. through different 
reimbursement methods). However, this may not always be straightforward as there 
sOlnetimes there could be multiple principles for anyone agent. For example, a 
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physician may act as an agent for a patient, but at the same time may also be seen as 
an agent for hospital management, whose objectives may be different form those of 
the patient (e.g. cost containment). How different providers in the health care system 
are paid can have an impact on their behaviour, and therefore on the achievement of 
the objectives of the health system (efficiency, equity, cost containment). In addition, 
to ensure against inappropriate behaviour by agents, rules and sanctions are also 
needed (Bennett et aI., 1997). 
Neo-c1assical economICS is criticised for its expectation of rational, maxImIsIng 
behaviour by all individuals and its failure to represent chronic infonnation problems 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 2000). New institutional economics argues 
that, given the complexities of health care, it is neither practical nor desirable for all 
agents to be perfectly informed (Hodgson, 1988; Hart, 1990), and institutional 
arrangements can help to reduce problems associated with asymmetric infonnation 
(North, 1990). For example, professional organisations certify medical personnel and 
provide some guarantee of the quality of care which they will deliver (Mills et aI., 
2001). 
North (1990) argues that problems of imperfect information create transaction costs, 
e.g. patients unsure of a physician's skills may seek a second opinion. New 
institutional economics assumes that high transaction costs are one more reason for a 
dominant government role in provision. According to Williamson (1985), the 
appropriate institutional form for producing and delivering a good or service depends 
on which form minimises costs. In a situation where infonnation is expensive to 
acquire, transaction costs are high and market-based arrangements may be 
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inappropriate (North, 1990). Under such circumstances it may be more efficient for 
the service to be produced and delivered by a bureaucratic organisation. However, 
for that organisation to operate efficiently, it is essential that the individuals within 
the organisation are faced with appropriate incentives (Handy, 1993; Preker and 
Harding, 1999; Le Grand, 2003). The new institutional economics theorists argue 
that private ownership, and the incentives associated with it, may stimulate 
competition and result in efficient service, and that the role of government is not 
necessarily one of direct service provision, but rather policy making (Hood, 1991; 
Russell et aI., 1999). 
Institutional approaches may also help to analyse issues of appropriate incentives 
and the motivation of individual actors within organisations. Many of the problems 
identified in public sector bureaucracies (e.g. lack of competition, inappropriate 
incentives) stem from institutional weaknesses (Bennett et al 1996). Cassels (1995) 
identifies three key principles important for institutional reform in the health sector, 
namely, strengthening of management and accountability, specification of priorities, 
objectives, standards and monitoring of outputs, outcomes and resources use, and 
clarification of institutional relationships. 
In summary, new institutional economics suggests that institutional arrangements 
can help to reduce problems associated with imperfect information, provided that the 
individuals within the institutions are provided with appropriate incentives. It also 
suggests that high transaction costs, created by the problem of imperfect information, 
are one more reason for a dominant government role in provision. 
2.2.3 Public-private mix in the health sector: an introduction to financing and 
provision functions 
Health systems in developing countries have three main characteristics. First, health 
services have been traditionally regarded as a responsibility of the state. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, a strong state role in health has been rooted in the political 
ideology of socialism (Russell et aI., 1997). In Sri Lanka, health care was perceived 
as a basic right for all citizens, and that was embodied in the constitution (Russell 
and Attenayake, 1997). Second, there is a strong bias towards curative and hospital 
services. Though the primary health care approach has been promoted, health 
systems in most countries are heavily hospital and curative care biased (Mills et aI., 
2001). In Zimbabwe, over 50 per cent of government health expenditure is allocated 
to hospitals, with its the majority going to central and general hospitals (Cripps, 
1997). Finally, as the health care sector developed, various health sector 
constituencies also developed. For example, with the expansion of the government 
health care in Ghana, bureaucratic and professional constituencies have expanded 
(Smithson et aI., 1997). 
Development of health systems in developing countries has some common historical 
features. Organised health services were introduced by the colonial power to cater 
for the needs of the military, civil service and settler communities (Zwi and Mills, 
1995). Given the prevalence of communicable disease (e.g. typhoid and tuberculosis) 
at the time, protecting expatriates meant that the health of the indigenous population 
had also to be addressed. This was actively promoted through churches and 
mISSIons. In the post-colonial period, regimes of newly established countries 
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introduced a policy where education and health care were available free of charge 
(Mills et aI., 2001). 
Health systems in developing countries are predominantly publicly financed and 
provided. Though the private sector financing and provision were not banned in the 
past, they were not encouraged either. In many countries, traditional health care 
practices operate alongside Western medicine. China, India and Zimbabwe are only 
some examples (Bennett and Muraleedharan, 1998; Russell et aI., 1997; Uplekar, 
2000). However, while is some countries, traditional practitioners are officially 
recognised as professionals who provide additional resources, they do not have the 
same status in other countries (Mills et aI., 2001). 
In the 1980s, the World Bank introduced structural adjustment programmes. The 
main policies included deregulating markets, shrinking the public sector, dismantling 
direct controls over trade and investment, and devaluing national currencies (World 
Bank, 1987). These policies had impacted upon the health system. For example, 
introduction of user fees led to declines in health services attendances, which had 
indirectly influenced health status (Russell and Gilson, 1997; Russell et aI., 1997; 
Smithson et aI., 1997). Global economic recession and reduction in foreign aid also 
had a major effect on health services. 
While there is no universal package of measures that constitute health sector refonn, 
overall goals of many countries are improving health care efficiency, equity and 
sustainability (Cassels, 1995). In developing countries, the aim of health sector 
refonn is to strengthen the basic health services as well as to shift scarce resources to 
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pnmary care and prevention (Cassels and Janovsky, 1995). The changed health 
systems have an impact on the design, financing and delivery of health care services. 
In the early 1980s, the government, in many developing countries, was viewed as a 
primary player in the health sector. From the mid-1980s, international financial 
organisations, such as the World Bank, set a new policy agenda recommending a 
smaller role for government in health care and the promotion of the private sector 
(World Bank, 1987; 1993; 1997). Some of the assumptions upon which this 
recommendation was based were: (a) costs of health care are rising and government 
resources are scarce; (b) private health expenditure in most developing countries 
exceed government expenditure; (c) people tend to prefer private health care and pay 
for it rather than avail themselves of free public sector services; (d) the private sector 
is free from administrative and political constraints and therefore delivers health 
services efficiently; (e) increasing privatisation will free up scarce government 
resources which can be targeted to provide services for the poor; and, (f) infusion of 
market forces such as competition and incentives will lead to improvements in 
service quality (World Bank, 1993). The proposed expanded role for the private 
sector was argued primarily on ideological and theoretical grounds, with almost no 
reference to empirical evidence (Brugha and Zwi, 2002). Common criticism of these 
policies points to a lack of evidence on the validity of assumptions about cost and 
quality of services provided by private health care providers (Bennett, 1991; 1992; 
Bhat, 1993; Yesudian, 1994; Bennett et aI., 1997; McPake, 1997; Swan and Zwi, 
1997; Uplekar, 2000; Mills et aI., 2001). In particular, the ability of users to judge 
the technical quality of the care that they receive for important public health 
problems such as sexually transmitted infections, TB and malaria has been 
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questioned (Brugha and Zwi, 1998; Schneider et aI., 2001; Up I ekar, 2000). In 
addition, the issue of equity and workable mechanisms of selective targeting of 
select services for the poor are some of the overriding concerns (Bennett et aI., 1997; 
Gilson, 1998; Mills, 1998; Chabikuli et aI., 2002). 
The health systems around the world broadly include various combinations of three 
basic systems (Bennett, 1991): 
1) Public assistance, where governments provide medical care in large part through 
their own hospitals and health centres financed by general taxation; 
2) Health insurance, provided often by governmental, non-governmental or a mix of 
institutions that cover the population partly or entirely; and, 
3) National health service, which ensures free services with universal coverage. 
There are many individual variations among different countries and more than one 
system can be found within a single country. In addition, there is no general rule on 
the extent to which the public sector should provide health care directly and where it 
should restrict its activities to financing it. The South African health system has a 
strong private sector but it serves less than 20% of the popUlation and is financed 
through voluntary health insurance (only 16% of the population are members of 
these medical schemes) and out-of-pocket payments. The public sector serves the 
rest _ of the population and is funded primarily through taxation (McIntyre and 
Doherty, 2004). South Africa also has a long history of public-private interaction 
within the health system. Many uninsured South African pay out-of-pocket for 
primary care in the private sector (Cornell et aI., 2001), partly due to inaccessibility 
of public services and also due to much higher quality of care offered by private 
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doctors (Palmer, 1999; Schneider et aI., 2001; Mills et aI., 2004). On the other hand, 
less than 40% of the population uses private providers for acute care (Cornell et aI., 
2001) suggesting significant inadequacies in primary health care coverage. 
The relationship between the public and private sectors with respect to servIce 
provision is traditionally viewed by economists in tenns of two key functions, that of 
financing and provision (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Bennett at aI., 1997) by 
which the responsibilities of the public and private sector are delineated. In tenns of 
financing and provision, Mills et al (2001) suggest four main types of organisational 
arrangements that may exist between the public and private sectors: 
1. Public financing and provision. Government both funds health care and adopts 
direct roles of service management and delivery. National health systems which 
provide services to the entire population and are financed from the central 
government budget exist in many countries. 
2. Public financing and private provision. Government funds health care, but 
adopts an indirect role of service provision by arranging contracts or subsidising 
private providers in a more infonnal way. For example, contracting out - where a 
public hospital may purchase clinical (such as laboratory, dialysis or radiology) or 
non-clinical services (management advisory services, laundry, security, catering and 
paramedics and air ambulance services) from a private provider. 
3. Private financing and public provision. Private agents including users finance 
health care services which are delivered by publicly owned agents. For example, 
leasing out public beds/wards for private patients, where private providers pay to use 
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public facilities; or limited private practice, where public sector doctors are allowed 
to spend a specified number of hours in private practice. 
4. Private financing and provision. The government role is confined to regulation 
and standard setting; services are both financed and provided by private sector 
agents. It includes privately owned facilities, private practitioners such as doctors, 
nurses, physiotherapists, traditional healers, and privately owned pharmacies. 
Public financing and private provision, and private financing and public provision, 
are the arrangements that are referred to in the term the pUblic-private mix within 
health care. They present a useful framework for understanding public-private 
partnerships with respect to financing and provision of health care services. The 
nature of these types of relationships often varies according to level of care, and the 
history of the interaction between the two sectors (Hanson and Berman, 1998). Most 
countries have a number of these public/private sector combinations in existence in 
their health systems. A combination of the first and the fourth arrangements are 
predominant in most developing countries (Mills et aI., 2001). However, economic 
theory of the public-private mix is extremely scarce. In addition, evidence of public 
financing and private provision arrangements particularly in developing countries is 
limited. 
2.2.4 Definition of the private sector 
While the public sector is fairly homogenous, the private sector in health is very 
complex and includes all those health care providers working outside the direct 
control of the state. The definition therefore includes (Bennett, 1991): 
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a) Non-profit organisations (non-governmental organisation, and mISSIon or 
church related facilities) 
b) For-profit individuals In group or solo practice (both allopathic and 
traditional); 
c) More complex for-profit multi-institutional forms such as Health 
Maintenance Organisations; and, 
d) For-profit commercial interests. 
Providers may be individual practitioners, groups of practitioners, or facilities (e.g. 
clinics, hospitals, or other institutions). A general typology of health care providers 
includes doctors, paramedical health workers (such as physiotherapists), nurses, 
pharmacies (who play an important role as providers of over-the-counter and 
prescription drugs, and in giving medical advice), and traditional doctors or other 
healers (Brugha and Hanson, 2000; Mills et aI., 2001). The private arrangements can 
also differ in terms of whether the services provided rely on traditional medicine, 
and whether they provide ambulatory or inpatient care (Berman, 2000). 
In many developing countries there is a long tradition of service delivery outside of 
government, with a low involvement of the formal private-for-profit sector and more 
substantial involvement of the not-for-profie sector. Most African countries have a 
strong presence of non-profit private providers such as church health facilities, major 
providers of services in rural areas. The mission sector is the largest part of the non-
profit sector in Africa whose activities mainly originated in colonial and pre-colonial 
2 Non-profit does not imply that non-profit organisations do not make profits but that any profits or 
surpluses that they make are not distributed to shareholders. They are instead retained and reinvested 
in the business (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). 
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times. However, it was only in the 1990s that non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) were recognised to have a significant role in the health sector (W orId Bank, 
1993). The NGO sector is very diversified in terms of size, means of and access to 
finance, control, motivation and roles. Their involvement in health care ranges from 
social transformation and advocacy to more specific aspects of service delivery. 
Green and Matthias (1995) subdivide NGOs activities as service providers into: (a) 
mainstream service delivery; (b) special disease programmes; (c) emergency and 
relief services; (d) pilot projects/research; (e) support to other NGOs; and, (f) 
training. The informal health sector is also present in many developing countries. 
Many private for-profit service providers are present in low- and middle-income 
countries in South Asia and Africa. In India, for example, the private medical sector 
accounts for about 80% of doctors of modem medicine and 60% of hospitals (Ogden 
et aI., 1999a). In Zimbabwe, 66% of doctors work in the private sector (Bennett et 
aI., 1997). In these countries, private provision and expenditure is concentrated at 
lower levels of the system. In countries with higher levels of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, the private sector usually incorporates an insurance sector. In 
South Africa, where 72% of doctors, 75% of specialists, 48% of hospitals and 25% 
hospital beds are provided by the private sector, the expenditure, which pays for 
these services, is channelled through 'medical aid schemes' (price et aI., 1993; van 
Rensburg and van Rensburg, 1999). The private sector in South Africa plays an 
important role in secondary and tertiary level provision. 
It is conventional to define private providers as those who fall outside the direct 
control of government (Bennett, 1991; Smith et a!., 2001). However, there are a 
number of grey areas that are inadequately described by this definition. For example, 
NGOs may receive a considerable proportion of their funding from government, 
blurring the distinction between public and private where conditions are attached to 
these funds. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, governments provide substantial subsidies to 
church providers (Mills et aI., 2001). Measurement of private activity is further 
complicated by the fact that much private sector activity takes place within the 
public sector (e.g. private practice by government physicians, or fee-paying beds in 
public sector hospitals). Numerous studies in developing countries have shown that 
private provision of services account for a large share of health care delivery 
(Birdsall and James, 1992; Griffin and Paqueo, 1993; Uplekar and George, 1993; 
Hanson and Berman, 1998; Berman, 2000; Cornell et aI., 2001). Private health care 
providers are used by both middle and low income groups (Berman, 1996). 
Evidence suggests that the private sector primarily focuses on the provision of acute 
curative services, and that private practitioners' provision of public health services is 
very limited (Bennett et aI., 1997; Hanson and Berman, 1998). However, private 
practitioners are often a dominant source of intervention for many public health 
conditions like malaria, TB, sexually-transmitted infections (STls), diarrhoea and 
respiratory infections (Berman, 1996; Musgrove, 1996; Swan and Zwi, 1997; Brugha 
and Zwi, 1998; Berman, 2000). The main reasons for consulting private sector 
providers are: (1) better geographical accessibility, shorter waiting time, longer or 
more flexible opening hours; (2) greater availability of staff and drugs; (3) greater 
confidentiality in dealing with diseases such as TB, STls, which carry social stigma; 
( 4) perception that private service providers are more considerate, caring and 
sensitive to client concerns; (5) perception, in some settings, that private services are 
technically superior; and, (6) continuity of care (Aljunid, 1995; Swan and Zwi, 1997; 
Uplekar et a!., 1998; Lonnroth, 2000; Schneider et a!., 2001). 
2.2.5 Public-private partnerships in the health sector 
Increasingly, pUblic-private partnerships (PPPs) in many countries are considered an 
important mechanism for solving complex social and health problems 
(Kolehmainen, 1999). The increased importance of this kind of partnership is related 
to many factors, including changes in international economic priorities and the effect 
of these changes on local and national policies, health sector reform, and increasing 
pressures on health resources (Management Sciences for Health, 1999). Public-
private partnership is a formal or informal collaboration among two or more 
organisations engaged in a joint initiative to achieve common objectives (Ridley, 
2001). At least one partner is from the public sector, and at least one is from the 
private sector. 
A large variety of global pUblic-private partnerships, combining the skills and 
resources of a wide range of collaborators, have arisen for product development, 
disease control through product donation and distribution, or the general 
strengthening or coordination of health services (Widdus, 2001). The typology of 
PPPs includes (Buse and Walt, 2001b): 
(a) product-based partnerships (e.g. Mectizan Donation Programme, Malarone 
Donation Programme, Zithromax Donation Programme) 
(b) product-development partnerships (e.g. The Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, Medicines for Malaria 
Venture) 
(c) systems/issues-based partnerships (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Children's 
Vaccine Program; Global Programme to Eliminate Filiariasis; Secure the Future). 
At national level, there are numerous examples of PPPs in operation in health sector. 
In Taiwan, private physicians are contracted to provide sterilisation and IUD 
insertion (Foreit, 1992). In Costa Rica, the contracting out of a broader range of 
public health services has been attempted (Pezza and Bolanos, 1994). In South 
Africa, several reformed health plans have been implemented with partnerships 
being formed amongst public hospitals, factories and groups of doctors (Goudge et 
aI., 2001). Other two examples ofPPP initiatives in South Africa are: 
• An unused public hospital ward is designated for private sector patients of an 
independent practitioners association in return for reasonable payment and 
contribution of free sessions at community clinics by the GPs (or funding an 
account dedicated to the maintenance and upgrading of the public facility as a 
whole, according to the plan approved by hospital management) (Management 
Sciences for Health, 1998). 
• Leasing out vacant space in an academic hospital to a private hospital group (a 
private wing attached to the academic hospital) (Cleary and Thomas, 2002). 
Public-private partnerships at a national level range from small-scale contracting out 
of one or two service components to large-scale sharing of health care provision and 
financing. However, they should be distinguished from the trend to privatisation 
(i.e. the private for-profit sector provision of health services), where the public health 
policy goal and the rules under which for-profit entities operate are set and enforced 
solely by government agencies (Widdus, 2001). 
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Reasons for embarking on health partnerships at both global and national levels are 
many: shifting ideologies and trends in globalisation have highlighted the need for 
closer global governance; a desire on the part of the private sector to be part of 
global regulatory decision-making processes; and, searching for 'win-win' 
interactions in an increasingly interdependent world (Buse and Walt, 2001a). 
However, pUblic-private partnerships in health at a national level are still very rare 
and most of those that exist are small scale. 
Giusti et al (1997) argue that partnerships can help supplement government health 
care services by ensuring access to services in regions or for groups that the 
government cannot adequately cover. Some of the many benefits of public-private 
partnerships include: 
• An increased number of people receiving health care services; 
• Redirection of scarce public resources to provide essential health care needs; 
• Combination of public and private resources to increase the resource base; 
• A source of additional revenue for private sector entities; 
• Improved efficiency and management in health care delivery; 
• Structural improvement through new investments; and, 
• Improved technical competence through training and capacity building efforts. 
Criticisms of partnerships have also been made. One critic of PPPs argues that the 
private sector has several mechanisms for maximising profits which may be in 
conflict with the goal of better health (Hancock, 1998). Among these is the reduction 
of costs by paying low wages and reducing the size of the workforce, thereby 
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making people poorer. Buse and Walt (2001a) argue that public and private sectors 
are driven by differing ethos and principles. 
Literature is beginning to emerge on lessons learned on the 'effectiveness' of global 
health partnerships (Frost and Reich, 1998; Ridley et aI., 1999; Widdus and Evans, 
1999). However, very little is known about how effective PPPs are at national level. 
2.2.6 Involving private providers in the provision of TB treatment 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, due to the specific characteristics of TB 
treatment which causes market for TB treatment to fail, the government in many 
developing countries has a dominant role in TB control (Jack 2001). In high-burden 
countries, the focus of activities aimed at strengthening National Tuberculosis 
Programmes (NTPs) has been on the general health services. However, due to an 
increasing TB burden, related particularly to the global HIV pandemic, it seems 
unrealistic to rely only on existing government services to improve TB control. In 
addition, in order to retain confidentiality, patients co-infected with TB and HIV are 
likely to use private providers (Newall, 2002). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, there is an increasing interest in enhancing the contribution of 
communities to effective ambulatory TB, as part of national TB programme 
activities (Maher et aI., 1999; Maher, 2003). Several published studies show good 
results with community contribution to TB care in various settings (Mushtaque et aI., 
1997; Wilkinson, 1997; MalIa et aI., 1997; Dudley et aI., 2003). A number of cost-
effectiveness studies performed as a part of the 'Community TB Care in Africa' 
project demonstrate that community contribution to TB care can be cost-effective in 
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various African settings (Floyd et aI., 2003; Moalosi et aI., 2003; Nganda et aL 
2003; Okello et aI., 2003; Sinanovic et aI., 2003). However, data on the quality of 
care provided through different approaches to community-based TB care is lacking. 
There are some initiatives that are trying to build a public-private mIX in the 
provision of TB treatment in Asia (WHO, 2001 b). A unique public-private 
partnership project in Hyderabad City in India demonstrated that it is possible to 
involve the private sector for the purposes of TB diagnosis and treatment (Murthy et 
aI., 2001). This PPP model was established on a pilot basis, with collaborative efforts 
between private practitioners and the government, through an intermediary 
organisation (a non-profit hospital). In their study, Murthy et al (2001) conclude that 
the PPP can achieve moderate to high rates of case detection and high rates of 
treatment success. The pUblic-private services also appeared to be more convenient 
to patients. 
Another example of pUblic-private mix models in the provision of TB treatment in 
India involves local NGOs to increase case finding and improve access to direct 
observation of treatment (Rangan et aI., 2003). In the Philippines, a public-private 
mix model in the provision of directly-observed TB treatment, in which the private 
clinics provide the space, staff and operational funds and the public sector provides 
technical assistance, anti-TB drugs, laboratory supplies and forms, was developed. 
Evaluation of the model showed treatment success over 80% (Mantala, 2003). A 
public-private mix project in Vietnam, where private practitioners diagnose and treat 
TB patients according to the NTP guidelines and the NTP provides training, supply 
forms and monitors the collaboration, shows that formal collaboration with private 
practitioners can substantially increase case detection (Quy et aI., 2003a) and 
improve treatment outcome (Quy et aI., 2003b). In Kenya, an NGO provides a 
subsidy on drugs to private hospitals and physicians who in tum follow NTP 
guidelines, notify cases, assist in defaulter retrieval and maintain and submit records 
(World Health Organisation, 2001b). Preliminary results of this intervention show 
840/0 success rate (World Health Organisation, 2001b). 
The various ways in which the public sector can collaborate with the private health 
sector are described above. The majority of the reviewed studies show that most 
public-private mix models depend to some degree upon public financing, mostly in-
kind such as supply of drugs or training. All pUblic-private mix models envisage an 
agency that communicates with private practitioners, and is responsible for looking 
after the 'public health' elements in provision of TB care, such as ensuring quality 
microscopy, regular drug supply, patient support services, absentee retrieval, and 
recording and reporting (W orld Health Organisation, 2001 b). Whilst there is 
empirical evidence on the quality of care provided through pUblic-private 
partnerships for the provision of TB treatment in Asia, evidence on public-private 
partnerships, and the quality of care provided through different partnerships, in 
Africa is limited. In addition, most of the existing initiatives to include private 
providers are small scale. 
Potential problems with expanding private sector development have also been 
recognised. For example, problems associated with under provision of services for 
which no profit can be made, or concentration of private-for-profit providers in 
urban areas, have been reported (Bennett, 1991; Bennett et aL 1997). Bennett et al 
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(1994) suggest five main problems associated with private-for-profit provision: (1) 
the main objective is profit-maximization; (2) failure to address public health; (3) 
lack of integration with government health services; (4) attraction of professionals 
out of the public sector; and (5) provision of poor quality or inappropriate services. 
They suggest that due to different objectives between the government and private 
providers, and the problems of agency relationship (in this case a principal is the 
state and the agent is private provider), mechanisms like regulation, advocacy, 
incentives and monitoring systems must be in place. The following section looks at 
economic theory of incentives and empirical evidence on the use of incentives in 
health care and more specifically tuberculosis treatment. 
2.2.7 Theory of incentives and incentive mechanisms for the private sector 
participation 
Economic theory suggests that problems are likely to arise in any principal-agent 
relationship as the agent is tempted to pursue hislher own goals at the expense of 
those of the principal (Arrow, 1963; Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The transition from 
public to public-private sector treatment of TB raises a range of issues related to 
incentives and structuring relationships to achieve desirable outcomes. What do we 
mean by incentives? For economists, the nature of incentives is the driving rationale 
behind observed market behaviour. Economic incentives are defined as "aI/owing 
individuals to behave in accordance with expected material rewards or favours that 
can be traded for such rewards including leisure" (McPake et aI., 2002). This can be 
contrasted to social norms where people behave in accordance with social rewards 
such as approval or disapproval of others (Lindbeck, 1997). 
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Originally developed in the context of a firm and employee, the economic theory of 
incentives uses the context of agency relationships as its basis: "wherever there is an 
agency relationship, there is a set of incentives through which the principal aims to 
direct the agent to act on her behalf" (McPake et aI., 2002). Essentially because of 
information problems, the behaviour of the agent (e.g. private sector provider) can, 
through some hidden action, lead to a sub-optimal allocation (e.g. lower quality). 
The solution to the problem (e.g. how to affect the behaviour of the agent so that 
desired outcomes are reached) results in different incentive designs dependent on 
observed outcomes. 
In the case where outcomes are difficult to observe, then the solution to the problem 
depends on whether the parties are willing to bear risk. Within this context, the 
incentives must be structured so as to allow for managers or individuals to be willing 
to participate in the firm (the participation constraint). Second, the incentives are 
structured in such a way as to allow for a greater return if there is higher effort than 
the return to the manager for a lower effort (the incentive-compatibility constraint). 
Thus the resulting mechanisms relate rewards to different observed outcomes 
(Kumaranayake, 1998; McPake et aI., 2002). 
Incentives could be either managed or regulated. Due to informational, transaction, 
administrative and political constraints to achieving desired objectives, there has 
been a great interest in finding out whether incentive management is not a better way 
of achieving the objectives of regulation. Whilst incentive management attempts to 
manage an individual's behaviour, incentive regulation adopts market-based criteria. 
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For example, incentive regulation scheme can be 'rules' which regulate verifiable 
outcomes such as price (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). In 
a study that looked at whether monetary incentives can improve the access and 
health of Medicaid residents in nursing homes while saving money, Norton (1992) 
found that the incentive regulation had beneficial effects on access, quality and costs 
of care. The study showed that incentive mechanisms could have much lower 
transaction costs associated with them. However, it also suggested that monitoring is 
still important. 
Incentive management may take two forms McPake et al (2002): 
(1) the government can subsidise or tax regulated firms. Transfers can take several 
forms: direct subsidies (a lump sum payment or a 'price subsidy'), government loans 
at low interest or government guarantees for borrowing on the private markets, and 
transfers of public input. (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
(2) the government can make transfers to firms through its purchasing function. This 
is also a subsidy but is associated with a greater explicitness of contractual 
arrangements. For instance, in the UK, contractual arrangements between health 
authorities and hospitals have been classified as 'block' (equivalent to fixed rate 
subsidies), 'cost-per-case' (equivalent to price subsidies) and 'cost and volume' 
(where a specific price-quantity point is agreed). Examples of incentive management 
practices in developing countries come from Malaysia and Thailand where 
allowances paid to encourage physicians to forgo private practice represent a form of 
subsidy to the services provided by those physicians. 
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Governments have a range of incentive options for influencing providers' behaviour 
in ways consistent with their national health sector goals. Bennett and Zwi (1993) 
list a number of incentive mechanisms that can be used to encourage private for-
profit providers to collaborate with the public sector. They include: (1) providing 
free or subsidised continuing education for private practitioners (has positive quality 
effects); (2) free provision of supplies such as vaccines, condoms and other 
contraceptives to private practitioners to encourage them to provide preventative 
services; (3) supporting the development of the private sector by providing access to 
drugs and other medical supplies at state tender prices or by exempting these 
supplies from customs duties when they are purchased directly by the private sector; 
(4) government financing of certain privately provided services (contracting out 
services); (5) capitation reimbursement (in preference to fee-for-service) to promote 
efficient provider behaviour; and, (6) committees to facilitate public and private 
sector co-operation. These incentive mechanisms are also used to encourage co-
operation between the non-profit and public sectors. Additional incentive and 
collaboration mechanisms that are applied to the NGO sector include (Bennett and 
Zwi, 1993): (a) lump sum annual subsidies (sometime called subventions); (b) 
payment of NGO staff salaries; (c) secondment of public health personnel to work in 
NGO facilities and projects; and, (d) payment of retirement benefits. 
The possibility of utilising incentives as a means of improving the control and 
management of TB has received particular attention internationally (World Health 
Organisation 1994). Some of the examples of incentives/subsidies for TB control 
include: (a) inviting representatives of private practitioners to participate in planning 
TB control activities; (b) involving private practitioners in case-finding activities by 
providing incentives for reporting and contact tracing; (c) providing free diagnostic 
services and drugs, as well as monitoring and outcome evaluation, to patients of 
those private practitioners agreeing to supervise them according to national TB 
guidelines; and, (d) providing the services of support staff such as social workers for 
patient health education and defaulter tracing. Accreditation and franchising have 
been suggested as effective incentives to promote quality of TB treatment in the 
private sector (Brugha and Zwi, 1999; World Health Organisation, 2003b). 
The literature on response to incentives by health care providers observes the broad 
distinction between financial and non-financial motivation or incentive response (see 
Table 2.1 overleaf). Studies on the general practitioners' contracts in the United 
Kingdom highlight the influences on the effectiveness of a pure financial incentive, 
including the level of incentive, the identity of the provider, and socio-economic 
factors relating to the community in question (Lynch 1994; Hughes and Yule 1992). 
Preker and Harding (1999) argue that certain environmental factors, such as 
governance, market environment, and the payment mechanism, and personal factors 
(e.g. altruism or social responsibility) can weaken the influence of financial 
incentives. However, motivating individuals is complex, and theories of 
organisational behaviour have not come up with one generally applicable theory of 
how incentives operate (Handy, 1993). 
Table 2.1: Policy options for influencing provider incentives and behaviour 
Financial incentives 
Capital markets 
• Provide government loans at low interest 
• Provide government guarantees for borrowing on private markets 
I 
• Improve access to low-cost credit and simplified loan application processes 
• Provide access to foreign currency 
Taxes and tariffs 
• Introduce tax waivers, exemptions, and deductibles 
• Provide favourable tariffs and duty-free imports of medical equipment and supplies 
Other subsidies 
• Give direct government subsidies targeted to public health objectives 
• Provide government grants targeted to public health objectives 
Provider payment 
• Selective contracting 
• Ensure appropriate provider payment mechanisms 
• Assure reasonable profit margins (if prices are controlled by the government) 
• Pay government obligations to providers in a timely manner 
• Protect overdrafts in response to government payment delays 
• Give bonuses to serve in underserved areas 
Non-financial incentives 
Regulatory environment 
• Improve ease of entry to the market 
• Improve regulatory processes and reduce bureaucratic controls 
• Disseminate information on regulation and laws 
Market and business environment 
• Purchase selectively 
• Grant access to use government facilities and equipment 
• Provide consumer and market information 
• Support development of an adequately skilled work force 
Human resource development 
• Open training and professional development opportunities to private participants 
• Improve career path for private specialties that are in short supply 
Public-private sector relations 
• Assure clarity and predictability of performance expectations 
• Promote public and private sector provider dialogue 
• Formal partnerships where appropriate (e.g. engage private providers in public health 
programmes 
• Enable referral across public and private providers 
Source: Harding and Preker (2003) 
Le Grand (2003) identifies two possible fonns of motivation: the first type would 
principally respond to financial incentives and is self interested, whilst the second 
assumes that people are predominantly public-spirited or altruistic. Policies 
constructed on one set of assumptions would be markedly different from those 
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constructed on the other. Whilst profit making finns or individuals will be largely 
influenced by financial incentives, it is not known what incentives are most 
important for a non-profit making finn or individual, as very little is known about 
the motivation of any of these types of providers, especially in developing countries 
(Robinson, 1997). In her study on the motivations of public and private managers, 
Steele (1999) found that altruistic motivations existed in the public sector and that 
they were more pronounced than in the private sector. Whilst providing a service to 
the community was the most important goal of public sector managers, improving 
the financial perfonnance of the organisation and achieving organisational targets 
were the main goals of private sector managers. However, there has been a shift in 
beliefs about the motivations of those involved in the public sector which has led to 
policy makers to use market incentives to ensure that the service is provided 
efficiently (Le Grand, 2003). 
Both incentive management and incentive regulation can be implemented through 
contractual arrangements. When designing contracts and restructuring incentives, 
there are two important constraints: the participation constraint - each person is 
willing to participate, and the incentive compatibility constraint - the contract needs 
to structure incentives in order to meet the desired objectives (McPake et aI., 2002). 
However, in the health sector, there are many problems associated with restructuring 
incentive and designing contracts. For instance, the payer organisation may not be 
able to exactly verify what treatments have been administered to each patient. There 
may also be difficulties in verifying the symptoms of disease and the appropriateness 
of diagnosis recorded. Finally, since health outcomes are not easily observable by 
third party payers, contract reimbursement is almost never linked to health outcome. 
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Although it is desirable that contracts have such incentives, it is rarely the case, 
mainly because health outcome is not primarily dependent on health service inputs 
(Forsberg et aI, 2001; McPake et aI., 2002). 
Arguments in favour of the use of market incentives, and especially contracts, in 
publicly financed health services are often couched in terms of potential gains to 
efficiency. It is argued first that increased provider competition will increase 
technical efficiency on the supply side, second that contractual relationships enhance 
efficiency via the incentive structure of the contract, and third that the contracting 
process itself promotes transparency in trading and the decentralisation of 
management responsibility, which will again have beneficial effects in terms of 
efficiency (Broomberg, 1994). There is an assumption that contracts will be 
adequately specified and monitored, allowing such tasks to be fulfilled. However, 
research (McPake and Banda, 1994; Broomberg, 1997; Palmer, 2000; Palmer et aI., 
2003) has highlighted that this may not always be the case, and poor contract design 
or insufficient capacity to monitor may be a feature of many contracted out services. 
In some cases this may result in the poor operation of these services, in others it may 
be less important. Hence the spotlight is shifting from the desirability of contracts 
per se to issues of contract design and the nature and influences upon a range of 
contractual relationships. 
Contracts can be formal/explicit (written and formally binding agreements) and 
informal/implicit (McPake et aI., 2002). The movement from classical to neo-
classical to relational contracts described by McNeil (1974) resembles the movement 
from explicit to informal contracts. Recognition of the likely incompleteness of 
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contracts begs the question on what other forces are at play detennining the 
behaviour of parties in an incompletely defined contractual transaction. Behaviour 
within some contracts may be detennined as much by factors external as internal. 
Institutional economics emphasises the importance of the role of both institutional 
and environmental factors and individual beliefs and motivations in shaping the way 
that contracts operate. 
Effective monitoring of contracts is the major question in the health contracting 
literature. Due to bounded rationality and opportunism 'classical contracts' are not 
only difficult to attempt but also inefficient to monitor (Williamson 1975). Bounded 
rationality arises because "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and 
solVing complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems 
whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world" 
(Simon 1961). Providers can act opportunistically ex-ante in the development of 
monitoring mechanism, and ex-post in their response to the monitoring mechanisms 
imposed (McPake et aI., 2002). Since effective monitoring could be a very costly 
activity, the question to be addressed is, therefore, the type of contract and the degree 
of monitoring that is most likely to minimise transaction costs. 
It is argued that trust can reduce transaction costs associated with contracting 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1995; Newman, 1998; Moore, 1999). The concept of trust 
is increasingly seen as playing an essential role in underpinning efficient contractual 
relationships, reducing the need for complex and expensive infonnation and 
monitoring inherent in principal-agent relationships (Arrow 1973; Deakin and 
Wilkinson 1995; Goddard and Mannion 1998). In her article on trust and the 
development of health care as a social institution, Gilson (2003) suggests that trust 
may enable interactions between the public and private health sectors to function 
effectively, and that " ... the state should not be seen as just a provider, funder, 
manager or regulator of health services. Rather, in relation to health care, its 
central role is to manage the processes through which the meaning of the health 
system to society, and so its contribution to broader societal value, is established." 
There is an increasing interest in selective contracting with the private sector for the 
delivery of health services in developing countries, although there is considerable 
debate over the cost and quality of care which they deliver (Yesudian, 1994; 
McPake, 1997; Swan and Zwi, 1997; Schneider et aI., 2001; Chabikuli et aI., 2002; 
Mills et aI., 2004). The principal evidence relating to contracting in developing 
countries comes from a project on the extent and nature of clinical and non-clinical 
contracting (Alvarez et aI., 1995; McPake and Hongoro, 1995; Beracochea, 1997; 
Bhatia and Mills, 1997; Broomberg et aI., 1997; Gilson et aI., 1997; 
Tangcharoensathien et aI., 1997), and a study on the performance of different models 
of primary care provision in Southern Africa (Mills et aI., 2003). The available 
evidence indicates that while private contractors may be able to deliver services at a 
lower cost than the public sector, when their profit margin is included the cost to the 
public sector may be higher or comparable to direct public provision (Mills, 1997). 
Quality of care may be similar to that in the public sector, but there is growing 
evidence that while private providers often have superior quality in relation to 
cleanliness and maintenance of facilities and sometimes in aspects such as staff 
friendliness, they also frequently have lower technical quality of care. In most of the 
cases, except in the study by Mills et al (2003), the extent of contracting with the 
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commercial sector and for clinical services was found to be limited. With respect to 
NGOs, there have been positive evaluations of service delivery under contracts with 
NGOs to deliver district health services in Cambodia (Souters and Griffiths, 2003), and 
to deliver preventive services in several Latin American countries (Abramson, 1999). 
However there is little evidence on contracting out primary care specifically, and 
questions have been raised about the ability of contracts to control the delivery of such 
broad services in remote rural areas (palmer and Mills, 2003). 
South Africa provides a series of interesting examples of contracts for health care, 
both at the primary level and for hospital care (Broomberg, 1997; Palmer, 2001). 
Contracts between the state and private firms have been used extensively for many 
years to provide long-stay hospital care, on a limited scale for district hospital care, 
and extensively for non-clinical hospital services such as catering and security at 
hospitals. Contracts for primary care are more limited and mainly represent the part-
time district surgeon service. 
2.3 Tuberculosis treatment and the private sector 
2.3.1 TBIHIV epidemic 
Tuberculosis is one of the oldest diseases known3 and yet remains a major health 
problem in developing countries. Rates of TB have been falling in industrialised 
countries throughout much of the 20th century. This decline is associated with 
improvements in socio-economic conditions (Porter, 1991). In addition to improved 
housing and nutrition, the introduction of effective anti-tuberculosis chemotherapy 
3 Dr. Robert Koch discovered Mycobacterium Bacillus in 1882 when TB was very prevalent. 
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contributed to the decline in TB rates in the decades following 1940. In spite of these 
advances, TB has continued to be a major infectious disease threat internationally 
and developing countries have continued to be burdened with large numbers of TB 
cases. The 1980s and 1990s have seen resurgence in international interest in TB due 
to increasing numbers of cases associated with HIV infection and an increasing 
problem of drug resistance. 
Due to infection by Mycobacterium tuberculosis, TB is usually defined as a 
respiratory disease, although extra-pulmonary TB (e.g. miliary, skeletal, meningeal, 
gastro-intestinal) also occur, particularly in children, immigrants from countries 
where tuberculosis is more common and in people with impaired immunity. 
Tuberculosis is spread by airborne droplet nuclei that contain M tuberculosis. Active 
disease occurs when the host immune response cannot contain the replication of M 
tuberculosis associated with initial infection. Whilst other medical conditions, such 
as poorly controlled diabetes mellitus, malnutrition and deficiency of vitamin D or A 
(Willkinson et aI., 2000; Karyadi et aI., 2002), can compromise the immune system 
and predispose to development of active disease, HIV is greatest single risk factor 
for progression to active disease in adults. 
Tuberculosis is the second commonest cause of death from infectious disease, after 
HIV/AIDS (Frieden et aI., 2003). Mortality rates were between 50% and 600/0 before 
chemotherapy became available. In the developing world, TB accounts for 70/0 of all 
deaths and 26% of avoidable adult deaths (World Health Organisation, 2001a). In 
2000, twenty-two countries were responsible for 80%) of the global TB burden 
(Raviglione, 2003). Although TB affects nearly all age groups, the greatest burden of 
TB incidence and mortality is concentrated in adults aged 5-59 years. In 2000, there 
were an estimated 8.3 million new tuberculosis cases, up from 8.0 million in 1997 
(World Health Organisation, 200tb, Corbett et aI., 2003). The rise is mainly due to a 
20% increase in incidence in African countries most affected by the HIV / AIDS 
epidemic. 
Besides being a serious public health problem, TB causes a particularly enormous 
burden to societies and economies in the developing world. However, the social and 
cultural factors that affect treatment behaviour and compliance have been 
inadequately studied. Tuberculosis is a disease that affects the most vulnerable and 
marginalized popUlations in all countries ... "the context of tuberculosis is one of 
social and economic deprivation and marginalisation" (Ogden et aI., 1999a). In 
developing countries, TB is the third most common cause of morbidity and mortality 
combined amongst women aged 15-44 years (Diwan and Thorson, 1999). Literature 
on gender4 and tuberculosis suggests that the stigma associated with tuberculosis 
seems to have a greater impact on women than on men (Diwan and Thorson, 1999). 
Since 70% of the world's poor are women who face the greatest obstacles to seeking 
care and getting successful tuberculosis treatment (Diwan and Thorson, 1999), 
gender differences may, therefore, influence rates of compliance. 
In the developing world, tuberculosis has always been a major public health 
problem, but the last decade has seen rising numbers ofTB cases due to TB-HIV co-
infection. In 2000, an estimated 11 % of new adult tuberculosis cases worldwide 
4 "Gender refers not only to the physiological differences between sexes but also to the variety of 
behaviours, expectations, and roles that exist within a social, economic, and cultural context" (Diwan 
and Thorson, 1999). 
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were infected with HIV (Corbett et aI., 2003). Tuberculosis is the commonest HIV-
related disease in the developing world (Elliott and Hawken, 1997; Godfrey-Faussett 
and Ayles, 2003, Corbett et aI., 2003). Around 11 million people are co-infected 
worldwide, with a large majority in sub-Saharan Africa (World Health Organisation, 
2000b). It is expected that by 2020, TB and HIV infection together will account for 
92% of adult deaths from infectious diseases and that HIV infection as a risk factor 
will account for 25% of the TB burden (World Health Organisation, 2000b). Rates 
among HIV infection among TB patients exceed 60% in countries like Botswana, 
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Corbett et aI., 2002). It is estimated that 
tuberculosis occurs in 40-60% of the HIV -infected (World Health Organisation, 
2000b). 
Several studies have indicated that active TB can cause progression of HIV disease 
and that HIV -infected patients with TB have a shorter survival and a higher tendency 
to acquire new opportunistic infections than an HIV -infected person who has not 
have TB, even when matched by HIV disease stage (Braun et aI., 1991; Whalen et 
aI., 1995). The extraordinarily high rate of co-infection with TB and HIV in 
developing countries has led to significant morbidity and mortality (Lucas et aI., 
1993; Murray and Lopez, 1997; Dye et aI., 1999; World Health Organisation, 
2002a), and proved to be a problem with enormous public-health consequences 
(Raviglione et aI., 1992; Harries et aI., 2001; Raviglione, 2003). In high HIV 
prevalence countries TB is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality (De Cock, 
1992; Murray and Lopez, 1997; Harries et aI., 2001). HIV promotes progression to 
active TB in both people with recently acquired (Di Perri, 1993; UNAIDS, 2002) 
and with latent Mycobacterium tuberculosis infections (Raviglione et al., 1992; 
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Elliott and Hawken, 1997; Sonnenberg et aI., 2001). In the developing world, IB 
accounts for 7% of all deaths and 260/0 of avoidable adult deaths (World Health 
Organisation, 2001a). In 2000, twenty-two countries were responsible for 80% of the 
global TB burden (Raviglione, 2003). 
2.3.2 Tuberculosis control 
The overall objective of any IB control programme is to reduce mortality, morbidity 
and the transmission of the disease. Ihe key to effective prevention and control of 
IB is the detection and cure of infectious, particularly smear-positive cases of 
pulmonary TB. The main components of a TB control programme are detection and 
treatment of TB, and prevention of TB thorough BeG vaccination and 
chemoprophylaxis. 
HIV -related TB cases are an additional burden on the already scarce resources in 
developing countries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa where the epidemic is the 
highest. A study in a rural South African hospital showed that in the period 1991-
1998, total district hospital admissions increased by 81 % and adult IB ward 
admissions increased by 360% (Floyd et aI., 1999). Negative implications that HIV 
epidemic has on a TB control programme and its resource requirements have not 
been documented on a country-level. 
Although economic studies have been undertaken on a variety of IB control topics, 
they have tended to be cost and cost-effectiveness analyses. In high-burden 
countries, cost studies have analysed total or per patient diagnostic and treatment 
costs from the perspective of health service providers (Barnum, 1986: Anand et aI., 
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1995; Dick and Henchie, 1998; Wyss et aI., 2001) and patients and/or households 
(Croft and Croft, 1998; Schoeman and Dick, 1998; Kamolratankul et aI., 1999; Wyss 
et aI., 2001). The most commonly studied topics in cost-effectiveness studies in 
high-burden countries have been the use of community-based care (Islam et aI., 
2002; Floyd et aI., 2003; Moalosi et aI., 2003; Nganda et aI., 2003; Okello et aI., 
2003; Sinanovic et aI., 2003), followed by evaluation of alternative approaches to 
delivery of short-course chemotherapy (Saunderson, 1995; Floyd et aI., 1997; 
Wilkinson et aI., 1997; Xu et aI., 2000; Khan et aI., 2002) and comparison of short-
course and standard chemotherapy (Joesoef et aI., 1989; Murray et aI., 1991; 
Kamolratankul et aI., 1993; Saunderson, 1995; Suarez et aI., 2003). The results of 
Floyd's review of 31 cost and 66 cost-effectiveness studies on TB control has found 
that in developing countries the main impact of economic studies has been 
influencing policy and practice on the use of short-course chemotherapy, justifying 
the implementation of community-based care in Africa, and helping to mobilise 
funding for TB control based on the argument that it is a 'good buy' for governments 
(Floyd, 2003). 
Several studies indicated that at US$I-3 per Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) 
in low-income countries, and US$5-7 per DALY in middle-income countries, short 
course chemotherapy for smear-positive tuberculosis is one of the most cost-
effective health interventions available (Murray et aI., 1991; World Bank, 1993; De 
Jonghe et aI., 1994). However, evidence on cost-effectiveness of interventions such 
as preventive therapy, active case finding, screening and infection control is limited. 
In addition to the cost to the health system, direct and indirect costs borne by the 
patient are equally important for estimating overall societal impact of the disease. A 
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study in Uganda showed that costs borne by the patient may considerably exceed 
those incurred by the provider, largely because of the assumed loss of income 
(Saunderson, 1995). Similarly, Nair et al (1997) found that most patients report a 40-
60% reduction in income because of their illness. Based on findings from India, 
Uplekar and Rangan (1996) concluded that on average patients spend almost half of 
their monthly income on their TB treatment. In their study on economic impact of 
tuberculosis at the household level in Thailand, Kamolratanakul et al (1999) found 
that illness-related costs particularly affected patients with incomes below the 
poverty level. They also found that, in this group, average out-of-pocket expenditure 
for the disease amounted to more that 15% of their annual household income, while 
incomes were reduced by 5% due to illness-related effects. In the review of 
tuberculosis control in India, Ogden and colleagues (l999a) state that the financial 
burden borne by TB patients may affect completion and continuity of treatment. 
The internationally recommended tuberculosis control strategy, called the directly 
observed therapy, short course (DOTS)5, embraces passive case detection by means 
of smear microscopy, directly observed treatment (DOT) with the recording and 
reporting of treatment outcomes, together with the mechanisms to ensure a regular 
drug supply (World Health Organisation, 1994). Short-course chemotherapy is the 
most effective treatment for most patients with TB, and direct observation helps 
many patients to complete to 6-8 month treatment regimen (Iseman et aI., 1993; 
5 While WHO maintained that DOTS contained five elements, only one of which was directly 
observed therapy (DOT), many believed that what was being pushed by WHO was direct~y observed 
therapy only, an approach that is controversial, considered by some to be both operatIOnally and 
ethically problematic. These concerns centred largely on the perception that DOTS was developed on 
the basis of a few carefully controlled studies, mainly in Africa. and was being transferred to other 
settings with different health sen'icc, social and economic contexts, in which the DOT component in 
particular might be problematic to implement (Ogden et aI., 2003). 
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Bayer and Wilkinson, 1995; Fox, Ellard and Mitchison 1999' Iseman 2000' 
, , , , 
Volmink et aI., 2000). 
The effectiveness of DOTS strategies for the management of ambulatory cases of TB 
has been reported in many studies (Fox, 1958; Moodie 1967; Morse 1996). In order 
to promote access to effective TB treatment, the WHO and the International Union 
Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease recommend the integration of standard 
national tuberculosis programmes with general health services (W orId Health 
Organisation, 1994; Enarson 1991). Limitations in the provision of widely accessible 
TB treatment through this approach includes an inadequate health service 
infrastructure in many countries, insufficient decentralisation to ensure adequate 
access to care, and human and financial resource requirements that exceed locally 
available resources (Maher et a11999; Frieden and Driver, 2003). 
2.3.3 Tuberculosis treatment in the private sector 
In many high-burden countries, private providers are an important part of the health 
system. Utilisation of private practitioners for disease such as STIs and TB is quite 
significant, possibly because of increased confidentiality (Swan and Zwi, 1997; 
Schneider et aI., 2001). The few available studies suggest that in many low-income 
TB endemic countries, with large public health sectors, private physicians, 
traditional healers and private pharmacists playa significant role in the initial stages 
of health seeking by TB symptomatic individuals (Lonnroth et aI., 1999; Hurtig et 
aI., 2000). In Asia, the majority of TB patients get their diagnosis and treatment from 
private medical practitioners (Juvenkar et aI., 1995; Uplekar and Rangan. 1996; 
Uplekar et aI., 1998; Lonnroth, 2000; Lonnroth et al.. 2001: World Health 
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Organisation, 2003a). However, case detection and cure rates in the private sector 
are unknown and little information is available on the size of TB caseload mana oed 
::;, 
in the private sector. Notification of TB cases from the private sector is rare in 
developing countries. India, for example, has the highest burden of TB and the 
largest private sector that manages half of the prevalent cases without notifying them 
(World Health Organisation, 2001b). 
The large share of first contacts with private practitioners has important implications 
for TB control. Concerning TB treatment, a number of authors have identified 
deficiencies in private sector behaviour. Studies that have examined the prescribing 
behaviour of private practitioners in treating TB found private practitioners deviate 
from standard TB management practices (Uplekar et aI., 1998; Lonnroth et aI., 1999; 
Hurtig et aI., 2000). In one study of the TB treatment practices of private 
practitioners in Bombay, the physicians were found to use 80 different regimens for 
the treatment of TB between them, most of them inappropriate and unnecessarily 
costly (Uplekar and Rangan, 1993). Other studies from India have found that almost 
half of the TB patients attending private practitioners failed to complete the 
treatment (Uplekar et aI., 1998) and that over three quarters of patients seeing private 
providers received an X-ray instead of a sputum test (Uplekar, 1999). Hong et al 
(1995) found that in Korea sputum examination was neglected by general 
practitioners and treatment regimens were often inappropriate. Olle-Goig et al (1999) 
document poor adherence to prescribing norms in Bolivia. Studies in Vietnam have 
shown similar patterns of health care provision for TB by private sector providers: 
little use of appropriate diagnostic tests, delays in establishing the diagnosis and 
commencing treatment, and poor referral to the best available public sector sen'ices 
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(Lonnroth et aI., 1999; Lonnroth, 2000). There is a concern that these shortcomings 
in private sector TB care may promote resistance to the drugs that are essential for 
controlling infections (World Health Organisation, 1994; Brugha and Zwi, 1998; 
1999; Weil, 2000). 
Evidence from India illustrates that the problem of access is central to people's 
ability to obtain and maintain appropriate TB treatment (Ogden et aI., 1999b). Health 
sector reforms aimed at improving access through an increased collaboration with 
the private sector are seen to be beneficial to TB control (Baris, 2000; Kumaresan et 
aI., 2000; Lonnroth 2000; Miller, 2000; Weil, 2000). Whilst involving the private 
sector may improve quality of care, insufficient incentives to collaborate in TB 
activities (especially case holding), no improvement in technical capacity, and poor 
outcomes and drug resistance are potential risks with involving the private sector in 
the provision of TB treatment (World Health Organisation, 1994; Brugha and Zwi, 
1998; 1999; Weil, 2000). 
Public sector collaboration with private providers can range from prOVISIon of 
information and education to formal public-private partnerships with small-scale 
contracting of service components or larger-scale sharing of health care provision 
and financing (Gilson and Mills, 1995; Mills et aI., 2002). Public-private 
partnerships seek to complement rather than substitute for public health services. 
Partnerships with traditional healers, community-based organisations and private 
practitioners can provide a number of benefits, including increased numbers of 
people receiving services, leveraging of additional resources, improved private 
provider technical capacity, and adherence to national protocols helping to nlinimise 
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drug resistance (Uplekar, 2003). Public-private partnership arrangements with 
private practitioners have been shown to work (Chee, 2003; Newell et aI., 2004), but 
little has been done on the economic aspects of financing and relative efficiency of 
these arrangements (Uplekar, 2003; Newell et aI., 2004; Mahendradhat and Utarini, 
2004). 
In summary, tuberculosis imposes epidemiological, social and economic burdens in 
many developing countries. Tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment is characterised by 
many market failures and has therefore become the main responsibility of 
government. Whilst the few available studies in Asia show that the private sector 
plays an important role in TB treatment, and suggests a wide-range in quality and 
performance, there is no evidence on the extent of diagnosis and treatment of TB in 
the private sector in Africa. 
2.4 Conclusion and unanswered questions 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of 
government, public-private mix in the health sector, and economic incentives. 
Economic theory shows that there are potentially many conflicting roles for the 
government. Whilst neo-classical economic theory provides guidance as to which 
roles government should perform (based on the type and extent of market failure), it 
appears unable to offer much of the understanding of the precise form this 
intervention should take (Bennett et aI., 1997; Jack, 2001). New institutional 
economics, on the other hand, suggests that high transaction costs, created by the 
problem of imperfect information in the principal-agent relationship, is one more 
reason for a dominant govemn1ent role in provision. 
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The reVIew has identified a number of key gaps and unanswered questions 
concerning private sector involvement in the provision of TB treatment and public-
private mix. Models of public-private partnership are scarce, especially In 
developing countries, and economic analysis of pUblic-private mix is limited. In 
addition, documented literature on practical efforts or experiments involving the 
private sector in developing countries is extremely scanty. There is a growing 
international literature on issues related to pUblic-private sector collaboration and co-
ordination (Bennett et aI., 1997; Mills et aI., 2001; Brugha and Zwi, 2002). However, 
there is limited data on public-private partnerships in health, and even less disease-
specific partnerships, at a national level. 
Growing recognition of the importance of private providers in the health sectors of 
developing countries has generated evidence on the behaviour of private health care 
providers, particularly focusing on cost and quality of care. Documented literature on 
cost-effectiveness and quality of care of the private sector provision of TB treatment 
is, however, lacking. Although there is some evidence on the size and scope of 
private health care activities in developing countries, the empirical information base 
for policy-making is still very limited. Information on provider incentives and 
regulation of private providers in developing countries is scarce and does not allow 
for generalisable conclusions (Hongoro and Kumaranayake, 2000; Kumaranayake et 
aI., 2000a). 
The few examples of how to link private providers to TB control programmes and 
how to create a public-private partnership in order to improve TB treatment come 
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from Asia. Whilst the success of community-based care and involvement of local 
NGOs in direct observation of TB treatment has been documented, evidence on the 
involvement of private for-profit providers in Africa is scarce. For instance, there is a 
lack of published evidence on the value of linking employer based health care 
providers and private practitioners to TB programmes. Assessment of the extent and 
nature of private sector involvement in TB care is therefore needed. There is a need 
for the existing pUblic-private partnership pilot projects to be evaluated in terms of 
health outcome, cost-effectiveness, equity and quality of care. 
In the case of TB treatment, whilst much quantitative data has been collected on 
coverage of TB patients in the public sector, there is relatively little knowledge of 
the actual caseload and types of patients treated in the private (for-profit and not-for 
profit) sector. This information is essential not just for surveillance and monitoring 
but also to emphasise the need to engage with the private sector. In addition, there is 
no evidence on cure rates in the private sector. In many high-burden countries, 
private health care providers play an important part of the health system. However, 
infonnation on what the private sector is doing for TB control is lacking. 
Refonns in health care systems of developing countries frequently focus on 
'incentive compatibility' or 'getting incentives right' but a body of convincing 
empirical research on the effects of various incentives mechanisms on provider 
behaviour in developing countries is lacking. Health sector reforms also aim to use 
provider payments to optimise the utilisation of scarce health care resources, 
transform clinical practice, and improve the quality of care. McPake et al (2002) 
define this concept as . 'the process of designing mechanisms to restructure the 
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incentives facing individuals in order to achieve a desirable outcome". However, 
evidence on the most appropriate provider incentives which ensure that patients in 
the private sector receive good quality TB treatment, is scarce. There is also a need 
to explore different motivations for participation in pUblic-private partnerships for 
the provision of TB treatment, and based on the motivations, incentive structures 
suitable for different providers. 
There are a few studies on the TB epidemic and its implications for health care 
resources (Kumaranayake et aI., 2001; Floyd et aI., 2002). However, the implications 
that the HIV epidemic has for TB control and its resource requirements have not yet 
been estimated on a country-level. Options on the suitable pUblic-private mix in the 
financing and delivery of TB treatment have not yet been given adequate 
consideration by most national tuberculosis programmes. Given the scale of the 
HIV / AIDS epidemic in many developing countries, and its impact on TB caseloads, 
the existing levels of resources are likely to have to increase in future, and additional 
funds will be required to cope with the problem. There is a need for an assessment of 
the resources required to provide TB diagnosis and treatment over the next five to 
ten years in the specific context of the HIV / AIDS epidemic. 
On the basis of these knowledge gaps, the broad objective of this study is to evaluate 
whether improved TB treatment can be achieved by enhancing partnership between 
the private and public sectors in African settings. The next chapter provides some 
specific background to understanding of context in which pUblic-private partnerships 
exist with an emphasis on the public-private mix in the South African health sector, 
and the burden of the dual TBIHIV epidemic. 
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Chapter 3 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT - SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review has noted the potentially important role played by context in 
the performance of pUblic-private partnerships. The choice of a case study approach 
aimed to allow for this to be taken into account. This chapter provides background 
and details of the context in which the pUblic-private partnerships operate. It also 
gives some background information on the dual TBIHIV epidemic. Whilst chapter 2 
provided an overview of the TBIHIV epidemic in developing countries, this chapter 
focuses on South Africa-specific data on the impact of the dual TBIHIV epidemic. 
This chapter aims to provide some specific background and context to understanding 
the results presented from the case studies in chapters 5 - 8. The chapter starts with 
an overview of public-private mix in the South African health sector, with a 
particular emphasis on financing and structure of the public and private sectors, the 
distribution of human and physical resources between the two sectors, and utilisation 
of the private sector. Severe human and budgetary resource constraints faced by the 
South African government, which affect the current functioning and capacity in the 
public sector, are discussed. South Africa's powerful private health sector, as well as 
government policy towards it, is described. The latest policy documents on public-
private partnerships, recently recognised as a strategic policy objective, are critically 
reviewed. Lastly, the current and predicted trends of tuberculosis and HIV in South 
Africa over the 1998-2005 period are discussed. 
3.2 Methods 
Document review was the main method used in this chapter. Documents relating to 
policy on the role of the private sector in health, forms of interaction between the 
public and private sectors, focusing exclusively on PPPs, and policy obj ectives of 
PPPs in health were sought. The following policy documents ranging from 1997 to 
2001 relating to policies on the pUblic-private interactions in South Africa were 
accessed: 
1. The White Paper for the Transformation of Health System for South Africa 
(National Department of Health, 1997) 
2. The Health Sector Strategic Framework, 1999-2004 (National Department of 
Health, 1999) 
3. PubliclPrivate Partnerships in Health: National Department of Health Policy 
Framework (National Department of Health, 2000a) 
4. The National Treasury Manual on PPPs Projects (National Department of 
Health, 2001 b) 
5. Policy Framework on Public-Private Interactions (National Department of 
Health, 2001 c) 
3.3 Public-private mix in the South African health sector 
This section briefly reviews the current context of health care delivery in South 
Africa, highlighting the organisation, financing and structure of the public and 
private sectors. It also provides a review of the policy context for public-private 
sector activities in order to contextualise individual PPPs through broader 
consideration of the way in which the two sectors interact, that is the overall 
public/private mix of health care provision. 
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South Africa had a population of approximately 45 million in 2002 (Statistics South 
Africa, 2002), with around 50% of the popUlation living in urban areas. It is 
classified as an upper-middle income country with a gross 2002 national income of 
US $3 020 per capita (World Bank, 2002). Total annual expenditure on health per 
capita was US $222 in 2001, or 8.6% of the GDP, slightly higher than average for 
middle-income countries (World Health Organisation, 2004). However, the health 
status of the majority of South Africans does not reflect this relatively high level of 
spending. Whilst the private sector enjoys relatively substantial resources, a weaker, 
until recently very fragmented public health sector, struggles to serve the majority of 
the population. As a result, accessibility and quality of health resources vary 
enormously across the country, with the majority of South Africans receiving 
inferior care (McIntyre et aI., 1995; McIntyre and Gilson, 2002). The majority of 
resources in the health sector are spent on a minority of citizens, a reflection of 
South Africa's inequality. 
3.3.1 Health sector financing 
The South African health system is characterised by strong public and private sectors 
with multiple sources of revenue. The public sector provides care for the majority of 
the public (the indigent and low-income population), while the private sector serves 
more affluent groups that are able to afford medical scheme coverage. It is estimated 
that in 2001 private expenditure on health care was almost 59% of total health care 
spending, (World Health Organisation, 2004a). In 1999, government was the largest 
source of health care finance (44% of total finances), followed by households (39%) 
which either pay contributions to medical schemes and other forms of private 
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Insurance or pay out-of-pocket for health care goods and services (Doherty et aI., 
2002). The third source of finances is employers (private firms and government-
owned entities) (17% contribution) which fund their employees through health 
services provided at the workplace, or through contributing to different forms of 
private insurance on behalf of their employees (Doherty et aI., 2002). Finally, donors 
and non-governmental organisations contribute a small proportion of overall health 
care financing (0.1 %). More specific information about the financing and structure 
of the two sectors is presented in the sections below. 
The public health sector 
The financing and structure of the public health sector is directly related to South 
Africa's system of fiscal federalism. Public expenditure on health is financed almost 
entirely through general taxation, with local authority revenue, user fees, provincial 
revenue, and donor funding totalling less than 6% of comprehensive health spending 
in 1999 (Thomas et aI., 2000). Provinces receive a share of the central government's 
tax revenue that they then decide how to spend, subject to the constraint that 850/0 of 
their budget must go to education, health, and social welfare (McIntyre et aI., 1999). 
Overall government spending limits are determined in a medium-term fiscal 
framework, which uses budget deficit and tax to GDP ratio targets set by the 
Department of Finance's macro economic strategy, known as the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (Thomas et aI., 2000). This strategy has the 
explicit objective of deficit reduction in order to improve business confidence and 
encourage foreign investment. In order to remain within these limits, the South 
African budget in real terms increased only marginally from R 158 billion in 1995/6 
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to R160.9 billion in the 2001101 budget (McIntyre et aI., 1998). This means that the 
Department of Health was faced with the task of building up the capacity of public 
sector health services in the context of a budget that was shrinking in real per capita 
terms. 
There has been significant reorganisation of the health sector, even within the 
environment of constrained health care resources. To date decentralisation has 
involved streamlining of the National Department of Health (NDoH), the creation of 
Provincial Departments of Health and the devolution of powers to the provinces for 
operational decision-making in health care delivery (Gilson et aI., 1999). Provinces 
are now mandated to provide hospital and primary health care (PHC) services and 
determine subsidies for local authorities to provide health care services. The process 
of decentralisation - of devolving authority, responsibility, and resources from the 
national to the provincial level - and from the provincial to the district level, is by no 
means complete. Provincial departments of health still lack the capacity to perfonn 
some of their functions (for example, licensing and inspection of private hospitals), 
and management structure and capacity at the district level is not yet strong 
(Soderlund et aI., 1998; Barron and Sankar, 2000). These challenges must be viewed 
in historical context: over the past 8 years, the government has made considerable 
progress in transfonning the fractured, unequal, race-based health systems it 
inherited in 1994 to a more rational and unified system with central coordination and 
provincial/district service delivery (Buch, 2000). 
The structure and responsibilities of the public health sector are laid out in the 
National Health Bill (National Department of Health, 2001a). The NDoH is 
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responsible for developing health policy and legislation, setting goals and priorities, 
creating nonns and standards of care (to ensure equitable and affordable health care 
provision), and coordinating issue-specific programmes. Provincial departments of 
health are responsible for day-to-day operation of public health services in their 
province, which they do through a district-based system. Local government has been 
made constitutionally responsible for delivering of municipal health services, 
including all primary care services. Given these responsibilities and the financing 
process, provincial departments of health enjoy considerable autonomy, although the 
NDoH does retain the ability to influence provincial health spending by issuing 
conditional grants. In 1999, excluding debt service costs and a contingency reserve, 
over 44% of government resources were allocated to the national government, about 
54% to the provincial government and 1.3% to the local government (Thomas et aI., 
2000). In addition, public sector salaries and benefits and regulations regarding 
personnel transfers are largely detennined at the national level, which further limits 
provincial discretion and control. The main source of local government finance is 
local taxes and property rates, supplemented through lump sum allocations from the 
national (and provincial) level. 
The private health sector 
Private health provision in South Africa can be divided into a large, corporate private 
for-profit hospital sector and a smaller, rather heterogeneous private non-profit 
sector consisting of workplace health services and non-governmental organisations. 
The private-for-profit hospital industry is by far the largest section of non-state 
hospital provision, and consists of a mixture of independent facilities, and those 
belonging to large hospital groups. 
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Medical schemes are a major means of financing private health care, although they 
provided coverage for less than 17% of population in 1998 (Goudge et aI., 2001). It 
is important to emphasise that medical schemes are not the only source of private 
sector financing. Out-of-pocket payments and employers (primarily mining industry) 
comprised about 25% of total private sector fmancing in 1998 (Cornell et aI., 2001) 
(see Table 3.1 below). 
Table 3.1: Private sector expenditure by financing intermediary, 1998 
Financin2 Intermediary Percenta2e share 
InsurancerPre-payrnent 75.7% 
Medical schemesa 73.0% 
Health insuranceb 1.4% 
Worker's compensationC 1.3% 
Firms direct expenditure 1.8% 
Mining industryC 1.4% 
Other firmsc 0.4% 
Household's out-of pocket 22.5% 
Medical scheme membersd 16.1% 
Non-scheme membersd 6.4% 
Total 100.00/0 
Total expenditure R33 254000 
Institutional coverage as % of populatione 17.1% 
Source: Cornell et al (200]) 
a Medical schemes are non-profit associations funded primarily out of contributions from employers and 
employees. 
b Health insurance policies cover certain health related costs and are offered by life and short-term insurance 
companies. 
C Expenditure by firms is over and above their medical scheme contributions on behalf of their employees and is 
used for direct expenditure for on-site health services and services funded through the Workmen's Compensation 
mechanism. Industry-specific services range from limited workplace health services to comprehensive care at 
mining hospitals. 
d Direct expenditure by individuals or 'out-of-pocket' expenditure includes: 'schemes gap' payments, 
representing the difference between the fees charged by private health services providers and the amount 
reimbursed by medical schemes; payment by non-scheme members for consultations with private doctors and for 
the purchase of prescribed drugs; user fees at public sector hospitals; and spending on over-the-counter medicines 
by all categories of patients. 
e Includes medical schemes and mines. 
Like the public sector, the private health sector is undergoing significant changes. In 
the early 1990s, the majority of private health spending was financed through closed 
enr Inlent, tax d ductible employment-based medical schemes that paid 
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independent private practitioners on a fee-for-service basis on behalf of their 
members (Soderlund at aI., 1998). As would be expected given the resulting 
incentive structure, and as confirmed by several specific studies, doctors provided 
more expensive services than clinically needed (Soderlund et aI., 1998; Broomberg 
and Price, 1990). 
Due to premium increases that have risen at double the rate of inflation 1 and changes 
to the Medical Schemes Act in early 1990s, the schemes have begun to adopt a 
variety of cost containment measures, including co-payments, pre-authorisation, and 
limited benefits packages (Soderlund et aI., 1998). The cost explosion in the private 
health insurance market has led to greater enthusiasm by employers for lower cost 
alternatives to provide cover for their workforce, encouraging the arrival of low cost 
insurance models based on managed care principles. For all levels of care, medical 
aid administrators have moved increasingly towards the use of contracts with 
provider groups that contain an element of risk-sharing as well as greater reliance on 
the use of formularies and capitation payments to control costs. New chains of 
private clinics such as Primecure, CareCross, and MediCross (one of the potential 
partners for the PPP in TB treatment) are moving into this market by offering, via 
medical aid schemes, a low cost capitated cover for primary care services. Medical 
aid administrators then purchase hospital cover in a similar manner from a different 
group of providers and create a comprehensive package of low cost cover to market 
to industrial companies for their workforce. 
I From 1990-1995, premiums rose by more than 100%, whilst the Consumer Price Index rose by 
about ::;0° () (Soderlund et al.. 1998). 
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The expenence of private providers with medical schemes and cost containment 
measures, and concerns about the quality of care, are both important issues that must 
be incorporated into the analysis of the private sector engagement in the provision of 
TB-DOTS. This is discussed in next section. 
3.3.2 Human and physical resources 
Most health care professionals work in the private sector, including the majority of 
GPs (McIntyre et aI., 1995; Tollman and Rispel, 1995) and the private sector cannot 
be ignored in any description of primary health care delivery in South Africa (see 
Table 3.2). These figures conceal two important human constraints in the public 
sector. First, doctors tend to move from the public to the private sector as they gain 
experience, drawn in part by the prospect of higher wages2• Second, there are 
shortages of doctors and nurses in the public sector in many places, exacerbated in 
part by the movement to the private sector (and by emigration) and in part by the 
difficulty of transferring employees to underserved areas (van Rensburg and van 
Rensburg, 1999). 
Table 3.2: Health personnel and resources by sector in 1998 
Personnel or Resource Total Number Proportion in Private 
Type Sector 
GPs 19700 72% 
Specialists 7800 75% 
Nurses 173 600 41 % 
Phannacists 9700 88% 
Hospitals 704 48% 
Hospital beds 144000 25% 
.. Source: van Rensburg and van Rensburg, 1999; StatIstIcs South AfrIca, 2000 
2 Whilst clo e t 0% doctors with 0-5 years of experience are in the public sector approximately 
70% of d t r with 16-20 year of e perience practice in the private sector ( oderlund et al. 199 ). 
The majority of doctors in both the private and public sector work in urban areas 
and this pattern is mirrored by the average district income data for urban areas. 
However, the proportion of doctors working in the private and public sectors in rural 
areas is similar to that for doctors in urban areas (see Figure 3.1 overleaf). 
Figure 3.1 Number of doctors in the public and private sectors by location (rural/urban) and by 
income quartile* (1 is lowest) in 1998 
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* Quartile refers to the average annual income per family member. Quartile I indicates the poorest forth of the population, 
and quartile four the richest fourth of the populations. 
In addition, in the districts from the lowest income quartile there are as many private 
as public doctors, and almost twice as many in the second-lowest quartile (Soderlund 
et aI., 1998). Regardless of their patient mix (i.e. whether or not most of their 
patients are covered by medical schemes), most private doctors continue to practice 
independently (sometimes in Independent Practitioner Associations), with the 
exceptions of those employed by the mining industry or in the few health 
maintenance organisations (HMOs) and commercial companies that exist (Soderlund 
et aI., 1998). Physicians (public and private) are required to register annually with 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa and to undertake about fifty hours 
per year of continuing professional development, but in practice there is little 
monitoring of individual doctors (Soderlund et aI., 1998' Health Professions Council 
f uth Africa 2002 . 
The reforms in the medical schemes are in their early stages, and the extent to which 
they will affect private providers is unknown. Some analysts believe that there is 
already some saturation in the market for general practitioner services, with private 
GPs having to rely increasingly on uninsured, cash-paying patients (Soderlund et aI., 
1998). General practitioners have to compete for clients, not only amongst GPs, but 
between GPs and other private providers. A new trend in urban areas are private 
clinics, such as those described in the financing section above, where patients pay a 
flat fee to be seen by a nurse clinician and where necessary a doctor, and to receive 
drugs. These clinics are strongly branded and are favoured by patients for their 
cleanliness, politeness and prompt service (palmer et aI., 2003). In rural areas, 
doctors are often employed as district surgeons or medical officers as well as having 
their own private practices. In their private practices, doctors provide care both to 
those with medical insurance and those paying a flat fee per consultation. 
The 1995 October Household Survey data suggest that 31 % of all South Africans 
who seek treatment for an illness or injury do so in the private sector (Soderlund et 
aI., 1998). Figure 3.2 overleaf shows that although the use of the private sector is 
consistently higher for higher income quintiles, there is a considerable proportion of 
poorer groups that are paying for heath care. These utilisation figures suggest that 
direct costs are not the only determinant of health service utilisation and that patients 
are increasingly unwilling to accept inadequate, poor quality services. A study on the 
desirability of contracting out primary care to private providers suggests that the 
patient choice of prin1ary care provider is mainly influenced by perceptions of the 
better quality treatInent available from private doctors (Palmer. 1999). \Vhi 1st pri \"ate 
sector use in rural areas is partly due to inaccessibility of public servIces and 
perceptions of the quality treatment available from private doctors (Palmer, 1999), in 
urban areas it is suggested to be predominantly due to preferences for privacy 
(Rispel et aI., 1995), speed of service (Usdin, 1993) and perceptions of higher quality 
of care (Rispel et aI., 1995). 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of those ill or injured who used private services by income quintile* 
using the 1995 October Household Survey data 
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... Quintile refers to the average annual income per family member. Quintile 1 indicates the poorest fifth of the 
population, and quartile five the richest fifth of the populations. 
However, there has been concern about the quality of servIces for sexually-
transmitted infections (STIs) rendered by private doctors. A study by Schneider et al 
(2001) showed that fewer than 30% of private practitioners provided what would be 
considered effective care for certain STIs according to national syndromic case 
management guidelines. 
3.3.3 Public-private partnerships as a policy objective 
One of the main points of contention in the discussions underlying health policy in 
South Africa in the early 1990s was the role of the private sector (Gilson et aI., 
1999). At primary care level, the key issue was how to draw its plentiful human 
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resources into the service of the public sector and bridge the resource gap between 
the public and private sectors, for instance, by using public funds to contract private 
providers. Contracting with the private sector had developed in response to particular 
needs (e.g. part-time district surgeons due to lack of public sector doctors in rural 
areas; contractor hospitals for TB and psychiatric care due to lack of specialist 
inpatient facilities in the public sector) (McIntyre, 1997; Broomberg et aI., 1997). 
The new government faced the multiple challenge of attempting to regulate the 
private sector which was used to operating largely without government regulatory 
constraints and to achieve this within the context of a federal-type government 
structure. The National Department of Health is in the process of developing an 
integrated policy on the private sector. 
The section starts by summarising the findings of the policy documents review (in 
chronological order) and then gives an overview of the range of pUblic-private 
interactions. 
Policy towards the private sector and public-private partnerships 
Shortly after South Africa's first democratic elections, enthusiasm for contracts at 
primary care level was strong. In the draft policy for the establishment of a district 
health system (National Department of Health, 1995) it was suggested that district 
health authorities contract with individual or group private practices or NGOs. 
Partnership between the public and private sectors was recognised as a policy 
objective in the White Paper on Health (National Department of Health, 1997). The 
underlying justification for encouraging greater cooperation between public and 
private providers, with regard to the provision and management of services, is to 
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enhance the capacity of the National Health System to deliver affordable health care 
to all citizens of South Africa (National Department of Health, 1997). 
As stated in the White Paper, the main objectives of pUblic/private partnerships 
(PPPs) and how they can be achieved are summarised in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Main objectives of public/private partnerships and how they can be achieved 
Objective How can it be achieved? 
Improved efficiency Either by reducing the cost of the service or 
increasing the quality and effectiveness of 
the service 
Improved access to health servIces for By using the most cost-effective mean of 
under-served populations and access to service delivery and by using private sector 
under-provided services resources 
Generation of additional resources and By leasing facilities/equipment or expertise 
revenue for the public sector to the private sector at a reasonable cost 
Source: National Department of Health, 1997 
The range of public-private partnerships that may occur within the South African 
health system are set within the overall pUblic-private mix of the country. The 1997 
White Paper on health identifies four broad types of partnership: 
• Purchased services: where services are required to obtain specialised skills or to 
meet short-tenn staffing needs in the public sector. Services may be clinical, 
management and support. Examples include: 
• Contracts with private doctors for primary care sessions 
• Contracts for clinical equipment maintenance 
• Contracts for hospital beds in private hospitals 
• Contracts with NGOs for community health programmes 
• Contracts with private hospitals for specialised treatment 
diagnostic services and beds. 
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• 
• 
Outsourcing: where an independent organisation contracts to assume full 
operating responsibility for a specific function which was historically provided 
in-house within the public sector (e.g. laundry, security). 
Joint ventures: servIce partnerships involving sharing of resources between 
public and private partners resulting in the provision of increased or higher-
quality services, or lower costs. 
• Private finance initiatives: private companies provide capital funding unavailable 
in the public sector. 
The current 2002-2005 plan or strategic framework for the health sector indicates 
that the mission of the Department of Health is: 
"to consolidate and build on the achievements of the past five years in 
improving access to health care for all and redUcing inequity, and to focus on 
working in partnership with other stakeholders to improve the quality of care 
at all levels of the health system, especially preventive and promotive health, 
and to improve the overall efficiency of the health care delivery system" 
(National Department of Health, 1999) 
There is, however, relatively limited consideration of the private sector in this 
national document, with the exception of the section on the district health system 
which states that: 
"both the provincial and local spheres should explore the role that the private 
sector (jor-profit), NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and CBOs 
(community-based organisations) can play in extending capacity to deliver 
these services" (National Department of Health, 1999) 
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The PPP section of the five-year plan for the health sector highlights similar issues to 
those covered in the PPP policy document. It also explicitly notes that: 
"for the government to benefit maximally from these partnerships [PPPJ it is 
vital that systems and skills be developed in the following areas: contract 
negotiation, contract drafting and monitoring and evaluation of contracts" 
(National Department of Health, 1999) 
More specific references to the private sector in these two documents relate to 
hospital services. Issues such as leasing of unused public hospital beds to the private 
sector, avoiding the duplication of expensive diagnostic equipment, and admitting 
more private patients to public hospitals for revenue generation, are raised. There is 
limited reference to primary health care services with the exception of NGOs for 
community health programmes and private doctors in underserved areas. 
The White Paper on Health (National Department of Health, 1997) states that 
"private health practitioners should be integrated with the public sector with 
regards to the provision and management of services H. However, very little 
progress has been made in this direction and more recent policy documents (National 
Department of Health, 2000a) suggest a more cautious approach towards public 
private partnerships. It shows that a quite clear shift has taken place in attitudes to 
public private partnerships, placing a strong emphasis that they should: 
"not limit the government's ability to guarantee public access to health care. 
The government must be able to provide, or guarantee provision of services to 
public patients and must be able to act as the insurer of last resort to private 
patients. At this stage, this means that the government would not wish to lose 
control of clinical services for public patients, since these are the core 
senJices. III future, however, it may be useful to review whether it may be able 
to control and guarantee such core services without necessarily being the 
provider" (National Department of Health, 2000a) 
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Shortly after this policy framework was adopted by the national and provincial 
Departments of Health, the National Treasury developed its own guidelines for PPPs 
(National Department of Health, 200 1 b). The guidelines contain the basic documents 
required by South African public service managers in national and provincial 
government who are involved with the design, procurement and implementation of 
PPPs. These guidelines are for all sectors of the economy, not just the health sector. 
Treasury confines its definition ofPPPs to: 
"a contractual arrangement between a public sector entity and a private 
sector entity whereby the private sector performs a departmental function in 
accordance with an output-based specification for a specified, significant 
period of time in return for a benefit, which is normally in the form of financial 
remuneration" (National Department of Health, 2001b) 
Thus, they place a heavy emphasis on the contracting out of services. All prospective 
PPPs, including those in the health sector, have to go through a rigorous Treasury 
approval process, and must meet three key criteria, namely affordability, value for 
money and appropriate risk transfer. 
In 2001, the National Department of Health has approved a new policy framework 
which provides a basis for comprehensive, integrated consideration of all public-
private interactions (National Department of Health, 200Ic). This framework seeks 
to define PPPs more broadly by considering the full range of complex relationships 
between public and private providers in South Africa. In terms of this policy, any 
existing or proposed public-private interaction should contribute to improvements in 
the financial sustainability and equity of health care financing and provision. 
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Table 3.4 provides a brief overview of emerging policy issues concerning the public-
private mix in South Africa. 
Table 3.4: Policy issues concerning the public-private mix in South Africa 
Financing 
Public • 
Private • 
• 
• 
• 
Provision 
Public 
Improved equity, efficiency and • 
quality of care so that the public 
sector (especially hospitals) is the 
provider of choice for most South 
Africans 
• 
• 
Preferred provider contracts with • 
medical schemes 
Exploring potential to draw 
private finances to support quality 
public service provision 
Evaluating the potential for 
improving efficiency of resource 
utilisation by leasing of spare 
public sector capacity to the 
private sector 
Evaluating the feasibility of 
Private Finance Initiatives 
Source: National Department of Health, 2001c 
Private 
Reviewing existing public 
financing of private services (e.g. 
tax subsidies on medical scheme 
contributions, subsidised health 
professional training, etc) 
Reviewing existing mechanisms 
and future possibilities for 
purchasing private providers' 
non-clinical and clinical services, 
and management services 
Reviewing the potential involving 
the private sector in medical 
training 
Effective regulation of private 
financing intermediaries (medical 
schemes and health insurers) and 
private health care prOV1SlOn 
(private hospitals, private clinics 
and health maintenance 
organisations, workplace health 
facilities, independent 
practitioners and NGOs) 
Before describing the nature of TB treatment prOVISIon In South Africa, by 
identifying and defining the main providers of TB treatment and their roles and 
responsibilities to TB treatment, and describing existing PPPs for TB treatment 
between these provides (presented in chapter 5), it is important to be familiar with 
the nature of TBIHIV epidemic. The next section provides the TBIHIV background 
with an emphasis on the current and predicted trends of tuberculosis and HIV in 
South Africa over the 1998-2005 period. 
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3.4 Tuberculosis in light of the TBIHIV epidemic 
Tuberculosis in South Africa has reached epidemic proportions. In 2003, it ranked 
9th in the world for its contribution to the global burden of tuberculosis (WHO 
2004b). In 2001, the country had an estimated burden of 161 112 cases compared to 
142 277 cases in 1998 (Department of Health, 2002a). The incidence rate (per 100 
000) varied among the nine provinces, ranging from 91 cases in Limpopo to 841 
cases in the Western Cape (see Figure 3.3). Since 1998 there was a general increase 
in the incidence of TB as a result of advocacy, better case detection rates and as a 
result of increasing levels of HIV infection. Advocacy has been a key component of 
TB control efforts. Since 1996, when the Minister of Health announced that TB 
would be regarded as a national priority, TB control has been on the agenda at 
national, provincial and district level. Provincial TB coordinators have been 
appointed in all nine provinces and district level TB coordinators in most of the 
provinces. At the national level, the incidence in all types of TB increased from 338 
patients per 100 000 in 1998 to 362 patients per 100 000 in 2001 (Department of 
Health,2002a). Figure 3.3 shows the incidence ofTB for each province. 
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Figure 3.3: Incidence of all TB patients per 100 000 per province in 1998 and 2001 
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In terms of absolute numbers, the Western and the Eastern Cape provinces were 
severely affected, with 35 803 and 35 702 reported cases respectively (Department 
of Health, 2002). Figure 3.4 shows the number of all types ofTB cases reported per 
province and for South Africa, annually for 1998 and 2001. Although it is difficult to 
separate real increases in the number of cases from improvements in the reporting 
system, the figures suggest that the number of cases of TB is increasing at a rate well 
in excess of population growth. 
Figure 3.4: Number of all types of TB cases reported per province in 1998 and 2001 
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Tuberculosis is South Africa mainly affects the economically active age group as is 
graphically represented in Figure 3.5, where 86.60/0 of the TB patients reported in 
1999 are in the age group of 20-59 years (Department of Health 2000a. This 
distribution could have enormous economic implications since HIV infection the 
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most important factor responsible for the progression of latent TB to active disease 
also affects this broad age group most heavily. The TBIHN link was discussed in 
chapter 2 and will be discussed again in more details in the next section. 
Figure: 3.5 Age distribution of TB patients reported in South Africa in 1999 
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The enormous variation of TB incidence within South Africa is difficult to explain. 
The province with the highest incidence, the Western Cape, reports an incidence nine 
times higher than that reported in the Limpopo province, which has the lowest 
reported incidence. Whilst the Western, Northern and Eastern Cape provinces are 
recognised as having a high burden of TB, KwaZulu-Natal, the Limpopo Province 
and Mpumalanga all report incidences well below the national average of 362 per 
100 000. The contribution of under-diagnosis and under-reporting of TB in these 
three historically under-resourced provinces is not known. 
The World Health Organisation attributes the global increase in TB to four factors 
all of which are found to some degree in South Africa (Department of Health, 1999): 
(a) Socio-economic conditions. Many South Africans still live in overcrowded 
conditions conducive to the spread ofTB. 
(b) The HIV epidemic. It is estimated that 40-50% of people with TB in South 
Africa are co-infected with HIV. One third of people with HN are expected to 
contract TB before they die. 
(c) Ineffective TB control programmes. TB control efforts in South Africa have 
historically been patchy, with well-resourced but poorly managed programmes in 
some areas with others being neglected. 
(d) Demographic changes. The population of South Africa, like most developing 
countries, is young with a large percentage of children and young adults. Given that 
many adolescents and young adults were infected with TB during their childhood, an 
increasing number of cases is emerging in this pool. 
Further exacerbating the TB epidemic is the evolution of multi-drug resistant strains 
of TB (MDR-TB), primarily caused by non-adherence to treatment schedules, and 
incomplete or inappropriate treatment with one drug. Studies on MDR-TB by the 
South African Medical Council in all provinces show that an average of 1.8 percent 
of new cases are MDR and an average of 6.7 percent in re-treatment cases are MDR 
(MRC 2000). With such rates, some 6 000 cases of MDR-TB could be expected in 
2005. 
As indicated in chapter 2, a dual TBIHIV epidemic has emerged for many low-and 
middle-income countries, and that a great majority of TBIHIV cases live in sub-
Saharan Africa. Tuberculosis has always been a major public health problem in 
South Africa that is now exploding because of the HIV epidemic. The next section 
provides some background information on the HIV epidemic and the dual TBIHIV 
epidemic. 
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3.4.1 Tuberculosis and the HIV epidemic 
It has been estimated that there were over 6.5 million people infected with HIV in 
South Africa in 2002 (Medical Research Council, 2002). Over the past decade 
country level estimates of HIV infection have been based on surveys of women 
attending antenatal clinics. This has been the primary means of monitoring the 
spread of HIV since 1990. On the basis of the 1999 and 2000 surveys, the HIV 
prevalence rate of women attending antenatal clinics is estimated at 22.4% and 
24.5% respectively, compared to less than 1 % in 1990 (Department of Health 2001) 
(see table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: mv prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics in 1999-2000 
Province 010 of antenatal women who are 0/0 of antenatal women who are 
mv+ HIV+ 
1999 2000 
KwaZulu Natal 32.5 36.2 
Free State 27.9 27.9 
Mpumalanga 27.3 29.7 
Gauteng 23.9 29.4 
North West 23.0 22.9 
Eastern Cape 18.0 20.2 
Limpopo Province 11.4 13.2 
Northern Cape 10.1 11.2 
Western Cape 7.1 8.3 
South Africa 22.4 24.5 
Source: Department of Health 2001 
The levels of HIV prevalence reflect large geographical variations amongst the 
provinces, with Kwa-Zulu Natal consistently reflecting the highest, and the Western 
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Cape the lowest HIV prevalence rate. For 2000, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng 
provinces had the highest increase in the HIV prevalence rate for 2000. 
In tenns of age, women in age group 20-29 have consistently shown the highest 
levels of HIV infection (comprising half of the adult HIV positive population) that 
has significant social and economic implications (National Department of Health 
2001d). As no infonnation is available on HIV infection amongst non-pregnant 
women, men, newborn babies and children, projections have been made to 
extrapolate HIV infection to the general population. 
Dorrington et al (2001) estimate that about 40% of the adult deaths aged 15-49 that 
occurred in the year 2000 were due to HIV / AIDS and that about 20% of all adult 
deaths in that year were due to AIDS. These estimates indicate that AIDS has 
become the single biggest cause of death in South Africa. The projections show that, 
in the absence of treatment to prevent AIDS, the number of AIDS deaths can be 
expected to more than double the number of deaths due to all other causes. It is 
estimated that by 2010 there will be between 5 and 7 million cumulative AIDS 
deaths (Dorrington et aI., 2001). 
The relationship between TB and HIV has been well documented (De Cock et aI., 
1991; De Cock et aI., 1992; Narain et aI., 1992). In general, the HIV prevalence 
among adult TB patients is usually 2-3 times higher than among the general 
population (World Health Organisation, 2000; Mukadi et aI., 2001). It is estimated 
that in South Africa the percentage of people with TB who are HIV -positive is 
around 43% (Department of Health, 2001) (see table 3.6 below). Given the projected 
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continued increase in the prevalence ofHIV, the Medical Research Council of South 
Africa estimates that annual TB incidence in South Africa could more than double 
again by the year 2005 (Medical Research Council, 2000). 
Table 3.6: Estimated mv status among TB patients in 1999 
Province Estimate % mv+ amongst TB cases in 1999 
KwaZulu Natal 35.1 
Free State 46.8 
Mpumalanga 39.9 
Gauteng 59.7 
North West 54.2 
Eastern Cape 28.3 
Limpopo Province 31.4 
Northern Cape 40.6 
Western Cape 26.7 
South Africa 42.7 
Source: Department of Health 2001 
It is estimated that South Africa has a TBIHIV co-infection rate of2 540 per 100000 
and a TB case fatality rate of 166 per 100 000, a rate which is five times higher than 
the global TB fatality average of 32 per 100 000 (Dye et aI., 1999). In recognition of 
this threat, all provincial health departments in the country have agreed to promote 
the management of TB and HIV as a joint epidemic. Four TBIHIV integrated 
management pilot sites were established in the country during 19993. The main 
objectives of this TBIHIV initiative were to increase access to HIV voluntary 
counselling and rapid testing, and improve TB case finding, TB treatment 
completion rates and TB cure rates among people living with HIV / AIDS through 
community involvement. 
3 The South African Department of Health is participating in the WHOIUNAlD ProTest lnitiati e 
that eks to increa e acce s to oluntary HIV counselling and testing and improve TBIHIV care. The 
ultimat goal of th initiati e i to reduce the burden of the combined TB and HI epidemic . 
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Although these sites were established when antiretroviral therapy (ART) was 
considered unaffordable for most developing countries, there is now a strong 
international commitment to implement ART through the World Health 
Organisation's initiative to start 3 million people on ART by the end of 2005 (World 
Health Organisation, 2003c), the Global Fund Against AIDS, TB and Malaria, and 
other initiatives. South Africa decided to implement a national plan to roll out ART 
in November 2003 (National Department of Health, 2003). The interventions of the 
TBIHIV initiative could be included as part of the package of care for people living 
with HIV during the roll out of ART in South Africa. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on background and context for both the structure of the 
public-private mix in the South African health sector and burden of the dual TBIHIV 
epidemic. The private sector is an important component of the health care system in 
South Africa, employing an increasing proportion of health care providers while 
resources available to the public sector are declining. In particular, this chapter has 
highlighted that the Department of Health is faced with a legacy of fragmented 
services, inequity and a weak public sector human resource base which leads them to 
depend on the stronger private sector to meet demands of even basic service 
provision. On top of that, South Africa is experiencing a rapidly emerging TBIHIV 
epidemic that already has serious implications for health system resources. The 
evidence shows that the HIV epidemic has caused a substantial increase in demand 
for TB services. The background and context of the pUblic-private mix suggest that 
the public sector cannot effectively control TB epidemic without drawing on the 
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private sector. One response is to find effective ways to manage rising TB caseloads 
through strengthened pUblic-private partnerships in the provision ofTB treatment. 
Public-private partnerships remain a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa, 
and are seen as one component of the public sector's overall strategy for the 
provision of public services. This does not imply that public-private partnerships are 
the preferred option for improving the efficiency of services but are one of a range of 
possible service delivery options available to government. However, the evidence on 
performance of public-private partnerships is lacking. Given the policy interest in 
involving private providers for the provision of public services, evaluation of public-
private partnerships is vital. All recent policy documents stress four key goals -
equity, coherence, quality of care and efficiency - which provide a useful basis for 
decision-making about public-private partnerships. Appropriateness of existing and 
new public-private partnerships could therefore be evaluated in relation to the 
achievement of these key health systems goals. 
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Chapter 4 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 focused on South Africa, with an emphasis on the public-private mix in the 
South African health sector, and the epidemiological and economic burden of the dual 
TB/HIV epidemic. An important conclusion drawn is that the private sector is an 
important component of the health care system in South Africa, employing an increasing 
proportion of health care providers while resources available to the public sector are 
declining. Public-private partnerships are, therefore, seen as one possible service 
provision option available to government. The rapidly emerging TBIHIV epidemic in 
South Africa has serious implications for current and future health system resources. 
The discussion in chapter 3 concludes that the public sector cannot effectively control 
rapidly emerging TB epidemic without drawing on the private sector. 
The aim of this chapter is to present the study design and a brief overview of methods 
used in this thesis. It starts with a conceptual framework provided by the review of 
theoretical and empirical literature in chapter 2 and background information in chapter 
3. Study aims and specific objectives are then presented, followed by an overview of 
research questions and methods for addressing them. Lastly, justification for a case 
study approach and description of case studies in this thesis are given. 
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4.2 Conceptual framework 
Given the broad spectrum of different types of organisational arrangements, in terms of 
financing and provision, between government and the private sector (as shown in 
chapter 2), for purposes of this study public-private partnerships are defined as formal or 
informal collaboration between the government (the Department of Health, or more 
precisely, the Provincial TB Control Programme) and the private sector (both for- and 
not for-profit private providers) where the government subsidises private providers to 
provide good quality TB treatment following the national treatment guidelines. 
In this study, the private sector is defined as all those health care providers working 
outside the direct control of the government. They are as follows: 
1. For-profit providers 
a. private practitioners working in solo or group practices, such as 
Independent Practitioners Associations 
b. commercial clinic companies which provide pnmary health care to 
patients who pay a flat fee per visit 
c. traditional healers 
2. Non-profit providers 
a. NGOs, the majority of non-profit providers in South Africa. 
b. mission or church related facilities 
3. Employer-based providers 
a. companies directly providing health services to their employees 
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b. Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs), either linked to an employer 
or provide services independently. In the first case, the HMOs are usually 
paid on a capitation basis by the employer to provide services to the 
employees. 
The definition of employer-based providers is somewhat blurred in that it is not always 
clear whether they are for-profit or non-profit providers. For example, whilst an 
employer is not directly maximising profit by providing TB treatment to their 
employees, one of the driving forces behind it is to maintain their workforce healthy in 
order to keep them productive. For purposes of this study, both types of employer-based 
providers are classified as for-profit providers for the two following reasons. First, 
where TB services are provided directly by a company, and health care providers are 
effectively the company's employees, their for-profit nature stems from the for-profit 
nature of the company employing them. Second, whilst the HMOs may call themselves 
non-profit organisations, the definition of private health sector classifies health 
maintenance organisation as "more complex for-profit multi-institutional forms" 
(Bennett, 1991). 
A number of categories drive the conceptual framework for the evaluation of public-
private partnerships in the provision ofTB treatment (see Figure 4.1 overleaf). 
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Figure 4.1: Overall conceptual framework for evaluating public-private partnerships in the provision of TB treatment 
Public-private partnership 
models 
Type of private provider 
private for-profit 
private non-profit 
Performance 
quality of care 
cost -effecti veness 
r 
Incentive mechanisms for private 
participation 
financial 
non-financial 
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First, pUblic-private partnerships depend on the type and characteristics of private 
providers operating within the system. Second, different arrangements between public 
and private providers have differential impacts on quality of care and cost-effectiveness. 
Third, it is assumed that different private providers (i.e. private for-profit and private 
non-profit) have different motivations for participation in partnerships for the provision 
of TB treatment. Differences in motivation between public and private sector actors 
raises additional issues of appropriate incentive mechanisms that can be used to achieve 
converging public-private interests. The response that different incentive mechanisms 
create for different private providers has an impact on the performance of pUblic-private 
partnerships. Overall, the enhanced role of the private sector in the provision of TB 
treatment depends upon the contextual circumstances such as the existence of 
appropriate socio-economic conditions, the size and distribution of the private sector 
providers, and their degree of organisation; and, government institutional and financial 
capacity. Given this conceptual framework, the study will evaluate different models of 
public-private partnership in the provision of TB treatment in South Africa. 
4.3 Aims and objectives 
This study aims to evaluate the performance of different models of public-private 
partnerships in the delivery of TB treatment in South Africa. It also aims to explore 
incentive mechanisms for private sector participation in public-private partnerships, in 
order to make recommendations to policy-makers in South Africa on the best way to 
approach a policy on the enhanced role of private sector providers in TB treatment. 
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The specific objectives of the thesis are: 
1. To understand the nature of pUblic-private interaction in TB treatment in the 
African context in light of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
2. To describe the nature of TB treatment delivery including models of public-
private partnerships, in terms of what they are, the nature of partnerships and 
who is responsible for monitoring them in South Africa. 
3. To evaluate specific public-private partnership models of delivery of TB 
treatment in terms of cost, effectiveness and quality of care, and to compare their 
performance with that of public sector providers. 
4. To explore motivations of partners within existing partnerships, incentive 
mechanisms attributable to different models of public-private partnerships, 
potential partners in the provision of TB treatment, and incentive structures for 
broader public-private partnerships. 
5. On the basis of these findings, to make recommendations on how policy-makers 
in South Africa and elsewhere could best approach a policy on different ways of 
involving private providers in the provision ofTB treatment. 
4.4 Overview of methods for objectives 
To achieve the above aims and objectives, and following from the concepts highlighted 
by the literature review in chapter 2, a series of research questions are posed for each 
study objective. Table 4.1 overleaf gives a summary of study questions and overview of 
methods used to address them. 
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Table 4.1 Study objectives and the methods used for addressing them 
Objective Research question Sub-study Methods used Samplin2 method Sample size 
I and 2 Who are the main providers ofTB Situational analysis 1. Document review of policy 1. Not relevant I.Not relevant 
treatment and what are their roles and (chapter 5) documents, published and unpublished 
responsibilities? documents and reports, policy 
What is the level of involvement of South Africa as a case statements, and internal regulations of 
private providers in TB treatment? study. organisations 
What forms do the public-private 2. Open-ended interviews with key 2. Snowballing 2. Fifteen key infonnants 
partnerships in TB treatment take? How informants (8 from the public sector 
do they operate? and 7 from the private 
sector) 
3 What is the technical, process and Quality of care (chapter 6) 1. Technical quality checklist of I.Purposive sampling 1. Six checklists (I in each 
outcome quality ofTB treatment? Three different models of buildings, equipment and medical 2. Purposive site) 
In terms of quality of care, how do these the provision of TB supplies available sampling 2. Six interviews (I in 
models compare to the public sector treatment as case studies. 2. Semi-structured interview with 3. Purposive each site) 
providers ofTB treatment? For each model, 2 sites facility manager sampling 3. Fourteen interviews (6 
were selected by 3. Semi-structured interview with 4.Random sampling doctors,6 nurses, and 2 
purposive sampling. health care providers lay workers) 
4. Retrospective reviews ofTB patient 4. Hundred and twenty 
records records 
3 How cost-effective are public-private Cost -effecti veness 1. Document review I. Not relevant I. Not relevant 
partnership models for the provision ofTB (chapter 7) 2. Semi-structured interview with 2. Purposive 2. Six interviews (I in 
treatment compared to the public sector The same models and sites facility manager sampling each site) 
providers? selected for the quality of 3. Retrospective structured patient 3. Random sampling 3. Hundred and twenty (20 
Who bears the burden of public-private care sub study were used interview. 4. All new paticnts in cach site 
partnerships? . for this sub study. 4. TB register review who startcd treatment 4. Hundred and twcnty 
during thc 12-month patients (20 in each site) 
costing pcriod. 
4 What are the motivations of partners in Incentives for existing and Semi-structured interviews with Purposive sampling Fourteen interviews (5 
existing PPPs? potential partners government officials and private with thc Dcpartmcnt of 
Who are potential private partners? (chapter 8) providers currently in public-private Health oflicials, 3 with the 
What are obstacles to providing TB partnerships and potential partnership private for-profit 
treatment in the private sector? participants. providers, 2 with the 
What are the incentive structures that may private non-prolit 
be needed for a well-functioning PPP? providers, and 4 with 
potential partners. 
-- -~ . 
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Detailed presentation of methods and analysis for each study objective is given in 
chapters 5 - 8. In this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods are used as the 
two approaches complement one another, allowing research to benefit from the 
respective strengths of each (Dingwall et aI., 1998). 
4.4.1 Choice of the case study approach 
This study employs a case study approach - a research method that focuses on the 
circumstances, dynamics and complexity of a single case or a small number of cases 
(Bowling, 1997). The case study approach is useful where the relevant influences are 
difficult to distinguish from the general environment (Keen and Packwood, 1999). 
Multiple research methods are usually employed in a case study in order to investigate 
complex situations fully and to validate the findings (Bowling, 1997). A case study 
approach has both strengths and weaknesses. The strength of qualitative research is its 
ability to aid understanding, provide explanations and explore issues, particularly those 
of a complex nature (Coast, 1999). Its weakness, in comparison to quantitative research, 
is that it does not provide empirical data that are statistically generalisable to whole 
populations (Coast, 1999). 
A case study is a study of an event that also includes its real-life context. Features of a 
case study are the attempt to measure multiple variables using a variety of methods, and 
seeking to triangulate findings from these different methods. Case studies have 
traditionally been criticised as being a rather weak approach offering somewhat tentative 
conclusions and limited degrees of generalisability (Black, 1994). However, this 
109 
perspective derives from a highly positivistic conception of the nature of science (Yin, 
1994). Case studies are particularly appropriate when: (1) contextual conditions are a 
relevant issue for the study; (2) there are complex casual links between many variables 
to attempt to understand; (3) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life setting; and, (4) researchers have no control over events and so an experimental 
approach is not feasible (Yin, 1994; Keen and Packwood, 1999). 
In summary, case studies are good for analysing complex relationships and allowing for 
the importance of context. This is particularly relevant for the empirical study of the 
implementation of real-life policy. However, the inclusion of the context creates several 
technical challenges (Yin, 1993). First, the richness means that the study will need to 
use multiple sources of evidence. Second, the richness of the context means that the 
study will have more variables than data points. Third, even if all the variables are 
quantitative, different strategies will be needed for research design and for analysis (Yin, 
1993). Given the importance of background and context factors summarised in chapter 
3, a case study was clearly the most appropriate choice for being able to study the nature 
of public-private partnerships in South Africa in the 'real world'. This, combined with 
the small number of existing public-private partnerships for the delivery of TB treatment 
available for study, lead to the selection of the case study approach. 
4.4.2 Design of the case study 
There are two types of case studies in this research: (1) South Africa is selected as a case 
study; and, (2) within South Africa, each model of public-private partnership chosen for 
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the purpose of performance evaluation represents a case study. Each of these IS 
described below. 
South Africa as a case study 
South Africa was chosen as the principal case study in this research for a number of 
reasons. First, South Africa has one of the highest TB incidence rates in the world, 
which is worsening with the growing HN epidemic. In 2001, the country had an 
estimated burden of 161 112 cases compared to 142 277 cases in 1998, with the 
incidence rate (per 100 000) ranging from 91 to 841 cases in different parts of the 
country (Department of Health, 2002a). It has been highlighted that in order to achieve 
the South African target of detecting 70% of infectious cases and curing 85% of those 
detected, additional funding is likely to be required for new kinds of interventions 
(World Health Organisation, 2001a). The evidence shows that the HN epidemic has 
caused a substantial increase in demand for TB and general medical services (Floyd et 
aI, 1999). This has enormous implications for health system resources, and one of the 
challenges is finding effective ways to manage rising TB caseloads through improved 
public-private mix. Second, South Africa has a considerable private health care sector. 
Higher private sector incomes have led to an outflow of health personnel from the public 
sector. At the same time, a rapidly emerging TBIHIV epidemic, along with free primary 
health care, is likely to have compounded the problem by increasing the demand for 
public care. Third, there is a policy discussion and debate around the role of the private 
sector and existing/potential pUblic-private partnerships in the health sector. It has been 
recognised that the advantage of developing new partnerships with private sector 
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providers is that they have substantial resources available (particularly human 
resources), and, therefore, there is a need for the public sector to pro-actively use public-
private partnerships as a means of increasing the resources available to the public sector, 
enabling it to improve the quality of care (South Africa 1997). Finally, the researcher's 
personal knowledge of the country and TB control efforts through previous work was 
expected to reduce the access time to individuals and documents. 
Three provinces in South Africa were selected for this thesis: Western Cape, North West 
and Free State. The main reason for selecting the Western Cape was because this 
province has the highest TB incidence in the country, and amongst the highest in the 
world. Chapter 3 indicated that the incidence of TB patients per 100 000 was 841 in 
2001 (see Figure 3.3 in chapter 3), making TB one of the most important public health 
problems in the province. In addition, the Western Cape has the longest tradition of 
NGOs involved in tuberculosis. Reasons for selecting the Free State and North West as 
study provinces are as follows. First, the incidence rates of TB among miners in these 
provinces are almost ten times higher than those among the general population (see 
chapter 3). Second, mining companies are responsible for the provision of TB treatment 
to a large number of employees and, in some cases, to their dependents. Last, 
partnerships with private practitioners in the Free State and with traditional healers in 
the N orth West are emerging. 
For purposes of describing the provision of TB treatment in the public sector (as a part 
of addressing the study objective 2), three districts in the Western Cape were selected 
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using purposive sampling. In order to enhance the generalisability of the analysis, seven 
potential districts were first selected to ensure different settings were represented (urban 
versus rural) as well as different population sizes and density of districts. The choice of 
potential districts was then narrowed down to five districts, based on the high TB 
incidence and HIV prevalence in the districts. The final selection of three districts 
included availability and utilisation of alternative service provider (NGOs and private 
for-profit providers) and the proportion of TB patients supervised in the community TB 
programmes (see Table 4.2 overleaf). The selected districts were Khayelitsha, 
Helderberg, and Central district. Although the districts within the Western Cape that are 
most affected by TB are the predominantly rural districts, due to a continued influx of 
residents from the rural areas, and the rising HIV epidemic, there is an increase in 
incidence of new smear positive TB patients in peri-urban and urban districts. 
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Table 4.2: Selection criteria and ranking of districts selected for the study 
District Setting TB incidence Availability and utilisation of 
andHIV alternative service providers 
prevalence in 
2001 
1. Khayelitsha* • Peri-urban • Veryhigh** • Public providers 
• NGOs 
• Large number of TB patients 
sUj>ervised in the community 
2. Central* • Urban • Very high • Public providers 
• NGOs 
• Private practitioners and private 
hospitals 
• Some TB patients get TB 
treatment in the ~rivate sector 
3. Helderberg* • Rural • Very high • Public providers 
• NGO 
• Large number of TB patients 
supervised in the community 
4. Nyanga • Peri-urban • Very high • Public providers 
• NGOs 
• Large number of TB patients 
supervised in the community 
5. Oostenberg • Rural • Very high • Public providers 
• NGOs 
• Small number of patients 
su~ervisedintheconununity 
5. George • Urban • High*** • Public providers 
• Private practitioners and private 
hospitals 
6. Drakenstein • Rural • Very high • Public providers 
• Large number of TB patients 
hospitalised 
7. Cape Agulhas • Rural • High • Public providers 
• A large proportion ofTB 
_patients hospitalised 
* Districts chosen for the public sector sites. *. TB mCIdence 500 - 850 per 100 000; HIV prevalence 25 - 40% 
**. TB incidence 250 - 500 per 100 000; HIV prevalence 10 - 25 % 
Model of public-private partnership as a case study 
In addition to selecting South Africa as the principal case study, each model of public-
private partnership for the provision of TB treatment represents a case study on its own. 
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Two models of public-private provision were studied in great detail and then compared 
with the third model - purely public provision. Definition, selection and justification of 
PPP models chosen for this study are given in chapter 6. A common framework, 
described in detail in chapters 6 and 7, is used to analyse the nature of these two models, 
their performance in terms of cost, effectiveness and quality of care. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described and justified the choice of research design and presented a brief 
overview of methods used in this thesis. Detailed methods and analysis for each study 
objective are described in the next four chapters. In line with the research questions 
highlighted in this chapter and figure 4.1, the next four chapters describe the main 
providers of TB treatment and existing public-private partnerships for the provision of 
TB treatment in South Africa (chapter 5); present quality of care and cost-effectiveness 
of TB treatment in three models of public-private partnership (chapters 6 and 7); and, 
explores motivations for participating in existing and potential partnerships, and 
incentive mechanisms for different models of current and potential private sector 
participation in TB treatment (chapter 8). 
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Chapter 5 
SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PROVIDERS OF TUBERCULOSIS TREATMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
5.1 Introduction 
As outlined in the conceptual framework, a number of factors will detennine 
whether TB treatment can be improved by enhancing partnership between the private 
and public sectors in African settings (and whether it is worthwhile subsidising the 
private sector provision of TB treatment). The feasibility of increased public-private 
partnerships in health care will depend, amongst other factors, upon the nature of the 
services itself as well as upon contextual circumstances. This chapter focuses on the 
nature of TB treatment delivery in South Africa, seeking to explain ''who is doing 
what" by describing the main providers of TB treatment, their roles and 
responsibilities, and the level of involvement of private providers in TB treatment. It 
also aims to describe existing models of public-private partnerships, in tenns of the 
nature of partnerships and who is responsible for monitoring them in South Africa. 
While most of the international literature on the provision of TB treatment focuses 
on issues related to the public sector, there is little about what happens in the private 
for-profit and private non-profit sectors, and even less examination of public/private 
sector collaboration. In this chapter, the public-private mix in TB treatment delivery 
in South Africa is reviewed. None of what follows is intended to be a comprehensive 
review, but rather this chapter sets a scene in selected provinces where the further 
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study is going to take place. The chapter starts with the methods used for the review. 
It then provides an overview of the National TB Control Programme and focuses on 
public services in the Western Cape province. Public sector services are not 
reviewed in other provinces. A country-level review of private sector provision, 
including private for-profit and private non-profit providers, is then given. For each 
service provider, the review includes characteristics of providers such as the 
organisation of TB service delivery, cost and utilisation of TB treatment, and 
interaction between providers. Finally, different arrangements between public and 
private providers of TB treatment are reviewed in the provinces of the Free State, 
North West and Western Cape. 
5.2 Methods 
Two methods employed to answer the first two study objectives, in this chapter, are 
document review and open-ended interviews with key informants. Document review 
is widely used as a starting point for research as it has the advantage of being non-
reactive and relatively low in cost (Robson, 1993; Bowling, 1997). However, both 
content and the context under which documents were produced were examined in 
order to acknowledge any bias or incompleteness, and information obtained through 
document analysis was therefore triangulated through interviews with key 
informants. Key informants were located using a snowball technique, a technique 
used when no sampling frame exists and it cannot be created (Bowling, 1997). 
Interview schedule for key informants is presented in Appendix I. 
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Review of the National Tuberculosis Control Programme (NTCP) 
The following documents were used for the review of the National TB Control 
Programme: 
1. The South African Tuberculosis Control Programme Practical Guidelines 
(Department of Health, 2000a) 
2. Medium Term Development Plan 2002-2005, National Tuberculosis Control 
Programme of South Africa (Department of Health, 2001) 
The review focused on the Programme's history, strategy and organisation and was 
used to evaluate institutional environments surrounding the provision of TB 
treatment in the public sector. A total of five interviews were conducted with the 
NTCP managers (n=2) and the provincial TB control programme coordinators (n=3). 
All the interviews with key informants were open-ended and exploratory. The main 
focus of these interviews was the broader context of TB control in order to identify 
and define the main public sector providers of TB treatment, their roles and 
responsibilities to TB treatment, and existing partnerships for the provision of TB 
treatment between public and private providers. 
Review of the public sector provision of TB treatment 
Documents which were collected and reviewed at the district level include published 
and unpublished documents, reports, policy statements and internal regulations of 
organisations, and reports pertaining to or written by the public providers. To 
triangulate the document review, three key informants interviews were conducted 
with district managers focusing on the extent of provision of TB treatment, delivery 
points for TB treatrnent and characteristics of providers in the three districts. 
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Review of the private sector provision ofTB treatment 
The review of the private sector provision of TB treatment relied on the following 
policy documents: 
1. The Medical Schemes Act (National Department of Health, 2000b) 
2. The Mine and Safety Act (National Department of Health, 1996) 
3. The Occupational Disease in Mines and Works Act (National Department of 
Health, 1973) 
4. The Health Act (National Department of Health, 1977) 
The review of these documents was used to evaluate institutional and regulatory 
environment surrounding the provision of TB treatment in the private sector. In 
addition to the policy documents, published and unpublished documents, annual 
reports, and health care industry related literature were reviewed. Seven key 
informant interviews were conducted with officials from the private sector Medical 
Scheme Funds and Fund Administrators, the Chamber of Mines, the South African 
Medical Association, academics, chest specialists, and managers from local NGOs 
involved in the provision of TB treatment. All the interviews with key informants 
were open-ended and exploratory. The main focus of these interviews was the 
private sector providers of TB treatment in South Africa, their roles and 
responsibilities to TB treatment, characteristics of providers, formal interaction 
between the private and public sectors, and relationship with the provincial 
tuberculosis programmes. These interviews were also used to describe the main 
characteristics of different existing pUblic-private partnerships for TB treatment in 
the three study provinces. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Overview of the National TB Control Programme 
Until 1996, the actual diagnosis and the delivery of tuberculosis treatment in South 
Africa was highly disorganised. Tuberculosis treatment services were vertical in 
nature, and separated from other primary and secondary care services (Bayer and 
Wilkinson, 1995). Case definition for notification was ill defined and in many areas, 
especially rural, TB was under diagnosed as there were no health facilities available 
(or those that were present were inaccessible), and most cases were hospitalised for 
long periods. In 1997, the National Health Department decentralised responsibility 
for delivery of health care to the provinces, and actual delivery ofTB services is seen 
to occur through the district health system as part of general health services. 
A National TB Control Programme that existed from 1979, within the previous 
government health structures, failed at several levels. The complexity of attempting 
to co-ordinate vertically controlled TB services for fragmented health authorities of 
the various "affairs" for different races, and for homelands and independent states 
rendered it unworkable. The reasons for failure of the TB programmes are: (1) lack 
of unifonn policies for diagnosis and treatment; (2) frequently changed policies; (3) 
irregular funding; (4) insufficient nurse involvement; (5) lack of discipline of health 
workers; and (6) absence of community involvement and deficiencies in 
infrastructure (Edginton, 1997). 
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After a national survey in 1996, the NTCP implemented the DOTS strategy (in line 
with the internationally recommended tuberculosis control strategy discussed in 
chapter 2), with aims to expand effective and accessible TB services throughout the 
country. The five elements of the South African strategy are (Department of Health, 
2000a): 
1. Government commitment to a national TB control programme as a specific health 
system activity, integrated into comprehensive primary care, and supported 
technically at national level. 
2. Passive case detection l by means of a patient-friendly and clinically efficient 
service based primarily on smear microscopy. People with symptoms indicative of 
TB who attend primary health care (PHC) facilities or seek treatment from health 
practitioners should be identified and investigated appropriately. 
3. Standardised, directly observed, short-course treatment, prioritising sputum smear 
positive (or infectious) patients. Directly observed treatment involves each patient 
having a treatment supporter or supervisor who observes the patient swallowing his 
or her treatment on a daily basis for at least the first two months of treatment. "Short-
course" refers to a treatment of six to eight months' duration which is shorter than 
previous regimes which require treatment for nine to eighteen months. 
4. Standardised treatment in the correct combination and dosage. A reliable supply 
of necessary TB drugs in all PHC facilities is therefore essential. 
5. Effective monitoring using standardised registers, quarterly reporting and clear 
definitions and treatment outcomes. 
I The term 'case detection' recognises the fact that there are unknown cases in a community who may 
not present to the health sector, or who may not be identified when they do present (Broekmans, 
1994 ). 
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The NTCP aims to reduce the TB burden in the country through the provision of 
supervised TB treatment to all patients. The use of the directly-observed treatment 
for all TB patients, regardless of the likelihood of non-adherence to treatment, was 
preferred by most authors in international literature to strategies of attempting to 
identify likely non-adherent patients, or to promote effective self-treatment (Bayer 
and Wilkinson, 1995). There is a debate over universal DOT versus a mixture of 
DOT and self-treatment, and whether or not to include lay worker DOT supporters, 
medication monitors, private practitioners and traditional healers in the TB control 
programme (Uplekar and Rangan, 1995; Garner, 1998; Zwarenstein et aI, 1998; 
Moulding and Caymittes, 2002; Khan et aI, 2002; Colvin et aI, 2003). South Africa 
has adopted a flexible local adaptation of the DOT approach where different options 
exist for providing DOT to the patients. Selection depends on the preferences of the 
patients and availability of DOT supporter networks. 
One of the emerging issues in South Africa is multi-drug resistant tuberculosis 
(MDR-TB), defined as resistance to treatment with standard TB drugs (specifically 
isoniazid and rifampicin). MDR-TB results primarily from inadequate treatment, 
(due to improper prescribing practices), lack of patient adherence to treatment, 
irregular supply of drugs, and poor TB control programmes (WHO/International 
Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 1997). Treatment of this form of 
disease involves the use of less effective second-line drugs costing 10 to 20 times the 
cost of treating an uncomplicated drug-susceptible case. 
It has been estimated that it costs R8 428 per patient for the MDR drugs alone as 
opposed to R391 for a new patient with ordinary TB (Department of Health, 2003). 
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Such patients generally require to be hospitalised for long periods of time (usually 
between six and eighteen months), adding significantly to the cost of their treatment. 
Accurate figures for MDR-TB are not available but studies in three provinces 
(Western Cape, Mpumalanga and Gauteng) in 2001 indicate a rate of 1 % in new 
MDR-TB cases and 4% in retreatment cases (Department of Health, 2002a). This 
translates into about 2 000 new cases of MDR-TB in South Africa each year. Cure 
rates are generally below 50% even in the best circumstances. MDR TB-related 
mortality is at least 30% within the first two years - the remainder become 
chronically infected with TB posing a threat to communities. Ensuring that all 
patients diagnosed with TB complete their treatment is, therefore, the key way to 
prevent MDR-TB. 
Most countries, including South Africa, have adopted the WHO's goals of detecting 
70% of all new sputum smear positive patients and successfully curing 85% of those 
detected (Department of Health, 2001). Since 1997, the cure rate nationally has 
slowly improved from 57% in 1997 to 63% in 2000 (Department of Health, 2002a). 
Interruption rates for the country are still high, with a small decrease from 19% in 
1997 to 16% in 2000. The percentage of new smear positive pulmonary TB patients 
who die while on treatment increased nationally from 6% in 1997 to 8% in 2000 
(Department of Health, 2002a). 
The South African national TB budget is calculated to be approximately R500 
million (US$50 million) per year, one third of which is spent on the management of 
MDR-TB, and 20% on the hospitalisation of patients (Department of Health, 2001). 
It has been estimated that, due to the dual TBIHIV epidemic, the total cost for the 
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NTCP will have to increase to at least R931 million in 2005 (Department of Health, 
2001). It was estimated that the total cost of TB control in South Africa was around 
US$ 300 million in 2002 (Floyd et aI., 2002). At present, South Africa receives some 
external assistance, but the government funds almost all of the costs of TB diagnosis 
and treatment. In 2003, the Global Fund Against AIDS, TB and Malaria awarded 
US$ 25.1 million for TBIHIV activities, to be implemented primarily through NGOs 
(W orld Health Organisation, 2004b). 
At the district level, the TB budget is sourced from within the district health system 
budget, with no extra resources sourced from outside. While staff costs are carried 
by the district hospitals and clinics, drug procurement is through the pharmacy 
services and budget. Tuberculosis drug supply is guaranteed, broadly based on the 
number of registered cases. There is no specific tuberculosis line item in the budget 
and no district plan to guide activities and budget allocation. While there is no 
dedicated national TB budget, the National Treasury provides funds for TB control 
along the several other health care programmes directly to provincial Departments of 
Health through the Equity Share Grant for Health. Provincial Departments of Health 
generally make allocations to TB control based on financial data from the previous 
year and manage the overall health budgets that are accessed by district health 
management teams (World Health Organisation, 2004b). According to the National 
Department of Health, the cost per TB patient in 2000 was R3 122 (Department of 
Health, 2001). 
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5.3.2 Public sector provision of TB treatment in the Western Cape 
This section describes the organisation and availability of the public sector provision 
of TB treatment in the three study districts in the Metro health region of the Western 
Cape province. Khayelitsha is a peri-urban area consisting of infonnal and fonnal 
settlements. Overcrowding is a serious problem and unemployment is over 37% 
(Central Statistics Service, 1998). This area has grown significantly over the past 
few years and continues to grow. Helderberg is one of the smallest districts in the 
region consisting of urban and rural settlements. Infonnal settlement areas have 
grown significantly over the past few years. Finally, Central district consists of 
mainly urban areas where the choice of health service providers is the greatest, as the 
majority of private practitioners and private hospitals are located in this district. 
Tuberculosis is the predominant communicable disease in the Western Cape. 
Tuberculosis was identified as a provincial emergency in 1997. One of the priorities 
in the late 1990s has been to accurately quantify the epidemic by improving the 
surveillance system through the implementation of TB registers. The cure rates have 
significantly improved in the province which was partly due to the improved service 
delivery in this area. Figure 5.1 shows treatment outcomes for new patients in the 
districts in the 2nd quarter of 2001 (Department of Health, 2002). For new cases, the 
cure rate was highest in Central district (69%) followed by Khayelitsha (66%) and 
Helderberg (63%). All the districts showed much lower cure rates than the nationally 
accepted target of 85%. The gap between cure rate and successfully completed 
treatment rate was the highest in Khayelitsha district (13%), closely followed by 
Helderberg district (12%), and Central district (6%). 
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Figure 5.1: Treatment outcomes for new cases, 2nd quarter 2001 in % 
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With the intention to strive towards the universal provIsIon of a defined 
comprehensive package of care at all PRC facilities (mobiles, clinics, community 
health centres), local authority is given primary responsibility to provide basic PRC 
services, including TB services, within a district-health system. Besides treatment of 
acute cases, a comprehensive package of services includes health promotion and the 
prevention of diseases. Given high levels of unemployment and poverty, the 
comprehensive package is provided free at the point of delivery throughout the 
public primary health care system. The utilisation of primary health care facilities 
has increased by 27% in the period 1997-2000 (Department of Realth, 2000b). The 
main emphasis on TB treatment in the Western Cape changed from hospital to 
ambulatory treatment over 20 years ago. Only patients with particular types of TB 
and particular problems are admitted to specialised hospitals in the province. 
Table 5.1 gives a summary of the population size, number of TB cases reported, TB 
incidence rate, and RN prevalence of TB cases, for each district. In addition the 
table indicates the type and number of health facilities providing TB treatment in the 
districts. The municipal local authority is responsible for rendering preventive and 
curative services at fixed and mobile clinics. The mobile clinics render services to 
infomlal s ttl nl nts a cording to a monthly schedule. The pro incial administr tion 
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manages community health centres. Tuberculosis servIces are provided within a 
comprehensive PRC package through district-based programmes that are 
coordinated by the provincial TB pro gramme. 
Table 5.1: Population, TB incidence, HIV prevalence rate in TB cases and availability 
of TB treatment in 2002, in each district 
Kbayelitsha Helderberg Central 
Population 325 600 138310 381 361 
Number ofTB cases reported 1 376 594 666 
TB incidence per 100 000 423 429 175 
HIV prevalence rate in TB cases 39% 36% 23% 
Health facilities providing TB 
treatment 8 6 8 
- fixed clinics 1 1 0 
- mobile services 3 2 2 
- community health centres 
Source: Metro RegIOn Control Programme, 2002 
The majority of patients attending the health facilities are self-referrals who know 
the clinic by word of mouth or direct knowledge, having been treated before or 
investigated as a household contact. The main PRC providers are nurses, with 
doctors providing support on a daily, and more often weekly, basis. Most of the 
doctors have a sessional agreement with the local authority. The average 
nurse/patient ratio in all three districts is between 40 and 52, substantially higher 
than the accepted nonn of 30 patients per nurse per day. The great disparities in 
nurse/patients ratios per day significantly impacts on the amount of time that can be 
spent on treating and counselling TB patients at facilities and ultimately affects the 
TB treatment outcome indicators for the districts. The clinical personnel at the health 
facilities have been trained in implementation of the revised NTCP. All of them 
provide a range of PRC services and rotate on a 3 monthly basis, except for the DOT 
nursing sisters who provide TB care for 6 months for the sake of continuity of care 
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and bonding with the TB patient. All the clinics are part of a network that has access 
to the National Health Laboratory Service which offers microscopy, culture, 
identification and sensitivity tests. 
5.3.3 Private sector provision of TB treatment 
Private sector providers ofTB treatment could be classified into three major groups: 
1. the private for-profit health sector which includes contractor hospitals, 
private practitioners and private hospitals 
2. employer-based health care providers 
3. the non-profit private sector, represented by NGOs 
Private for-profit providers of TB treatment 
Two main private for-profit providers that provide TB treatment are contractor 
hospitals, and private practitioners/hospitals. South Africa has a long history of 
clinical contracting to for-profit private providers. In the case of contracting for 
hospital management, the annual value of the contracts accounted for 4.1 % of total 
hospital expenditure in 1995 (Hospital Strategy Project, 1996). These contracts are 
specifically for services rendered, and exclude all purchases of goods, supplies and 
equipment. Clinical contracts awarded for hospital TB services are provided by 
Lifecare Group Holdings (Lifecare). Lifecare is a private-for-profit company, funded 
by the government to provide hospital TB care. The company provides TB care in 8 
hospitals with 3 061 beds in four provinces. The contract with Lifecare was inherited 
from previous administrations. A number of different reasons appear to have 
influenced the decisions of the previous administrations to contract out the 
nlanagement of TB hospitals. In many cases, contracts have been so long-standing 
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that the provincial administrations no longer have the capacity to provide certain 
services themselves and have thus become dependent on Lifecare for delivery of TB 
services (Key informant, National TB Control Programme). 
The contract with Lifecare uses per-diem payment method, requiring the government 
to reimburse Lifecare retrospectively for the number of annual patient days 
delivered. Although the total government expenditure on Lifecare was R60 million 
in 2002 (Interview data), there was no indication whether or not the government was 
securing efficiency gains through contracting out TB services. As discussed in 
chapter 2, according to the theory of contracts, efficient contracts require a degree of 
symmetry in the distribution of risk between the parties (Arrow, 1985; Guesnarie, 
1990). This argument is based on the assumption of some degree of asymmetry in 
information between the principal (government purchaser in this case) and the agent 
(contractor in this case), and on the further assumption that the agent will behave 
opportunistically and exploit the contract if given the space to do so. The Lifecare 
contract has been subj ected to systematic review by the various provincial 
administrations which have taken them over. The key issue is that reports which 
used to be submitted to the provinces included information on the annual number of 
patient days which formed the basis for reimbursement, without giving any 
information on the outcome of patient care. 
A study on the relative efficiency of contracting out versus direct provision of 
hospital services in South Africa by Broomberg et al (1997) found that for 
contracting out to generate efficiency gains the necessary conditions for an efficient 
contract must be in place. These conditions include strong government capacity to 
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negotiate, implement and monitor contracts, adequate information on government's 
own production costs, as well as those of competitors, and the presence of actual or 
at least potential competition. The authors of the study argue that: 
"the presence of these conditions will allow for the negotiation of fair 
contracts, with a symmetrical distribution of risk between the government and 
the contractor. Efficient contracts should also rely on reimbursement 
mechanisms which generate incentives for contractor efficiency, rather than 
perverse incentives such as prolonging length of stay" (Broomberg et aI, 1997: 
pp.233-34) 
Most of these conditions are not present in the contract with Lifecare. For example, 
the management and monitoring of the Lifecare contract has been weak. As one of 
the key informants explained: 
HI think it is just management. I mean there is no doubt it is just management, 
and this has been going on for a long time and no one was querying because 
this was comfortable and maybe this was working well" (Key informant, 
Gauteng) 
Although Lifecare is going to continue providing TB services to government on a 
contracted basis in the future, a new contract which includes infonnation on the 
outcome of patient care, is planned to be developed. In addition, reports will have to 
be submitted to provinces on a more regular basis (quarterly as opposed to annual 
reporting in the past). 
The Medical Scheme Act (Act 131 of 1998), effective from January 2000, regulates 
medical scheme coverage for certain defined conditions in terms of prescribed 
minimum benefits (PMBs). Medical schemes are non-profit associations funded 
primarily out of contributions from employers and employees. The aim of the 
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legislation is to prevent schemes that did not provide these minimum requirements 
from abandoning members to the public sector, thereby exhausting public hospital 
facilities. The minimum benefits may be covered by one network of hospitals, which 
includes public sector hospitals (Stein et aI, 2002). 
The prescribed minimum benefits for TB are part of the PMBs for the treatment and 
management of opportunistic infections in HIV / AIDS patients (Department of 
Health, 2000c). The PMBs place emphasis on counselling, testing for HIV and 
treating people with HIV for opportunistic infections such as pneumonia and 
tuberculosis. This includes screening and preventative therapy for these conditions. 
Across all medical schemes, 84% of beneficiaries have access to screening for TB 
and to preventative therapy for TB (Stein et aI, 2002). 
According to one of the largest medical schemes administrators in South Africa, 
most medical schemes cover in-hospital treatment for TB in situations when patients 
are admitted with a form of TB as an AIDS defining disease, e.g. TB meningitis or 
severe pneumonia, requiring hospitalisation. These patients are treated under the 
HIV benefit for the acute event. The treatment for TB is commenced, and after 
discharge the patients become the government's responsibility and are referred for 
further ambulatory treatment to a public clinic. Should a patient require long-term 
hospitalisation for very severe chest disease caused by TB (often associated with 
HIV / AIDS), medical care is provided in public sector hospitals. To summarise, 
medical schemes cover the cost of diagnosis of TB associated with HIV - the 
treatment is, however, still the responsibility of the government. 
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Although the private for-profit sector is responsible for more than half of the national 
expenditure on health, very little treatment for TB is provided by private 
practitioners as medical schemes do not cover TB treatment. According to one of 
the key informants: 
"private providers are not interested in primary health care, including TB 
treatment, because there is no profit to be made. It's hospital procedures and 
specialist services that attract them" (Key informant, Western Cape) 
In the private practitioners' setting, patients diagnosed with TB are referred to the 
nearest public clinic. The three main reasons for referrals are as follows: (1) private 
practitioners do not have the necessary training in managing tuberculosis; (2) 
medical schemes do not cover TB treatment in an ambulatory setting because the TB 
treatment is free of charge in the public sector; and, (3) TB treatment in the private 
sector is costly for the patient and unprofitable for the provider. The exception to this 
is when patients insist on getting TB treatment from their private practitioners. In 
situations like this, the private practitioner initiates the TB treatment using 
combination tablets. A family member is asked to supervise the patient and keep the 
patient's records. The patient makes monthly visits to the private practitioner, more 
if there are side effects. It is the responsibility of the private practitioner to notify the 
provincial TB control programme of the TB patient under treatment in the private 
practice. According to a key informant, cases like this are very rare and, on average, 
around 10 to 15 TB cases a year are treated in the private medical centre where he 
works. Private practitioners refer approximately 99% cases to the public clinics. 
"patients can get TB treatment in the private sector if they insist. However, 
they very quickly realise how expensive TB drugs are and make a plan. Alast 
of them end up in the public sector" (Key informant, Western Cape) 
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Since the provision of TB treatment in the private for-profit sector is minimal the 
author estimated the potential, rather than actual, cost of managing a pulmonary TB 
patient from diagnosis to treatment completion, using 2002 prices. The author's 
calculations are based on the assumption that, during a 6-month treatment period: (1) 
TB patient is supervised by a family member; (2) TB patient makes 7 visits to a 
private practitioner (one visit for initial diagnosis and 6 visits for follow up); (3) 
there are no side-effects to the treatment; (4) investigations include 6 sputum smears, 
1 culture, and 2 chest X-rays; and (5) TB drugs are purchased at a local pharmacy. 
Figure 5.2 below gives a breakdown of the cost estimate. On average, it costs around 
R4 300 to treat a new pUlmonary TB patient in the private sector. The highest cost 
component of the TB treatment is the cost of drugs (R3 000). 
Figure 5.2: Estimated total cost of managing a new pulmonary TB patient from diagnOSis to 
completion of treatment in the private for-profit sector, Rand 2002 
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Investigations Drugs 
Whilst investigations and consultations may be covered by medical schemes the 
entire cost of TB drugs is borne by the patient. The availability of TB drugs in the 
private sector can also be problematic, as local pharmacies usually do not stock TB 
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drugs. In many cases, TB drugs must be ordered in advance which delays the start of 
the treatment. 
Employer-based provision of TB treatment 
Some private companies in South Africa provide and fund on-site health services for 
their employees, ranging from limited primary and/or occupational health care in 
non-mining companies, to comprehensive health care (from primary health care 
through to specialist hospital referral services) on the mines. The mining industry is 
one of the most important industries in the South African economy. Although the 
numbers of employed in the South African mining industry have decreased 
substantially over the past twenty years, it remains a major employer in South 
Africa, with just under 400 000 people in service in the year 2000 (Guild et aI., 
2001). 
According to the notification to the Chamber of Mines South Africa, TB incidence 
rates have increased dramatically. In 1997, the incidence rate among gold miners 
reached 3 000 per 100 000, compared to under 1 000 per 100 000 in the early 1990s 
(Churchyard and Corbett, 2001). Although the increase has occurred among workers 
on all the main commodity mines (i.e. gold, coal and platinum mines), TB incidence 
rates among silica-exposed gold miners are about 3 to 4 times higher than in non-
silica exposed platinum miners, and almost 10 times higher than those among the 
general population (Corbett et aI, 2000). 
Among mIners the increase in TB incidence notification rates has occurred in 
parallel with the increasing prevalence of HIV infection. It was estimated that up to 
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300/0 of mineworkers in certain mines may be HIV positive (Guild et aI, 2001), and 
that the proportion of HI V associated TB among miners exceeds 50% of all TB cases 
in this group (Churchyard and Corbett, 2001). Migrant labour and single sex hostels 
have contributed to the spread of sexually transmitted infections and HIV, both in 
neighbouring residential communities and in remote rural areas. TB associated 
mortality, including deaths from HIV associated opportunistic infection, exceeded 
deaths from mine accidents among gold miners for the first time in 1996, and is the 
leading cause of death amongst gold miners (Churchyard and Corbett, 2001). It can 
be expected that TB incidence rates among miners will continue to increase during 
the next decade unless effective control methods can be identified and implemented. 
In addition to HIV infection, silica inhalation and silicosis are potent risk factors for 
TB, particularly among gold miners. 
According to the main acts that regulate financing and provision of TB services on 
the mines, mining companies are responsible for ensuring TB surveillance, treatment 
and notification, and in cases of possible chronic lung damage, for the assessment of 
impairment and submission of cases for compensation. There is a long history of 
provision of TB treatment in the mining industry. According to the regulatory 
framework, employers are required to cover the cost of TB services for their 
employees. Some mining houses provide medical services, including TB services, 
in-house, whilst other companies contract these services out to managed care 
companies. The managed care companies are paid on a capitation basis by the 
employer to provide a comprehensive service to lower income groups of employees. 
Higher income employees contribute to medical schemes and can choose health care 
providers. 
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Like the majority of employer-based health services, mining companies generally do 
not provide health care services for the wider community (i.e. people other than the 
companies' employees and their dependents). Some companies provide health care 
services to other mining companies, including contractors, on a fee-for-service basis. 
The mining health services generally do not refer TB patients to public sector 
facilities. The only exception are employees who resign and become the state's 
patients, and contract workers working on the mine who are not employees of that 
particular company but are contracted and the contractor does not pay for non-work 
related injuries and illnesses. The latter category of miners depends on public health 
services delivered to 'informal settlements', and shows high treatment interruption 
rates (Key informant, Chamber of Mines). 
Since the great majority of miners still live in hostels, where they usually share a 
room with other miners, some mining health services admit all sputum positive 
patients until they become sputum negative. After two weeks of hospitalisation, or 
longer depending on the particular patient, patients are discharged back into the 
residence community at the mine's shaft, and their treatment is carried on at the shaft 
clinics. In most cases, however, patients are not admitted at all and both the 
investigations and treatment are provided on an outpatient basis. Regardless of 
whether patients are admitted or not, professional nurses or nursing category 
employees administer the treatment under direct observation. The proportion of 
miners who successfully complete TB treatment is high, with treatment interruption 
and failure occurring uncommonly (Key informant, Chamber of Mines). 
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TB control programmes in the mining industry have two major objectives: early 
detection and cure of infectious cases, and prevention of drug resistance (Churchyard 
and Corbett, 2001). In addition to passive case finding ofIB cases, advocated as the 
only method of case detection according to the NTCP guidelines2, South African 
miners are one of the few communities in the world in which routine radiography is 
practiced. Although the proportion of TB cases detected by the radiological 
screenIng programme has declined because of the fact that miners with HIV 
associated TB are more likely to self-present, a substantial number of TB cases are 
still detected on routine x-ray screening (Churchyard et aI., 1999). 
As far as TB diagnosis and treatment are concerned, the mining companies have a 
standard which exceeds what is considered to be acceptable to the National TB 
Control Programme. It has been recommended that, in addition to the NTCP 
guidelines as the minimum standard required for TB control, the mining company 
follows the guidelines developed by the Chamber of Mines in its document, Practice 
Standards for the Management of Patients with Pulmonary TB on Mines (Chamber 
of Mines, 2000). According to Churchyard and Corbett (2001), these guidelines are 
evidence based as far as possible or based on best practice in the industry. The main 
differences between the NTCP and Chamber of Mines' guidelines are outlined in 
Appendix II. The most important ones are that (a) the mining population is routinely 
screened at least annually (active case finding); (b) TB patients' contacts are traced; 
(c) all smear positive TB patients are hospitalised for at least 2 weeks; and, (d) chest 
x-ray is used on all patients irrespective of whether the first smear is positive or 
negative. 
2 Active case finding is expensive, and requires access to an efficient TB treatment programme in 
order to be effective. 
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Non-projit private providers of TB treatment 
There has been a long history of NGOs working in the South African health sector. 
A large NGO, the South African National Tuberculosis Association (SANTA) owns 
and manages 22 hospitals (5 018 beds) located in most of the provinces in the 
country, in which it provides TB treatment to publicly funded patients. In 2002, the 
total amount paid by the provinces to the NGO amounted to RI02 million (Interview 
data), which is approximately 20% of the government's TB budget. SANTA is 
reimbursed on the basis of an agreed tariff per patient day, which varies between 
different hospitals. Under the arrangement, the NGO does not incur any losses, nor 
make any profits, and the government funds any deficits. This situation clearly 
places the burden of risk on the government side, and creates poor incentives for 
efficiency on the part of SANTA. The agreed tariff per patient day in 2001, averaged 
across all the hospitals, was approximately R90. The price charged by SANTA 
covers only 'hotel fees', since the government separately funds drugs, other medical 
supplies and transport. 
The relationship between the provincial department of health and the NGO dates 
back to a verbal agreement reached in the 1950s. The 'contract' remains in the form 
of a 'gentleman's agreement' between the two parties. Under the terms of this 
agreement, the NGO provides two services to the government. Its primary service is 
the provision of hospital care to TB patients. In 1993, it started providing 
community-based TB services through its voluntary branches country-wide. 
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As with the Lifecare contracts, it is difficult to identify any explicit rationale for the 
existence or nature of the SANTA agreement - other than historical. Some provincial 
health administrations have expressed concerns and dissatisfaction with quality of 
care provided by the SANTA hospitals, as well as on the clinical approaches used, 
and on the relationship between these hospitals and the rest of the public health 
system. The concerns seem to emerge from a perception that the 'contract' is based 
on an outdated model of TB care, in which patients are hospitalised for lengthy 
periods. Approaches focus on supervised outpatient treatment close to the patient's 
home, thus reducing the need for a large-scale in-patient capacity, which is often 
sited at long distances from where patients live. 
In 2000, the National TB Control Programme, with technical and financial support 
by the UK Department for International Development, conducted a review of 
services provided by SANTA. Although the results of the review are still 
confidential, indications are that some provinces will take over SANTA hospitals, 
convert them to step down facilities, and use the existing infrastructure for managing 
terminally ill HNIAIDS patients (Key informant, National TB Control Programme). 
5.3.4 Existing public-private partnerships for TB treatment 
Whilst the great majority of TB services in South Africa are provided in the public 
health sector, almost all the provincial TB control programmes have partnerships for 
directly observed TB treatment with non-profit and/or for-profit private providers. 
This section describes the characteristics of different existing public-private 
partnerships in the three study provinces. 
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Partnerships with the non-governmental organisations in the Western Cape 
The NGO sector also plays a vital role in TB treatment at the community level, 
where lay workers, usually volunteers, are increasingly being used as DOT 
supporters. The government has recognised that NGOs have an important role to 
play in the NTCP, as they add value by making treatment more accessible to TB 
patients through various strategies and programmes, including community-based 
DOT. 
"they are the backbone of our DOT support system and basically it is on a 
community-based level and they have three functions in our province. The one 
is health education, the second one is to do the follow up of the interrupters, 
and then the third one is to be a DOT supporter" (Key informant, Western 
Cape) 
The provincial departments of health have developed a good working relationship 
with many of them especially in the priority areas of TB and HIV. The lay workers, 
TB treatment supporters form part of the PHe team that operate external to the 
public health system. In addition to their service delivery, the NGOs provide an 
important link between the formal public health services and the community. Most 
of the NGOs involved in the community TB programmes are concentrated in the 
Western Cape where the community-based TB treatment was initiated with the 
training of DOT supporters by local NGOs in the early 1990s. At the time of this 
study, there were six NGOs and 1 200 trained TB treatment supporters providing 
community-based TB treatment in this province. DOT supporters are active in most 
of the health facilities in the Western Cape, and their services are firmly linked to the 
health services. 
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Although there is a long history of NGOs involvement with TB (some NGOs go 
back to the 1920s and 1930s), it is only since the advent of the revised TB control 
programme in 1995 that the emphasis was on supervision of patients in community-
based programmes. On the other hand, the NGOs have changed the focus and the 
service they provide, and realised that they cannot work in isolation and provide TB 
services without the support or integration with the public clinics. 
In 1996, the Metro region in the Western Cape started building relationships with the 
NGOs on a collaborative basis - both institutions tried to find ways to assist each 
other in providing services to TB patients. After piloting and evaluating the 
community-based programmes, and prompted by the increasing number of TB 
patients in the region, the region decided to formalise relationships with two largest 
NGOs through a memorandum of agreement. According to the memorandum of 
agreement, the region pays an agreed sum per patient per month to the NGO to 
manage a community-based programme. This money is used to pay an incentive to 
the treatment supporters. In addition, the region pays towards the salary of the 
district co-ordinator, the training and general administration costs of the NGO. 
Duration of the agreement is one year renewable, and the NGOs have to reapply for 
funding each year. The region assesses the previous year and renegotiates the 
funding for the next year. Due to the small number of NGOs involved in TB care, 
the initial agreement was directly negotiated. Since working with the private 
providers on TB DOT is a fairly new phenomenon, there have been no guidelines on 
delivery of TB services in the private sector,3 and the province had to develop a 
memorandum of agreement for the partnership with the NGOs from scratch. 
3 At the time of this study. the guidelines on working with the private sector were being developed. 
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The objective of the partnership is to give TB patients the options of where they 
want to be supported for the duration of their treatment, and to improve compliance 
because service could be rendered nearer to where the patients live. As one of the 
key informants explained: 
"the onus really rest on the client (patient) where and how they would actually 
like to be supported for the duration but it is to give that leeway and not have it 
very strict and rigid and no other options to patients" (Key informant, 
Western Cape) 
Another view is that the objective of the partnership is to involve the community to 
take the ownership of the TB and HIV problems in their community: 
"for as long as they perceive it to be a health problem which belongs to the 
government we are not going to make any headway at all. The community has 
to be empowered to understand that they are part of the solution to the 
problem" (Key informant, Western Cape) 
The responsibilities of the NGOs are to efficiently and effectively manage funds that 
are given to them, recruit, train and manage treatment supporters with the 
community, and finally, to liase with the public clinics in the managing of the people 
they have recruited to support patients in the community. Monitoring procedures 
include quarterly reports submitted by each NGO to the regional office, detailing a 
financial statement and proof of payment of all expenditure related to the funding 
received from the regional office, the number of treatment supporters, the number of 
TB patients supervised in community-based programmes, and information on 
training of the treatment supporters. The reports are completed by hand on a 
standardised fom1. 
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One of the NGOs is also involved in supporting TB programmes in the workplace, 
where TB patients are supervised by a colleague at work, a treatment supporter 
trained by the NGO. However, this supervision option is not widely used and only a 
small number of patients choose this option. Table 5.2 shows a percentage of 
registered TB cases in the study districts by type of supervision in the 2nd quarter of 
2002. 
Table 5.2: Percentage of registered TB patients by type of supervision, 20d quarter 2002 
DOT option Khayelitsha Helderberg Central 
Community DOT 30% 44% 12% 
Clinic DOT 61% 48% 55% 
Workplace DOT 3% 4% 10% 
Family member DOT 6% 4% 23% 
Source: Department of Health, 2002 
Quite a high proportion of registered TB patients were supervised in community 
programmes, ranging between 30% and 44%. Whilst Khayelitsha district had a lower 
percentage of patients supervised in the community, the actual number of patients 
was higher than in Helderberg district. The main reason for this is a greater 
availability of treatment supporters in Khayelitsha district with predominantly peri-
urban areas where community-based NGOs manage several community-based TB 
programmes. Workplace supervision option was the least favoured by the TB 
patients, with only 3% to 10% choosing this supervision option. The region's 
medium term development plan is to have 50% of all the registered TB cases 
supervised in the community, including workplace. Of all the districts, Helderberg 
was the closest to the region's target rate, having 48% of all the patients supervised 
in the community (including workplace) in 2002. 
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Partnerships with the mining health services in the Free State and North West 
Historically, the mining industry in South Africa has received subsidies from the 
government to treat TB patients in their facilities. The government's reasons for 
subsidising the mining industry are many. Firstly, since it employs a large number of 
people, the mining industry has an important role to play in the South African 
economy. Secondly, the government recognises that the industry needs to fulfil the 
legal requirements where TB in a mine setting is an occupational disease and the 
mining companies are obliged to identify and treat TB patients. Thirdly, the public 
sector does not have health facilities on the borders of the mines to manage such a 
huge number of TB patients. Even if the miners were using public sector facilities, 
their shift working hours do not coincide with the opening times of the public clinics. 
Finally, in South Africa, employer-based model is a common model of providing 
health services and a significant source of health care. In both North West and Free 
State, the mining industry health services treat almost 10% of all registered TB case. 
At the time of the study, there were partnerships with two platinum mines' health 
services in the North West and partnerships with two gold mines' health services in 
the Free State. In addition, there was a health services provider contracted by a gold 
mining company in the North West that was not working closely with the provincial 
TB control programmes but was seen as a potential partner. 
The subsidies used to be paid per TB patient per day, on a reimbursement basis, and 
the mining health services provided TB treatment according to their own protocol. 
Several years ago, the North West discontinued the subsidy system and replaced it 
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with a system where mining health servIces get TB drugs for each TB patient 
registered and treated by them. The Free State continued with the subsidy system. 
The subsidy amount has not been increased for years and it only covers a small 
fraction of cost of TB treatment provided by the mining health services. 
There are two main reasons for providing the mining health services with the free 
drugs in the North West. First, the TB incidence rate on the mines is the highest in 
the country and is contributing to the epidemic. Second, it is in the interest of the 
provincial TB control programme to have TB epidemic under control. In return for 
the free drugs/subsidy, the mining health services must follow the national treatment 
guidelines, complete quarterly reports using a standardised form and submit them to 
the district TB coordinator, and interact with the district health facilities. Only those 
mining health services that comply with the North West TB Control Programme's 
requirements receive free TB drugs. 
The partnership with the mining health services is very informal, without a written 
agreement in place. The provincial TB coordinator and the representative from the 
mining side meet on a quarterly basis to assess the situation in the previous quarter, 
and make plans for the next one. From the provincial TB control programme's 
perspective, the main objective of the partnership is to integrate TB treatment 
activities in the mining sector into the TB programme with the main aim to correctly 
manage TB and get TB patients cured. From the mining health services viewpoint, 
the objective of the partnership is early identification, high cure rate, compliance 
with the national guidelines and delivery of a cost effective service, which includes 
getting free treatment/subsidy from the government. 
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The interaction between the mining health servIces and the government is very 
important for both stakeholders, and it works well. 
"we know what they want and they know what we want. And if you want your 
programme to be successful, if you want to combat the disease, you have to 
combat it in all areas. If you are going to just do your own thing around here 
and they don't know what we are doing, I don't think that can work" (Key 
infonnant, North W est) 
Partnerships with occupational health services in the Western Cape 
Many occupational health services in the Western Cape have agreements with their 
local authority TB services to provide directly observed TB treatment at work. 
According to this agreement, the public clinic is responsible for investigations and 
TB drugs, and the occupational nurse supervises TB treatment daily at workplace. 
The cost of TB treatment is therefore split - while the cost of the occupational nurse 
is borne by the employer, the government covers the cost of the drugs and 
investigations. A private occupational physician has a contract with the employer to 
provide primary care and occupational health at the factory clinic twice a week. 
Partnerships with private practitioners in the Free State 
Although private practitioners tend to refer their TB patients to the public sector, 
there are examples where private practitioners are involved in the provision of TB 
treatment in a partnership with the district health services. In the Free State, the 
provincial TB programme has trained 293 doctors on the NTCP guidelines 
throughout the province in the last four years, and some of them are doing DOT in 
their consulting rooms. 
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The district TB coordinators generally have a very good relationship with the private 
practitioners. For example, in some cases, TB patients diagnosed in the private sector 
prefer to take their medication at home. In this case, the patient gets a monthly 
supply of drugs from the public clinic, and the doctor takes the responsibility for 
following that patient throughout the treatment according to the national guidelines. 
The doctor is asked to report the outcome to the district TB coordinator. 
Although most of the key informants think that partnerships with private 
practitioners need careful monitoring, there is hope that more private practitioners 
will follow the national guidelines and treat their patients accordingly. As one of the 
key informants explained: 
" ... we are very strict. When they send a patient to the clinic they know they 
must follow the national guidelines. But on the other side, I also want to 
protect my doctors because we can't run a TB programme without the 
cooperation of everyone so I try to have an open relationship "(Key informant, 
Free State) 
Partnerships with traditional healers in the North West 
Traditional healers enjoy considerable status with a high degree of acceptance by 
majority of the South African popUlation. They generally live within their 
communities and are more easily available and accessible than the allopathic health 
servIces. Types of traditional health practitioners can be broadly categorised as 
diviners, herbalists, faith healers and traditional birth attendants. There are an 
estimated 150 000 to 200 000 traditional healers in South Africa (Pretorius, 1999) 
and they are represented by the Council for Traditional Healers. Although there is 
entrenched historical bias towards western/allopathic health care, the government has 
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committed itself to the involvement of traditional healers in official health care 
servIces. 
In order to cope with the increasing numbers of TB patients, the TB control 
programme in the North West has developed good working relationships with 
around 1 000 traditional healers. The traditional healers are integrated into the 
existing community-based TB DOTS programmes, where options for supervision 
consists of the local health clinic, community health workers, lay people, and 
traditional healers. They are working closely with the district clinics and are 
involved in identifying TB suspects and supervising TB patients. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the nature of TB treatment delivery in South Africa, 
focusing on the characteristics of different service providers and interaction between 
these providers. It has also reviewed different partnerships between public and 
private providers ofTB treatment. The four main TB treatment providers are: (1) the 
NTCP operated by and through public health services at district level; (2) the mining 
industry TB services provided either in-house or contracted out to managed health 
care companies; (3) contracted out private-for-profit hospitals; and, (4) the non-profit 
non-governmental organisations providing community-based TB treatment. The 
public health sector is predominant in the provision ofTB care across the country. 
A rapid increase in the detection of TB in a high HIV / AIDS environment and the 
emergence of MDR-TB has led the national and provincial governments to identify 
TB as a priority. With the intention to strive towards the universal provision of a 
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defined, comprehensive package of care at all PHC facilities, local authority is given 
primary responsibility to TB services within a district-health system. Besides 
treatment of acute cases, a comprehensive package of services includes health 
promotion and the prevention of diseases. Given high levels of unemployment and 
poverty, the package is provided free at the point of delivery throughout the public 
primary health care system. As a result, medical schemes do not cover treatment for 
TB, and patients who are diagnosed in the private sector are referred to the public 
sector facilities. 
Different partnerships exist between the providers of TB treatment in the public and 
the providers of TB treatment in the private for-profit and non-profit sectors. 
Amongst the non-profit private providers, both formal and informal partnerships 
exist between the provincial Departments of Health and individual NGOs. The 
government has recognised that NGOs have an important role to play, as they add 
value to the NTCP by making treatment more accessible to TB patients through 
various strategies and programmes, including community-based DOT. Partnerships 
between the for-profit private providers, such as the mining industry health services, 
and the provincial Departments of Health are informal and historical. Informal 
partnerships between the provincial Departments of Health and private 
practitioners/hospitals are emerging. The next two chapters examine the performance 
of two pUblic-private partnerships: a partnership between the provincial Department 
of Health and NGOs providing community-based DOT, and a partnership between 
the provincial Departments of Health and mining companies. Public provision of TB 
treatment is also included as a model, since expanding direct provision represents an 
alternative to partnerships. 
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Chapter 6 
SELECTION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MODELS 
AND QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE TREATMENT FOR 
TUBERCULOSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 has described the nature of TB treatment provision in South Africa. It 
identified and described the main providers of TB treatment, their roles and 
responsibilities for TB treatment, and partnerships for directly observed TB 
treatment that exist between them. Although the predominant provider of TB 
treatment is the public sector, the private for profit sector, through employer-based 
health services, and private non-profit sector, through community-based DOT, make 
a significant impact on the delivery of TB treatment in the country. Some of these 
private providers, such as NGOs, work closely with the public sector facilities and 
are subsidised by the provincial Departments of Health to provide services on behalf 
of the government. Others, like the mining companies, are bound by law to provide 
TB treatment to their employees and are also subsidised for reasons discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
One of the main aims of the study is to evaluate the performance of different models 
of pUblic-private partnerships in the delivery of TB treatment, and to provide a 
comparison between these models and a purely public model of TB treatment. The 
aim of chapters 6 and 7 is to explore whether, in light of the TBIHIV epidemic, 
increased collaboration with private providers through partnerships could potentially 
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improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of TB treatment. For the analysis 
in chapters 6 and 7, a common evaluative framework is used to assess the 
performance of PPP models and a purely public sector model. It examines the 
following: 
1. Quality of care in terms of structure, process and outcome. 
2. The average costs of TB treatment. Costs are disaggregated by different 
dimensions ofTB treatment (e.g. diagnosis, DOT, monitoring) and compared 
to assess technical efficiency. In each evaluation, costs are considered from 
the perspective of health services providers, the tuberculosis programme, 
NGOs involved in tuberculosis care, and patients. 
3. Effectiveness is measured using two measures of effectiveness: cure rate and 
successful treatment completion rate. Judgements on allocative efficiency are 
based on a cost-effectiveness analysis (cost per patient cured and cost per 
patient successfully treated). 
In evaluating the performance of two examples of partnerships for TB treatment, the 
research aims to address both the question of "in terms of quality of care of TB 
treatment, how well do these models work?" and seek answers to "why it this so?" 
By seeking to answer both "how" and "why" questions, the research described here 
was both exploratory and explanatory. To achieve the above aims, and following 
from the concepts highlighted by the initial literature review, a series of research 
questions are posed for each model of service delivery: 
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1. In terms of quality of care of TB treatment, how well do these models work? 
What is the technical, process and outcome quality? 
2. What is the nature of the factors potentially impacting on quality of care? 
3. How do these models compare to the public sector providers of TB 
treatment? 
This chapter starts with the methods, focusing the research process by giving details 
about data collection, definition, selection and justification of PPP models, site 
selection, and methods used for measuring quality of care. Findings on different 
components of quality of care evaluation, the nature of the factors potentially 
impacting on quality of care, and sensitivity analysis results are then presented for 
each study site, and overall for each model of delivery. Chapter 7 presents the 
methods and results of performance of these models in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
6.2 Methods 
This section describes the research process and methods used for evaluating quality 
of care. Details about the fieldwork, PPP model selection, and site selection are first 
given. Description of the objectives, tools and methods used to conduct the 
individual components of quality of care assessment are then presented. 
6.2.1 Research process 
Data collection was undertaken between March 2002 and February 2003. Written 
consent was obtained from all the study providers (see the written consent form in 
Appendix III). Each facility delivering TB treatment within a model of provision of 
interest was visited during this time. Over a period of two to three days data were 
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collected for a comprehensive cost-effectiveness and quality of care evaluation for 
each site. 
To gain permission for the research each provider was contacted individually and 
asked whether he/she would be willing to participate in the study; all were keen to 
agree. The study was described as a joint undertaking between the University of 
Cape Town (VCT) and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM), funded by the UNDPlWorld BanklWHO Special Programme for 
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. Ethical approval was also obtained from 
both the VCT and the LSHTM. All the providers were assured that no facilities 
would be identified. The clinics themselves were only contacted at a later date to 
make logistical arrangements, once they had been informed that the study would take 
place, following consent by the provider. The author played the major role in the 
data collection and analysis. 
All data collection instruments were piloted in a public sector clinic in the Western 
Cape in February 2002. After piloting, semi-structured provider interview schedules 
needed to be modified by adding more "probing" questions for better understanding 
of some of the questions, and by taking out questions which were not within the 
scope of the research and therefore focusing on the most relevant issues. 
6.2.2 Selection of models 
In chapter 5, different existing partnerships between public and private providers of 
TB treatment were reviewed. Amongst the non-profit private providers, both formal 
(in the Western Cape province) and informal (in other provinces) partnerships exist 
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between the provincials health departments and individual NGOs. Partnerships 
between the for-profit private providers, such as employer-based service providers, 
and the provincial health departments are informal and historical. Informal 
partnerships with private practitioners and traditional healers are emerging. In 
addition, the government has contracts with the for-profit company Lifecare and 
with the non-profit provider SANTA. These long-standing contracts reflect a 
historical tendency of the South African government to rely on private providers for 
health services where government capacity was lacking. 
Using purposive sampling, the following existing pUblic-private partnership models 
were chosen for the study: 
1. Public - private for-profit partnership model. Employer based private providers 
were selected as they are a significant source of health care in South Africa. 
Specifically, mining companies were selected, as there is a long history of TB 
treatment in the industry. TB incidence is up to 10 times higher in the mines relative 
to the general population, due both to occupational TB hazards and very high HIV 
prevalence rates among mine workers. Historically, the mining industry in South 
Africa has received subsidies from the government to treat TB patients in their 
facilities. In return for the free drugs or a subsidy, the mining health services are 
expected to follow the national treatment guidelines, complete quarterly reports 
using a standardised form and submit them to the district TB coordinator, and 
interact with the district health facilities. The partnership with the mining health 
services is very informal, without a written agreement or formal contract in place. 
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2. Public - private non-profit partnership model. NGOs were selected as the 
services that they provide represent an important complement to the public sector 
provision of TB services. NGOs have an important role to play, as they add value to 
the NTCP by making treatment more accessible to TB patients through various 
strategies and programmes, including community-based DOT. The government has a 
formal relationship, through a memorandum of agreement, with NGOs involved in 
the community-based supervision of TB treatment. According to the memorandum 
of agreement, the government pays an agreed sum per patient per month to the 
NGOs to run a community TB programme. The programme involves supervision of 
TB treatment using lay workers "treatment supporters", health education and 
advocacy, and training. The duration of the agreement is one year and renewable, 
and the NGOs have to re-apply for funding each year. Due to the small number of 
NGOs involved in DOT of TB, the initial agreement was directly negotiated with the 
NGOs that were already involved in the provision ofTB treatment. 
These models are then compared with purely public provision of TB treatment. In 
order to provide comparisons to the pUblic-private models, and because expanding 
direct provision represents a real alternative to partnerships, purely public provision 
of TB treatment was included as a model. Table 6.1 below summarises the main 
characteristics of different PPP models chosen for this study. 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of study models 
PPP model Type of private Type of subsidy Population Components of 
provider served TB treatment 
provided by the 
private provider 
Public-private for Employer based Drugs or a Low income All 
profit providers in the subsidy per workers 
mining industry patient 
Public-private Comrnunity- Agreed monthly Community Observing 
non-profit based non- sum per patient members patients take the 
governmental medications and 
organisations defaulter tracing 
Purely public Public sector N/A Local residents N/A 
providers 
As discussed in chapter 5, employer-based private providers and NGOs make an 
important contribution to the provision of TB treatment in South Africa, and the 
models chosen for the study therefore best represent the situation. The justification 
for using three models as case studies was that they complement each other by 
demonstrating a range of models of provision over a cross-section of settings. This 
would shed light on the influence of different factors on the overall nature of the 
models of provision. 
There are several reasons for not choosing these providers as the study models of 
PPP. First, the policy in South Africa is moving away from hospital-based TB care 
to ambulatory and community-based care. The concerns seem to emerge from a 
perception that the contracts with both Lifecare and SANTA are based on an 
outdated model of TB care, in which patients are hospitalised for lengthy periods. 
New approaches focus on supervised outpatient treatment close to the patient's 
home thus reducing the need for a large-scale in-patient capacity, which is often 
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sited at long distances from where patients live. Second, relative efficiency of 
contracting out to Lifecare versus direct provision of hospital services has already 
been assessed (Broomberg et aI., 1997). Third, both the Lifecare and SANTA 
contracts have been subjected to systematic review by the various provincial 
administrations. As discussed in chapter 5, there are concerns with quality of care 
provided, and efficiency of the clinical approaches used, by these contractor 
hospitals. 
Models with private practitioners, and especially with traditional healers, were quite 
limited which was the main reason for not selecting them. However, these emerging 
models ofPPP remain a viable option for the departments of health to consider in the 
future. 
6.2.3 Site selection 
For each type of provision model, 2 sites were selected (Table 6.2). Sites were 
selected by purposive sampling according to different delivery models, urban-rural 
locations, and willingness to participate in the study. Differentials among sites in 
terms of TB incidence and HIV prevalence reflected the variation in target 
populations reached by the PPPs. Sites were identified using key informant 
interviews with Provincial TB Programme officials. For the public-private for-profit 
model, two occupational health clinics in different mining companies were selected 
from adjacent provinces to capture differences in reimbursement mechanisms (per 
patient day or drugs). In addition to sputum smears, public-private for-profit sites 
also used sputum cultures and chest x-rays for TB diagnosis. In both sites treatment 
was observed by clinic staff and in site 1 all sputum-positive patients were 
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hospitalised for the first 7 days. For the public-private non-profit model, two clinics 
in the Western Cape province where NGOs have a long history of providing 
community-based TB treatment and social support were chosen in township 
locations where the NGOs tend to operate. Two clinics (urban and rural) in the 
Western Cape province were selected for the public model. These sites were selected 
to represent typical services in rural and urban areas comparable to those served by 
the pUblic-private models of provision. Data from these purely public sites were 
drawn upon as comparisons to the pUblic-private models. 
The sites were also selected to represent similar HIV prevalence amongst study 
popUlations. Sources of data for the estimated HIV prevalence were annual 
occupational medical reports prepared by the medical services in the mining 
companies, and the Western Cape's TB Working Groups' reports for selected 
districts. Since HIV + patients usually get extra pulmonary TB, and HIV prevalence 
is greater on the mines than in the community, sites that have similar HIV rate 
amongst TB patients were selected. However, one of the limitations of this study is 
the fact that HIV rate is generally higher in the mining popUlation than in the 
community. 
Table 6.2 overleaf summarises the major characteristics of the sites selected for 
performance evaluation. The public-private for-profit study sites were two 
occupational health clinics in two mining communities, Site A in North West and 
Site B in the Free State. The pUblic-private non-profit sites were two clinics working 
closely with two NGOs in the Western Cape Town (Sites C and D). Finally, the pure 
public sector sites were two clinics in the Western Cape (Sites E and F). 
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The findings of the quality of care evaluation in the sites were compared in the 
context of the national TB treatment guidelines, regarded as the gold standard in this 
study. This whole study focuses on new smear-positive pulmonary tuberculosis cases 
for several reasons. First, the DOTS strategy in South Africa focuses primarily on 
improving the cure rate in new infectious patients. The past efforts by the provincial 
TB Control Programmes have shown that by doing so the standard of the whole 
Programme is lifted and cure rates for other categories of TB patients also improve 
(Department of Health, 2001). Second, although HIV -positive patients have an 
increased risk of smear-negative and extra-pulmonary TB, the majority of them get 
smear-positive pulmonary TB (Department of Health, 2001). Finally, the national as 
well as provincial TB Control Programmes usually report on smear-positive 
pulmonary TB cases and data on other types of TB is not easily available. 
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Table 6.2: Key characteristics at each site 
Site codes Public-private for-profit Public-private non-profit Purely public 
Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Type of Private for Private for- Private Private Public Public provision profit profit non-profit non-profit 
Type of Occupational Occupational Health Health Health Health 
facility health clinic health clinic clinic clinic clinic clinic 
working working 
closely with closely with 
a local a local 
NGO NGO 
Location Rural town Small rural Urban Rural Small rural Urban city 
in North town in the township3 township in town in the area in the 
West Free State in the the Western Western Western 
Western Cape Cape Cape 
Cape 
Incidence of 
new smear- 1 073 3012 439 149 169 176 
positive 
pulmonary 
TB per 100 
000 
populationb 
Approximated (approx) (approx) (approx) (approx) (approx) (approx) 
HIV 44% 48% 39% 36% 29% 23% 
prevalence in 
the study 
populationC 
Overall TB Surveillance Surveillance Diagnosis, Diagnosis, Diagnosis Diagnosis 
service range for TB, for TB, treatment, treatment and and 
diagnosis diagnosis and social and social treatment treatment 
and and support support 
treatment treatment (e.g. soup (e.g. soup 
kitchen) kitchen) 
DOT system DOT by DOT by DOT by DOT by DOT by DOT by 
in place professional professional professional professional professional professional 
nurses at the nurses at the nurses at nurses at nurses ill nurses ill 
hospital for occupational the clinic the clinic the clinic the clinic 
the [lIst 7 clinic for the [lIst for the [lIst 
days 10 days 10 days 
followed by followed by followed by 
DOT by DOT by lay DOT by lay 
professional worker workers 
nurses at the "treatment "treatment 
occupational supporters" supporters" 
clinic in the in the 
community community 
or or 
professional professional 
nurses ill nurses ill 
the clinic the clinic 
b , 
Q Townships: fonnal and Informal sett lements In pen-urban areas. Source for TB prevalence. proVIders annual 
reports. C Appro imated by the clinic staff as no specific prevalence studies undertaken in clinic target 
populations. 
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6.2.4 Methods for measuring quality of care 
Donabedian (1980; 1985) distinguishes between technical and interpersonal aspects of 
quality health care and between quality of structure, process and outcome with respect 
to each aspect. The technical aspects of quality of care concern the physical 
manipulation of material things (e.g. cleanliness, adequacy of physical facilities, 
treatment appropriate to standard guidelines). Interpersonal interventions are just as 
important as technical ones but are much less predictable in their impact. They 
include politeness, privacy, choice, and information given in a comprehensible 
manner. 
In this study, the three Donabedian's dimensions of quality of care - structure, 
process and outcome, and the relationships between them, were assessed 
(Donabedian, 1980). Structure is frequently taken to mean the resources in the health 
care system including the number, type and training of professionals, the building and 
equipment available, the materials supplied, and the cash devoted to care. 
Donabedian (1987, p76), however, defines structure as 'the more subtle features of 
organisation: differentiation, coordination, power, specification of work, procedures, 
and visibility of consequences. Process refers to the actual delivery of care, and 
includes access, diagnosis, treatment interventions and their administrative and 
technical support, discharge and community after-care arrangements, and health 
promotion and education activities. Outcome is defined as the end result of care. It 
includes health status, improvement in function, longevity, comfort, and, more 
broadly, quality of life. 
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Yin (1994) identifies six possible sources of data for case studies: interview, direct 
observation, participant observation, archives, physical artifacts and documents. 
Specific methods used for the case studies reported here were semi-structured 
interviews, direct observation and record reviews. Table 6.3 summarises the 
objectives, tools and methods used to conduct the individual components of quality of 
care assessment. A more detailed description of the methods used for the assessment 
of the quality of care follows the table. 
Table 6.3: The aims, tools and methods used to measure quality of care 
Ob.iective Tools Method 
1. To measure the technical DefInition of standards for a Technical quality checklist of 
quality range of technical criteria (see buildings, equipment and 
Appendix IV) medical supplies available 
completed, and semi-structured 
interview with facility manager 
conducted, at each site and 
analysed quantitatively. Direct 
observation of the way in which 
the facilities visited were run or 
delivered services informed the 
interpretation of much of the 
data. 
2. To assess the process quality Interview with health care Semi-structure interviews were 
providers to collect information conducted with doctors, nurses 
on technical quality of care - and TB treatment supporters 
the provider'S knowledge of the from study facilities. 
TB treatment guidelines, and 
type of information given to TB 
patients. 
3. To assess the outcome TB patient record reviews were Retrospective reviews of TB 
quality (treatment outcome) used to analyse the quality of patient records were conducted 
treatment offered to TB at each site. 
patients. Record reviews were 
conducted to (a) assess (a) 
adherence to TB treatment, and 
(b) treatment outcome. 
The quality of care assessment adopted a modified evaluation approach from Rispel et 
al (1996) and combined several data collection tools for qualitative and quantitative 
information. These data collection tools were adapted versions of questionnaire 
d signed for a study on contracting PRe services to private providers in Southern 
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~a (PRICON study!) (Mills et aI. , 2003). Drawing on the literature review in 
ter 2, criteria or specific attributes of the TB service (i.e. specific elements of TB 
that should be present at the facilities) were identified for evaluation. A proposed 
of criteria as indicators of quality was then compiled and discussed by health 
ice professionals and academics who together had extensive experience in the 
:h African health services. Based on their comments, the author fmalised the list 
riteria. The degree to which these criteria were present in each of the sites was 
assessed in a combination of ways, using qualitative and quantitative analysis 
through a composite scoring method (see Appendix IV for scoring method). 
~ods used for assessing technical quality 
mical quality was assessed via a technical quality checklist, a semi-structured 
~iew with the facility manager, and direct observation. For each site, one 
:klist and one manager's interview were completed. Justification for conducting 
interview with the facility manager is the fact that each facility employs only one 
ager. The interview usually lasted one hour. To ensure consistency of 
pretation, the author completed the checklist in each site. The manager's 
view was held with the facility manager or acting manager. The interview with 
facility manager included questions on types of services offered at the facility, 
ling hours, waiting time, management and support, in-service training and 
inuing education, workload and staff establishments, service delivery and access, 
quality assurance (copy of interview schedule can be found in Appendix V). All 
views were taped and analysed by the author. 
r ON proj t e aluated whether contracts between health authorities and private pro iders for the 
:ry of primary h alth care .(~H ) to people dependent on publicly fun~~d ~HC can be ~ desirable 
uti e to dire t public pro 1 lOn, partl ularly for under- erved commUll1t1es III outh Africa. 
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The technical quality checklist used in this study included the following categories: 1) 
infrastructure; 2) access; 3) management and staffing; 4) drugs and diagnostic testing; 
and, 5) patient environment. Each category was awarded standardised scores 
according to a standardised list of scores (Rispel et aI., 1996) (see scoring tool in 
Appendix N). The infrastructure category looked at the following indicators: 
electricity, adequate toilets, functioning refrigerator, emergency kit, drug storage, and 
cleanliness. In terms of the access category, indicators were the size of building for 
patient load, a range of TB services offered, whether emergency instructions after 
hours were posted, the facility opening times, availability of TB treatment after hours, 
position in relation to community served, and availability of transport for TB patients. 
The management and staffing assessed continuing education in DOTS, workload 
(patient load per full-time equivalent consulting/professional staff), quality assurance 
at the facility, record keeping systems, and whether active defaulter tracing was in 
place. The category drugs and diagnostic testing assessed the availability of a copy of 
the National TB Control Programme Practical Guidelines, essential TB drugs, and 
diagnostic tests in the facility, whether active case finding was in place, and turn-
around time for sputum smear test results. Finally, the patient environment category 
included waiting time, adequacy of the waiting area, patient privacy, patients' 
complaints/suggestions mechanisms, whether health education materials were on 
display, and where the first sputum specimen is collected (health safety issue). 
Methods used for assessing process quality 
A detailed interview schedule was used to conduct sixteen semi-structured interviews 
with health care providers, including doctors (n=6; 1 doctor in each site), nurses (n=6; 
1 nurse in each site) and treatment supporters (n=2; 1 treatment supporter in site C 
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and 1 in site D) (see Appendix VD. The main reasons for the chosen sample size (one 
doctor, one nurse and one treatment supporter per facility) were to cover a range of 
different service providers (doctors, nurses, and treatment supporters), rather than 
conduct more interviews with the same provider type. The interviews sought to gather 
factual information on their knowledge of TB treatment guidelines, in particular, TB 
diagnostics and procedures, TB treatment methodology, management of side effects 
ofTB treatment, and patient education. These interviews were also used to elicit staff 
perceptions of the problems with which the facility was faced. The interviews usually 
lasted between one hour and one and half hours. The information from the health care 
provider interviews was analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Methods used for assessing outcome quality 
A total of 120 records of new sputum positive pulmonary TB patients were reviewed 
in 6 facilities to measure patient adherence to TB treatment and treatment outcome. A 
sample of records was selected from the TB patient register in each site for all the 
patients who started the treatment in the period January - June 200l. Every second 
record was selected and the sample consisted of 25 records in each site. The sample 
size of 25 records in each site was chosen due to a considerable time it takes to review 
a single patient record. As this study's focus was on the new pulmonary patient, all 
the records for re-treatment cases were discarded. The number of records reviewed in 
each site was as follows: 23 in site A, 21 in Site D and 19 in sites B, C, E and F. For 
each patient, the following data were recorded: 1) date of diagnosis, 2) patient 
category and treatment regimen, 3) record and result of sputum test at the end of the 
intensive phase of the treatment 4) record of whether the treatment was completed, 
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and 5) treatment outcome (see Appendix VII). The records were analysed in the 
context of the National TB Treatment Guidelines. 
6.2.5 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken to assess the robustness of the results to 
changes in the weights used for each category in the composite score. A new 
composite score for the quality of care assessment, where categories that may have 
more influence on the final quality of care score, such as access and treatment 
outcomes, were allocated a higher weight, in order to minimize the influence of other 
components such as patient environment, infrastructure and the provider knowledge 
on the final score. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Technical quality 
Technical quality performance at each site is shown in Table 6.4. Each category is 
discussed in detail below. 
Table 6.4: Technical quality performance (0/0 of maximum score for each category8) 
Public-private for- Public-private Pure public 
Category profit model non-profit model model 
Site A Site B Site C Site D SiteE Site F 
Infrastructure 96% 96% 54% 89% 89% 69% 
Access 88% 97% 64% 73% 60% 64% 
Management and staffing 77% 77% 70% 70% 29% 29% 
Drugs and diagnostic 930/0 100% 75% 75% 81% 750/0 
testing 
Patient environment 56% 80% 66% 74% 82% 67% 
a The cOring method IS presented 10 AppendIx IV. 
166 
Infrastructure category produced varied results, with scores ranging from 54% to 
96%. This category aimed to establish essential technical criteria for TB treatment 
delivery: reliable electricity, functioning refrigerator, sanitation, emergency kit, safe 
drug storage and cleanliness. Sites A and B achieved a high score for infrastructure, 
followed by sites D and E. Site C lacked adequate sanitation (less than 3 toilets per 
100 patients per day, and no wheelchair access toilet) and several areas of the facility 
were dirty. As a result, this site achieved a score of 54%. Site F also scored low in this 
category mainly because an emergency kit on site was incomplete and waiting area in 
the facility was dirty. 
The second category aimed to measure geographical and physical access to TB 
services, and the range and frequency of TB services offered. Sites C and E were 
often overcrowded and sites D and F were overcrowded on peak days only. Only sites 
A and B offered a wide range of TB services on site, treatment, laboratory and 
radiology investigations, and had emergency instructions after hours clearly visible. 
TB patients in all other sites had to visit another clinic/day hospital for radiology 
investigations. Sites E and F did not offer TB treatment after hours and were within 
2km for less than 40% of population served. Site B scored very high (970/0) because it 
offered a range of TB services, including transport services for TB patients. 
Management and staffing assessed training, workload, quality assurance at the 
facility, record keeping system and defaulter tracing. This category also produced 
very varied results, with scores ranging from 290/0 to 77%. Common problems were 
the absence of continuing education programmes (all sites), quality assurance 
Inechanism at the facility (sites A, B, E and F) or active defaulter tracing system in 
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place (sites E and F). In addition, sites E and F had a low staff to patient ratio (over 45 
patients were seen per day per full-time equivalent staff). These two sites achieved the 
lowest score (29%). All sites had a good record keeping system, where it was possible 
to link a TB patient to hislher records. 
Site B scored 100% on drugs and diagnostic testing category. This category assessed 
the availability of a copy of the standard TB guidelines, essential TB drugs, diagnostic 
testing available at the facility, active TB screening and tum around time for sputum 
smear test result. In comparison with other sites, site C scored low in this category 
(66%) in reflection of the availability of basic TB drugs. This site was lacking in some 
basic TB drugs (Rifanah 300) for a week including the main pharmacy in the area. For 
diagnostic testing component of this category, only sites A and B offered a range of 
diagnostic testing at the facility. 
The patient environment category included waiting time, adequacy of the waiting 
area, patient privacy, patient complaints mechanism in place, whether education 
materials were on display, and safety (whether the first sputum specimen is collected 
in a well ventilated area or outside without others watching). Different sites exhibited 
a range of strengths and weaknesses. The most serious problems were long waiting 
times (sites E and F in particular), insufficient patient privacy (sites A, C and E), a 
lack of health education materials available for patients (site A and B), and safety 
(sites A, C, D and F). 
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6.3.2 Process quality 
This section starts with a brief overview of the characteristics of health care providers 
in the study sites. It then presents findings on the providers' knowledge of the national 
TB treatment guidelines, main problems regarding working conditions they 
experience, and their motivation for the work they are doing. 
Characteristics of health care providers 
More than half (67%) of the doctors interviewed were women (in sites B, C, D, and 
E) and the majority (83%) had qualified since 1990 (in all sites but A and D). This 
suggests that the mean age of the majority of doctors was thirty-five years and 
younger. Three (43%) had post-graduate training, mostly as diplomas or masters 
degrees. All the nurses who were interviewed were female and all had a diploma in 
nursing. The year of graduation ranged from 1988 to 1999, reflecting a wide variety 
of experience in nursing. All the treatment supporters interviewed had a mean of 6 
years of schooling and worked as volunteers in the community. All health care 
providers were trained on DOTS. 
Knowledge of the TB treatment guidelines 
This category looked at the health care providers' knowledge of standard TB 
treatment guidelines and information given to TB patients by health care providers. It 
included the providers' knowledge of symptoms and signs of TB, the first diagnostic 
test used for confirmation of pulmonary TB, essential TB drugs and the dosage, side 
effects, management of side effects, and information given to TB patients. The 
knowledge by the health care providers was assessed against the national TB 
treatnlent guidelines. The percentage of the possible maximum score that the health 
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care providers achieved in this category is shown in Table 6.5 (as % of the maximum 
score achievable for that facility). 
Table 6.5: Process quality performance 
Public-private for- Public-private Purely public 
Category profit model non-profit model model 
Site A SiteB Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
(n=2) (n=2) (n-3) (n-3) (n=2) (n=2) 
Knowledge of most common Very Very Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate 
symptoms of pulmonary TB gooda good 
Knowledge of the first Very Adequate Very Adequate Very Very 
diagnostic test for good good good good 
confirmation of pulmonary 
TB 
Knowledge of the essential Very Very Adequate Adequate Very Very 
TB drugs and the dosage good good good good 
Knowledge of side effects of Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate 
TB treatment 
Knowledge of management Adequate Very Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate 
of side effects of TB good 
treatment 
Information given to TB Adequate Adequate Adequate Very Very Adequate 
patients good good 
Combined score for the 89%* 89% 83% 83% 89% 86% 
category using the 
J!eometric mean 
a The scoring method is presented In AppendIx IV. For example, where all 7 symptoms ofTB were mentIoned, the 
site scores 'very good' or 100%. Ifbetween 3 and 5 symptoms were mentioned, the site scores 'adequate' or 80%. 
The most common symptoms of pulmonary TB are persistent cough for 3 weeks or 
more; sputum production; shortness of breath, and chest pain; loss of appetite and loss 
of weight; a general feeling of illness; tiredness and loos of motivation; and night 
sweats and fever (Department of Health 2000a). All health care providers mentioned 
persistent cough for 3 weeks or more and night sweats and fever as some of the 
symptoms of pulmonary TB. Only one health care provider (a nurse in site D 
mentioned "a general feeling of illness" as an additional symptom ofTB. 
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According to the national TB treatment guidelines, new patients are diagnosed using 2 
sputum microscopy smears and subsequently twice more during treatment to monitor 
progress. Cultures are not done routinely for new cases and x-rays are not 
recommended for first-line diagnosis. New TB patients are given standardised short-
course drug regimens in the correct combination and dosage 5 days a week for 6 
months. The essential drugs for pulmonary TB are isoniazid, rifampicin, 
pyrazinamide, streptomycin and ethambutol (their dosages and combinations are 
given in Appendix VI) (Department of Health 2000a). Whilst all the providers in sites 
E and F knew that the first diagnostic test for confirmation of pulmonary TB is a 
sputum test, a nurse in site B was incorrect in saying it was a chest x-ray, and a 
treatment supporter in site D did not know the answer. All the providers except the 
treatment supporters in sites C and D could list the essential drugs for pulmonary TB 
and their correct dosage. 
The minor side effects of TB treatment are anorexia, nausea, abdominal pain, joint 
pain, burning sensation in feet, and orange/red urine. The major side effects are skin 
itching/rash, anaphylactic reaction, deafness, dizziness, jaundice, vomiting and 
confusion, visual impairment, and generalised reaction, including shock and purpura 
(Department of Health 2000a). All sites scored 80% for the knowledge of side effects 
of TB treatment in pulmonary TB. In sites A and B doctors had a very good 
knowledge but nurses only had poor-to adequate knowledge. In sites C and D, both 
doctors and nurses had a very good knowledge of side effects but treatment supporters 
had a very poor knowledge - they either could not remember or mentioned only 2 side 
effects. In sites E and F, both doctors and nurses had adequate knowledge of side 
effects. 
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Whilst all providers gave a correct answer when asked what advice they would give to 
a TB patient who is on TB treatment and who is complaining of nausea ("give tablets 
last thing at night") and orange urine ("reassurance"), they failed on what advice they 
would give if the patient is experiencing visual impairment. Only one doctor in site B 
said she would stop the treatment immediately. 
When asked what information they provide to a patient who is diagnosed with TB, all 
the providers gave adequate to very good information. In each site, more than two-
thirds of the providers provided TB patients with information on method of taking 
drugs. Fifty percent of providers in sites E and F, and one-third of the providers in 
sites A, B, C and D, informed TB patients about the disease and adverse effects of the 
treatment. Whilst 50% of providers in sites A and B and 15% of providers in sites C 
and D, none of the providers in sites E and F advised TB patients to have a good 
healthy diet. Similarly, none of the providers in sites E and F advised their patients on 
the symptoms of TB and family contact tracing. However, whilst none of the 
providers in sites A, B, C, and D mentioned commitment and responsibility, two-third 
of the providers in sites E and F said they would advise a TB patient to be committed 
and responsible to complete the treatment. Overall, providers in sites D and E gave 
more extensive information to TB patients and achieved a score of 100%. 
In summary, all sites achieved a similar score (between 83% and 89%) in technical 
quality of care category. In comparison to other sites, sites C and D scored lower, 
mainly as a reflection of a poor knowledge of the first diagnostics test for 
confirmation of pulmonary TB and the essential TB drugs by the treatment 
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supporters. On average, sites A and B achieved the highest score (91 %), followed by 
sites E and F (88%) and sites C and D (83%). This was mainly due to the very poor 
knowledge of treatment supporters. 
6.3.3 Outcome quality 
According to the South African TB Control Programme Guidelines, the mam 
treatment outcome indicators are compliance by the patients to the treatment regimen, 
keeping the treatment interruption rate below 5%, and smear-conversion after the first 
part of the treatment (intensive phase). A well functioning TB control programme 
must achieve a smear conversion rate of at least 85% amongst new smear positive 
cases. In this study, key treatment outcome indictors included: 
(a) the successful treatment completion rate (% of patients who are cured plus 
those who completed treatment but without laboratory proof of cure); 
(b) the interruption rate (% of patients whose treatment was interrupted for two 
months or more); 
(c) the sputum conversion rate (% of smear-positive patients who converted to 
sputum smear-negative after the first phase of the treatment); and, 
(d) the cure rate (% of patients who are proven to be cured using smear 
microscopy at the end of the treatment). 
Table 6.6 below shows the findings of the records review at each site. As the findings 
indicate, patients supervised in the public clinics (sites E and F) generally had lower 
treatment completion rates, and patients supervised in the occupational health clinics 
in the workplace (sites A and B) and in the community (sites C and D) achieved 
highest treatment completion rates. Overall, the proportion of patients successfully 
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completing the minimum of six months' treatment ranged from 74% (site E to 8 00 
(sites B and D). 
Table 6.6: Treatment outcome rates for new pulmonary TB patients 
Indicator Public-private Public-private Purely public 
for-profit model non-profit model model 
Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Treatment completion rate 86% 87% 82% 87% 74% 78% 
Treatment interruption rate 1% 1% 11% 7% 24% 17% 
Sputum conversion rate 82% 80% 67% 81% 73% 68% 
Cure rate 83% 81% 65% 87% 64% 78% 
The treatment interruption rate in sites C, D, E and F was between 1.5 and 4.8 times 
higher than the national target rate of 5%. Less than 1 % of TB patients in sites A and 
B interrupted the treatment. It is suspected that this relatively low treatment 
interruption rate is mainly because of a 'parading,2 system that is in place in the 
mining medical facilities. 
Percentage of patients who had their sputum collected at the end of the intensive 
phase of the treatment ranged from 67% (site C) to 82% (site A). Cure rate was 
between 64% (site E) and 87% (site D). Only site D achieved the national target cure 
rate of 85%. Table 6.7 below summarises the treatment outcome quality perfonnance 
for each treatment outcome indicator. It also presents a combined score for this 
category using the geometric mean. More detailed infonnation on this category is 
shown in Appendix IV. 
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Table 6.7: Outcome quality performance (% of maximum score) 
Public-private Public-private Purely public 
Category for-profit model non-profit model model 
Site A SiteB Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Treatment completion rate 100%a 100% 60% 100% 20% 20% 
Treatment interruption rate 100% 100% 60% 60% 20% 20% 
Sputum conversion rate at 60% 60% 20% 60% 600/0 20% 
the end of the first phase 
Cure rate 60% 60% 20% 100% 20% 60% 
Combined score for the 80% 80% 40% 80% 30% 30% 
category using the 
geometric mean 
a The. sconng method IS presented In AppendlX IV. For example, If less than 70% of patIents completed treatment, 
the sIte sc~res 10%, and if more that 84% of patients completed treatment, it scores 100% (as one of the aims of 
the NTCP IS to have 85% completion treatment rate). 
In the treatment outcome category, sites A, Band D achieved 80%. In these three 
sites, over 84% of TB patients completed their TB treatment. In sites A and Bless 
than 1 % of patients interrupted treatment, and in site Dover 840/0 of patients were 
cured at the end of the treatment. The scores in the other three sites ranged from 300/0 
to 40% reflecting differences in treatment completion, interruption and cure rates. 
6.3.4 Development of a composite score for the quality of care assessment 
In order to quantify the quality of care assessment at each site, a composite scoring 
method was developed by drawing selected criteria from different components of the 
quality of care assessment and grouping them into categories (see Table 6.8). For 
example, the infrastructure category included criteria concerning electricity, drug 
storage and toilets. Each criterion was scored out of ten and these scores were 
combined to produce the total score for that category, also out of ten. The method 
used to combine the individual criteria scores into a final score for the category was 
the geometric mean. By using the geometric mean rather than the arithmetic mean the 
- If a patient does not take hi daily TB drugs, he is not allowed to work and therefore not allowed to 
am hi wage until he continue with the treatment. The patient has to report to the clinic here he i 
£ rrnally coun elled, and in orne ca e , if this is repeated fIred. 
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final score is not influenced by either very high or very low individual scores. In 
addition, it reflects the compounding effect of quality shortfalls and allo\ s the 
definition of essential criteria, whose absence would produce a very low overall score 
(Beattie et aI., 1995; Rispel at aI., 1996). 
Table 6.8: Categories and their respective criteria used in the composite score 
Cate20ry Description Weight 
Infras tructure Establishes minimum technical requirements such 10% 
as electricity, sanitation, cleanliness. 
Access Geographical access, physical access for the 12.5% 
disabled, facility size and opening times, and the 
range of TB services offered. 
Management and staffmg Continuing education, patient load per full time 15% 
equivalent professional/consulting staff, record 
systems, quality assurance, active defaulter tracing. 
Drugs and diagnostic testing Availability of the standard TB treatment 10% 
guidelines, essential TB drugs, diagnostic testing, 
tum around time for sputum smear results. 
Patient environment Wide range of issues related to patient care 10% 
including waiting time, waiting area, patient 
privacy, health education materials, patient 
complaints/suggestions. 
Technical quality of care Knowledge of symptoms of pulmonary TB, 17.5% 
diagnostic criteria and procedures, treatment 
methodology, management of side effects, patient 
education. 
Treatment Quantifies the review of clinical treatment of TB, in 25% 
particular adherence to TB treatment, and treatment 
outcome. 
To determine the individual score for each criterion, several levels of achievements 
were defined. For example, within the "patient environment" category, there was a 
criterion on total patient time spent at the facility. The levels of achievement were 
defined as minutes spent at the facility, with <30 minutes scoring ten and >60 minutes 
scoring three. There were two other possible levels of achievement in this criterion 
which scored five and eight respectively. 
The best score is ten out of ten, and the poorest anything from 0.1 to 9 out of t n 
d pending how important the criterion was judged to be for 0 erall quality. Th 1 \\ r 
the poorest score, the more critical the absence of that criterion was considered for 
overall quality. For example, the total absence of a reliable electricity power supply 
got a score of 0.1, while the absence of after-hours instructions/contact recei ed a 
score of eight. The value of the poorest score therefore became the mechanism of 
weighting the criteria relative to each other, within the category. 
The criteria were grouped into seven categories and each category was weighted in 
the final analysis, as shown in Table 6.8 above. The combination of categories was 
weighted using arithmetic mean. Categories and their respective criteria used in the 
composite score, and the weights for each category, were adapted from the study by 
Rispel et al (1996). 
The composite score combined different categories in order to quantify the quality of 
care. The criteria were grouped into seven categories. The results of the seven 
categories at each site are shown in table 6.9, followed by discussion of the findings. 
The complete set of criteria and scores achieved at each site are shown in the 
Appendix N. 
Table 6.9: Summary of scores achieved in each of the seven categories at the study sites 
Public-private for- Public-private Pure public 
Category profit model non-profit model model 
Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Infras tructure 96% 96% 54% 89% 89% 69% 
Access 88% 97% 64% 73% 60% 64% 
Management and staffing 77% 77% 70% 70% 29% 29% 
Drugs and diagnostic 93% 100% 75% 75% 81% 75% 
testing 
Patient environment 56% 80% 66% 74% 82% 67% 
Technical quality of care 89% 89% 83% 83% 89% 86°,'0 
Treatment outcome 80% 80% 40% 80% 30°'0 30% 
These seven categories were weighted in the final analysis as shown in Table 6.10. 
The combination of categories was by weighted arithmetic mean. 
Table 6.10: Weighted composite scores for each category at study ite 
Category Weight Public-private Pu blic-private Pure public 
for-profit model non-profit model 
model 
Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Infrastructure 10% 9.6% 9.6% 5.4% 8.9% 8.9% 6.9% 
Access 12.5% 11.0% 12.1% 8.0% 9.1% 7.5% 8.0% 
Management and 15% 11.5% 11.5% 10.5% 10.5% 4.3% 4.3% 
staffing 
Drugs and diagnostic 10% 9.3% 10.0% 7.5% 7.5% 8.1% 7.5% 
testing 
Patient environment 10% 5.6% 8.0% 6.6% 7.4% 8.2% 6.7% 
Technical quality of care 17.5% 15.50/0 15.5% 14.5% 14.5% 15.5% 15.0% 
Treatment outcome 25% 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 7.5% 7.5% 
Total 100% 82.5% 86.7% 62.5% 77.9% 60.00/0 55.9% 
Figure 6.1 shows the overall weighted total composite score for each site. Sites F and 
E achieved the lowest overall weighted total at 55.90/0 and 60.0% respectively 
reflecting heavy workloads, poor access and poor treatment outcome. Sites B and A 
achieved a weighted total score of 86.7% and 82.5% respectively, reflecting a good 
technical, process and outcome quality of care. Site C and D scored somewhere in 
between, 62.5% and 77.9% respectively. 
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Figure 6.1: Total quality of care scores at each site 
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6.3.5 Sensitivity analysis 
The results were robust in sensitivity analysis (see Table 6.11). With alternative 
assumptions regarding the weights used for each category (a composite scoring 
method where more TB related categories were allocated a higher weight) sites A and 
B still had the highest total composite score and, therefore, conclusions remain the 
same. 
Table 6.11: Sensitivity analysis results 
Category Weight Public-private Public-private Pure public 
for-profit model non-profit model 
model 
Site A SiteB Site C SiteD SiteE Site F 
Infrastructure 5% 4.8% 4.8% 2.7% 4.4% 4.4% 3.4% 
Access 20% 17.6% 19.4% 12.8% 14.6% 12.0% 12.8% 
Management and 10% 7.70/0 7.7% 7.0% 7.0% 2.9% 2.9% 
staffing 
Drugs and diagnostic 10% 9.3% 10.0% 7.5% 7.5% 8.1% 7.5% 
testing 
Patientenvrronment 5% 2.8% 4.0% 3.3% 3.7% 4.1 % 3.3% 
Technical quality of care 15% 13.3% 13.3% 12.4% 12.4% 13.3% 12.9% 
Treatment outcome 35% 28.0% 28.0% 14.0% 28.0% 10.5% 10.5% 
Total 1000/0 83.5% 87.2% 59.7% 77.6% 55.3% 53.3% 
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6.3.6 Quality of care of different models of delivery 
Table 6.12 shows the average weighted scores for each model of delivery. 
Table 6.12: Average weighted composite scores for each model of delivery 
Category Public-private for- Public-private nOD- Purely public 
profit model profit model model 
Infrastructure 9.6% 7.1% 7.9% 
Access 11.5% 8.5% 7.7% 
Management and staffing 11.5% 10.5% 4.3% 
Drugs and diagnostic 9.6% 7.5% 7.8% 
testing 
Patient environment 6.8% 7.0% 7.4% 
Technical quality of care 15.5% 14.5% 15.2% 
Treatment outcome 20.0% 15.0% 7.5% 
Total 84.6% 70.2% 57.9% 
The figure 6.2 below summarises the total average technical, process and outcome 
quality of care represented as a total average score for each model of delivery. The 
findings are discussed in more detail below. 
Figure 6.2: Total average quality of care score for each model of delivery 
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In terms of technical quality, the public-private for-profit model of deli ery of TB 
treatment scored higher than the public sector model of delivery in all categori 
except "patient environment". A lack of health education material on display or 
available to take home as well as a clear system for patient complaints/suggestions 
mechanism contributed to a slightly lower score in the category. In terms of process 
quality, the public-private for-profit and public models of delivery achieved almost 
the same score, reflecting a very good knowledge of the treatment guidelines for both 
private and public sector health care providers. As far as the outcome quality of care 
is concerned, the pUblic-private for profit model scored much higher (20%) for this 
category compared with much poorer treatment outcomes in the purely public sector 
(7.5%). 
Public-private non-profit model of delivery of TB treatment 
The public-private non-profit model of delivery of TB treatment scored higher than 
the purely public model in three out of seven categories of the quality of care 
assessment. First, accessibility was better because of the availability of TB treatment 
after hours. Second, management and staffing category achieved a high score of 100/0 
as a result of lower patient load per full-time equivalent consulting/professional staff, 
the existence of a quality assurance system at the facility, and active defaulter tracing 
in place. Last, all four treatment outcome indicators were better, partly reflecting 
patient's adherence to treatment and partly provider's adherence to the treatment 
guidelines. For the remaining four categories, scores were very close to those of the 
public sector model. For instance, in terms of process quality, the public-private non-
profit model scored 14.5% compared to 15.2% achieved in the public sector model. 
On average for all seven categories, and compared to the pure public sector model, the 
public-private non-profit model showed better technical, process and outcome quality 
of care. 
181 
Purely public model of delivery of TB treatment 
An important finding of the composite scores was the indistinct relationship between 
the resources available and the quality of the clinical treatment provided. The poor 
quality of treatment in the purely public sector clinics could be connected to the lack 
of resources. Under-resourced clinics and poor management of the available resources 
in the purely public sector model of delivery was reflected in the low treatment 
outcome indicators. For instance, a lack of logistics support such as transport facilities 
for TB patients or defaulter tracing in the public clinics could have influenced 
patient's compliance with treatment. The possibility of under-resourced clinics could 
be the reason for the poor public system. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings of the performance evaluation, in terms of 
quality of care, of different models of pUblic-private partnerships in delivery of TB 
treatment. It has also described differences in quality of care between these models 
and a pure public model of TB treatment. Data presented suggest that the quality of 
care is superior in both models of public-private partnerships for TB treatment when 
compared to the purely public sector model of delivery ofTB treatment. 
Although differences in quality of care between the models can be identified, their 
cause is a more complex issue. The mining companies provide TB treatment to their 
employees within a very well resourced private health systen1 in which the employees 
have a strong economic rationale to complete the treatment due to the 'parading' 
system in place. The NGOs, on the other hand, have a strong ideology of care and 
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support. They develop alternative strategies for community-based TB treatment and 
make the treatment accessible to poorer community members. Finally, the relatively 
poor quality of TB treatment in the purely public model of delivery could be directly 
linked to insufficient funding, poor working conditions for doctors and nurses, and the 
flight of skills to the private sector or overseas. 
Essentially, it is the responsibility of the government to provide TB treatment to all 
South African citizens. However, the models of delivery evaluated here have had an 
active role in the management of TB due to a combination of history, legislation, 
necessity and verbal agreement. The legislation has placed the onus of improved 
medical surveillance of all workers on the employer and has resulted in better 
equipped resources and mine occupational health facilities. Providers like the mining 
companies in this study have the institutional capacity to be involved in TB treatment. 
The community-based DOT programmes run by NGOs have the potential to improve 
accessibility to TB treatment and provide a TB patient with an alternative treatment 
supervision option. 
The capacity of the public sector to provide subsidies and supply drugs might be 
enough for the pUblic-private partnerships to deliver high quality of care to TB 
patients. It is important, however, that the government maintains control by making 
sure that all providers of TB treatment follow the national TB treatment guidelines. 
In that way the government keeps control of quality of care and gets data on all 
patients under treatment. 
IS3 
The findings in this chapter show that, in light of the TBIHIV epidemic, increased 
collaboration with private providers through partnerships could potentially inlprove 
the quality of care. The next chapter will evaluate performance of the partnerships in 
terms of cost-effectiveness of TB treatment provision and the nature of the factors 
potentially impacting on cost-effectiveness. 
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Chapter 7 
FINANCING AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TUBERCULOSIS TREATMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 has presented the methods and findings of the quality evaluation of 
different models of pUblic-private partnerships for the provision of TB treatment. It 
has described differences in quality of care between these models and a purely public 
provision of TB treatment. The findings suggest that the quality of care is superior in 
both pUblic-private partnership models of delivery of TB treatment when compared 
to the purely public sector, and therefore show that, in light of the TBIHIV epidemic, 
increased collaboration with private providers through partnerships could potentially 
improve the quality of care and increase access to care. 
This chapter looks at cost and cost-effectiveness of different PPP arrangements in 
the provision of TB treatment, and the financing required for the different models 
from the perspective of the provincial TB programme, provider, and the patient. The 
main research questions that will be posed for each model of service delivery are: 
1. In terms of cost-effectiveness, how well do these models work? 
a. What is the cost ofTB treatment for each model? 
b. What is the effectiveness ofTB treatment for each model? 
c. Who is providing resources? 
2. How do these models compare to the public sector providers ofTB 
treatment? 
3. What is the role of public sector financing in each of the models? 
This chapter starts with the methods used for assessing cost and cost-effectiveness of 
TB treatment for different models of delivery. Findings on financial and economic 
costs and costs-effectiveness are then presented, followed by sensitivity analyses 
results. Finally, the role of the public sector financing in each of the models, are 
discussed. 
7.2 Methods 
Methods for assessing cost-effectiveness in this study draw mainly on the methods 
from a number of cost-effectiveness studies performed as a part of the 'Community 
TB Care in Africa' project (Floyd et aI., 2003; Moalosi et aI., 2003; Nganda et aI., 
2003; Okello et aI., 2003; Sinanovic et aI., 2003). 
7.2.1 Models of provision 
Three different models of DOT provision were evaluated for a 12-month cohort of 
newly registered smear-positive patients: purely public, public-for-profit partnership, 
and public-non-profit partnership (described in detail in chapter 6). In the public 
model, patients are diagnosed and treated in public clinics, with direct observation 
undertaken by health workers following national treatment guidelines. These require 
that new cases are diagnosed using 2 sputum microscopy smears and subsequently 
twice more during treatment to monitor progress, and are given standardised short-
course drug regimens in the correct combination and dosage 5 days a week for 6 
months (Department of Health 2000). Cultures are not done routinely for new cases 
and x-rays are not recommended for first-line diagnosis. There is no mandatory 
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hospitalisation. The pUblic-private for-profit model represents a partnership between 
Provincial TB Programmes and mining companies where the employer's 
occupational health services are either reimbursed per TB patient day or receive free 
TB treatment drugs. Patients are diagnosed and treated in employer-funded 
occupational health clinics. Employer based private providers were selected as they 
are a significant source of health care in South Africa. Specifically, mining 
companies were selected, as there is a long history of TB treatment in the industry. 
TB incidence is up to 10 times higher in the mines relative to the general popUlation, 
due both to occupational TB hazards and very high HIV prevalence rates among 
mine workers. The pUblic-private non-profit model is a partnership between 
Provincial TB Programmes and NGOs providing community-based DOT in which 
these NGOs are paid a monthly sum per patient to manage community-based TB 
programmes. In this model, patients are diagnosed and monitored in public clinics 
for the first 10 days. Subsequent treatment is directly observed by community health 
worker 'treatment supporters' in the community. In return for payments from 
Provincial TB Programmes both of these different private partners are required to 
follow national treatment guidelines, complete and submit standardised quarterly 
reports to district TB coordinators, and liaise with district public health facilities. 
For each type of provision model, 2 sites were selected. The study sites were two 
occupational health clinics in two mining companies (site A in North West and site 
B in the Free State), two clinics working closely with two NGOs in the Western 
Cape (sites C and D), and two purely public clinics in the Western Cape (sites E and 
F). The study sites were described in more detail in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.2). 
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7.2.2 Costing 
The aim of the cost analysis was to generate comparable costs of TB treatment 
between different models of delivery. The specific objective v.:as to estimate the 
annual full cost of providing TB treatment in the study sites which includes the costs 
of all resources that were employed in providing TB treatment, including basic 
infrastructure. The cost analysis was retrospectively undertaken from a provider 
perspective (the costs of providing TB treatment borne by the organisation delivering 
the services and the Provincial TB Programmes) and a societal perspective 
(including patient's travel and time cost). Costs were collected for a 12-month period 
in each facility between 2000 and 2001 and prices were inflated to 2001 using the 
medical consumer price index of 8.9% for 2000 (Statistics South Africa 2004). Data 
were converted to US dollars using the 2001 average annual exchange rate of 
US$1 =Rand 8.57. Average, rather than marginal, economic costs were assessed, 
which are more relevant for national policy (Murray et aI., 2000). New smear-
positive pulmonary TB cases were selected because the South African DOTS 
strategy focuses primarily on improving the cure rate among new patients. Past 
efforts by the Provincial TB Programmes have shown that if these services improve, 
the standard of the whole Programme is lifted and cure rates for other categories of 
TB patients also improve (Department of Health 2001). Although HIV-positive 
patients have an increased risk of smear-negative and extra-pulmonary TB, the 
majority of them develop smear-positive pulmonary TB (Department of Health 
2001). Finally, National as well as Provincial TB Programmes routinely report on 
smear-positive pulmonary TB cases and data on other types of TB is not easily 
available. 
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An ingredients-based costing methodology was used where quantities of resources 
were multiplied by their respective prices to obtain total costs (see Table 7.1). 
Recurrent costs consisted of personnel (clinical, administration, and support). 
supplies (sputum and culture tests, x-rays, drugs), vehicle and building operating 
costs. Capital costs included building, equipment, vehicles and training of 'treatment 
supporters.' They were annualised using 2001 replacement prices; life expectancies 
of buildings were 30 years, equipment 10 years, vehicles and training 5 years, and 
the standard discount rate of 3% (Russell et aI., 1996). Sputum and culture, x-ray, 
drugs, and hospitalisation costs were based on actual prices quoted by the providers. 
Average cost 'treatment supporter' visits was based on the NGO payment per visit. 
The average cost of a clinic visit and overall organisation and supervision of 
community-based treatment were established also using the ingredients-based 
approach. Joint clinic costs were allocated to TB treatment on the basis of the 
proportion of total clinic visits for which TB patients accounted, and to different 
types of visits (initial diagnosis and monitoring, and observation) on the basis of 
interviews with staff and numbers of each type of visit made. Observation was used 
to determine clinic staff time spent on each type of visit. The average cost of 
managing a new smear-positive patient from diagnosis to completion of treatment 
for each site was calculated by multiplying the average cost of each treatment 
component by the number of times the cost was incurred according to the site-
specific clinic protocols. Sources of data for the costing analysis included provider 
and Provincial TB Programme expenditure reports, National Laboratory Service, 
private laboratories, local equipment suppliers, vehicle log-books, car dealers. 
private and provincial pharmacy price lists, interviews with clinic managers, x-ray 
department record books, and observation. 
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Table 7.1: Methods used for measuring, identifying and valuing the costs ofTB treatment 
TYPE OF COST IDENTIFICA TION MEASUREMENT VALUATION 
Categories Costing method Sources of data Valuation method Sources of data 
Recurrent 
Personnel Administration and Percentage of time spent Observation and semi- Total remuneration Provider expenditure 
management, clinical staff on different activities structured interviews with package costs reports 
(doctors, nurses, lay providers 
workers), and support 
staff (cleaning) 
Supplies Sputum and culture tests, Quantity consumed Patient records Market prices Provincial and private 
x-rays and drugs laboratories and pharmacy 
price lists 
Vehicle operating and Vehicle running costs Number of kilometres Vehicle logbook, Actual expenditure on Automobile Association 
maintenance travelled interview with clinic fuel, oil and maintenance rates (RO.86 per km) 
manager 
Building operating and Overheads (water, Proportion of total visits Actual costs from facility Actual expenditure Provider exp nditur 
maintenance electricity, telephone, fax, for which TB patients records, interview with reports 
stationeries etc) accounted clinic manager 
C pital 
Buil ings Offices, clinics and Proportion of total visits Interview with clinic Replacement prices CSIR Building and 
hospitals for which TB patients manager onstruction T cJmology 
accounted 
quipment Furniture, medical and Proportion of total visits Interview with the clinic Replacement prices Local manufacturers 
non-medical equipment for which TB patients manager 
accounted) 
chic! Vehicles used for TB Vehicle utilisation (km Vehicle log book, Replacement prices Lo al car d a)crs 
patients travelled) interview with clinic 
manager 
raining mmuruty "treatment Number of treatment Actual costs from NGO Actual expenditure Intervi w with N 
supporters" trairUng supporters trained records manager 
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Patient costs were estimated using a retrospective structured patient interyiew (see 
Appendix VIII). A random sample of 20 patients in each site was asked about trayel 
and time costs associated with clinic visits for diagnosis and treatment monitoring. 
and visits to clinics or 'treatment supporters' for DOT. Time costs were converted to 
a monetary value based on the average income reported by the patients interviewed 
(Russell et aI., 1996). Diagnosis and treatment of TB are free of charge to patients. 
Financial and economic costs 
Costs were collected retrospectively to consider both the financial and economic 
costs. Financial costs represent actual expenditure on goods and services purchased. 
Economic or opportunity costs include the estimated value of goods or services for 
which there were no financial transactions or when the price of the goods did not 
reflect the cost of using them productively elsewhere. 
"The basic idea is that things have a value that might not be fully captured in 
their price. It is not difficult in many health programmes to identify resource 
inputs for which little or no money is paid: volunteers working without 
payment; health messages broadcast without charge; vaccines or other 
supplies donated or provided at a large discount by organisations or 
individuals" (Creese and Parker, 1994). 
Financial and economic costs mainly differ in the way they treat (Creese and Parker, 
1994): 
• 
• 
donated goods and servIces (economic costs include the estimated value of 
donated goods or services); 
other inputs whose prices are incorrect or distorted (economic costs capture thc 
cost of goods when the price does not reflect the cost of using them productivcly 
elsewhere); and, 
• valuation of capital items (economic costs also allow for people's preferences for 
receiving goods and services now rather than later). 
In this study, economic costs included subsidies provided by the provincial IB 
Control Programmes (i.e. drugs and reimbursement) to the private providers. 
opportunity cost of treatment supporter's time (R300 per patient treated, based on the 
average wage in the study area), and annuitised capital costs. 
In this study, economic costs are used because they are important when considering 
issues related to the sustainability or expansion of projects, as well as being a 
component of cost-effectiveness decision-making where choices are made regarding 
the allocation of scarce resources (Walker and Kumaranayake, 2002). Financial 
costs, on the other hand, are used when the purpose of the costing exercise is to 
compare expenditure against budget allocations or to explore affordability of the 
project (Kumaranayake et aI., 2000b). In this instance, the financial cost of a 
consumed resource for which nothing was paid (for example, a subsidy) is zero. 
Since one of the study aims was to estimate the financing required for the different 
models from the perspective of the provincial IB programme, provider, and the 
patient, financial costs were also used as they can indicate who is paying for 
different types of costs. Economic costs were estimated through discussions with the 
providers and through observation at the study sites of the resources used in the 
provision of IB treatment. 
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7.2.3 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
To calculate the effectiveness measures, the cohort of all new smear-positiye 
pulmonary patients who started treatment during the 12-month costing period was 
followed to obtain the treatment outcomes. First, the cure rate was estimated as the 
percentage of cases cured (as confirmed by smear microscopy at the end of 
treatment). The cure rate for new smear-positive patients is regarded as the key 
indicator in high burden countries (World Health Organisation, 2002). South Africa 
is aiming to achieve the accepted WHO target of an 85% cure rate for new smear-
positive cases. Second, the percentage of cases successfully completing treatment 
was used, as not everyone completing also had final laboratory testing to see if 
cured. For both measures of effectiveness the transferred out cases were excluded 
from the denominator l . The main source of effectiveness data was TB registers 
(routinely reported information regarding treatment outcomes). 
The cost-effectiveness ratio was calculated for each model of provision by dividing 
cost by the unit of effect and compared with each other. As these partnership models 
use resources from a number of sources (provider, patient and government), both a 
provider and societal perspective is adopted for the cost-effectiveness analysis. 
I In order to be in line with international and national reporting requirements, TB patients who were 
transferred out (i.e. patients who have been transferred to another reporting district and for,who~ t~e 
treatment outcome is not known) will in future be included in the denominator of the reportmg dlstnct 
where they were initially registered. This may initially impact negatively on the cure rate but should 
c\'entually contribute to better control of the epidemic. 
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7.2.4 Sensitivity analyses 
To reflect the uncertainty inherent in the analysis, four univariate sensitivity analyses 
were perfonned: using alternative assumptions regarding provider costs (reduction of 
50% of value of staff time in baseline analysis); using alternative assumptions 
regarding patient costs (limits of 95% confidence interval); variation in discount 
rates (3% below and above the rate used in baseline analysis); and adjusting 
effectiveness data by the death rate. The latter was to explore how important 
differential HIV prevalence across sites may be. Effectiveness was re-calculated by 
adjusting the total number of patients in the cohort by the total number of deaths in 
the same cohort. Different assumptions about provider and patient costs were 
examined because they constituted the major costs. 
7.3 Results 
This section summarises findings on the financial and economic costs and cost-
effectiveness of TB treatment for new smear-positive pulmonary TB patients. Total 
provider costs are first presented, followed by average provider costs, average 
patient costs, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The findings are disaggregated to 
the cost to providers, provincial TB Control Programmes and patients. Finally, 
results of the sensitivity analyses are discussed. 
7.3.1 Total provider costs 
Total provider costs of TB treatment are presented in Table 7.2. The economic cost 
analysis shown here included government subsidies to private providers (discussed 
in detail in section 7.4.1), opportunity cost of "treatment supporters" time and 
annualised capital costs. The financial cost analysis, on the other hand. excluded 
194 
subsidies to private providers, used the actual payment by the NGO to treatment 
supporters, and depreciated capital costs using a straight-line depreciation. Overall, 
there is a wide range of total provider costs among the sites. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the public-private for-profit model represents a 
partnership between Provincial TB Programmes and mining companies where the 
employer's occupational health services are either reimbursed per TB patient day 
(site B) or receive free TB treatment drugs (site A). This had a major impact on the 
cost of supplies in site B that had to pay the private sector market price for TB 
treatment drugs. The reimbursement per patient day that this site received from the 
provincial TB control programme covered a small fraction of the expenditure on 
drugs. The cost of drugs in site A were estimated using the government tender prices 
because the provincial TB Control programme provided this site with free drugs. 
Therefore, the cost of supplies was considerably lower in site A when compared to 
site B. The different types of reimbursement allow pair-wise comparisons between 
different sites in the same model of provision (site A versus site B). More detailed 
explanation of the subsidies to the private providers is provided later in this chapter 
(section 7.4 on the public sector financing). 
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Table 7.2: Total provider costs ofTB treatment for each site in 2001 Randa 
Cost category Public-private for-profit model Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD SiteE Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Recurrent 
Personnel 314,072 314,073 658,200 658,200 272,934 358,134 53,649 67,899 221,376 22 1,376 601 ,256 601,256 
Suppllesb 32,566 69,730 1,410,536 1,542,512 189,463 189,463 26,685 26,685 45,364 45,364 92,864 92,864 
Vehicle operating and 48,523 48,523 39,603 39,603 28,32 1 28,321 7,215 7,2 16 13,092 13,092 17,266 17,266 
maintenance 
Building operating and 59,553 59,553 76,224 76,224 36,221 36,22 1 4,995 4,995 28,080 28,080 25,4 11 25,4 11 
maintenance 
Tolal recurrent costs 454,715 491,879 2.184,563 2,316,539 526,940 612.140 92,545 106,795 307,912 307,912 736.797 736,797 
Capital 
Building 36,453 76,552 77,302 162,335 2 1,481 38,666 4,756 8,561 10,697 19,256 18,267 32,880 
qUlpment 14,291 30,012 22,638 47,541 7,883 14,190 1,783 3,210 3,792 6,825 7,446 13,402 
chIcles 19,519 40,992 15,084 31,677 11,130 20,034 2,621 4,7 18 5,40 1 9,721 6, 113 J 1.004 
raining of lay \\orkers N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1,716 3,088 1,241 2,435 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Tota! api/a! cost!> 70,264 147,556 115,025 241,553 42,211 75,979 10,402 18,925 19,891 35,802 31,826 57,287 
lOin! o t5 524.980 639,435 2,299.589 2.558,092 569.151 688,118 102,948 125,720 327.803 343.714 768.623 794.084 
• Co I cilt."l from 200 1. USS 1- R8.S7 (200 I). N.A. n I applicable . 
b Pro\ In ial TO Progr;Jnul)c co\crcd Ihe co I of drugs in 3111h si tes e cepl in sile B where a rcimbur.;emenl on a patient day basis was provided. In addition to Ihe drugs. Ihe Programme also covered Ihe co t of dragno tiC tcsts in si tcs of; 
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Compared to the financial costs, the economic costs of supplies in site A are almost 
double the financial costs as a result of the government subsidy (free drugs) to the 
private provider. The government subsidy to the NGOs providing TB treatment in 
sites C and D as well as the opportunity cost of "treatment supporters" time has 
increased the cost of personnel in these two sites. Overall, across all the sites, the 
capital costs have increased as a result of different approach to the costing of capital 
items. 
Results in Table 7.3 below indicate that, although there was significant variation 
across sites, personnel and medical supplies (i.e. drugs and diagnostic tests) captured 
the highest proportion of total costs in all the sites. The high supply costs in site B 
(61 %) are attributable to the cost of drugs in the private market. The low costs of 
supplies in site A are the result of free drugs provided by the Provincial TB Control 
Programme. As mentioned earlier, financial costs represent actual expenditure on 
goods and services purchased, and therefore the cost of donated goods is zero. This 
site has the highest capital costs (14%) and the building and vehicle operating costs 
(11 % and 9% respectively) which implies the capital-intensive nature of service 
provision (e.g. patients are admitted to the hospital for the first week of treatment). 
The relatively high personnel costs in sites E and F (67% and 78% respectively) are 
attributable to the labour-intensive nature of service provision, salary levels of staff 
employed by the relevant local authority, and the type of personnel (professional 
nurses) who observe the treatment. 
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Table 7.3: Percentage of total provider costs of TB treatment for each site 
Co t category Public-private for-profit model Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Recurrent 
Personnel 60 49 29 27 48 52 52 54 67 64 78 76 
upplies 6 11 61 60 33 27 26 21 14 /3 12 12 
Vehicle operating and 9 7 2 I 5 4 7 6 4 4 2 2 
maintenance 
Building operating and /I 9 3 3 6 5 5 4 9 8 4 3 
maintenance 
Total recurrent costs 86 77 95 91 92 89 90 85 94 90 96 93 
Capital 
Buildings 7 6 3 6 4 6 5 7 3 6 2 4 
quipmcnt 3 2 I 2 I 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 
Vehicle 4 I I I 2 3 2 4 2 3 I I 
raining of lay \ orkers NA . N:A. NA. NA . I I I 2 NA . NA. NA . NA . 
Towl capital OslS 14 23 5 8 /I 10 15 6 10 4 7 
fOlal OS( 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
N, \ . - n t applicable 
7.3.2 Average provider cost per patient treated 
The cost per TB patient treated varied across the models of treatment provision 
(Table 7.4), with the highest costs for the public-private for-profit model (R4,660-
R6,379) reflecting different protocols related to hospitalisation (Site A) and 
procurement of drugs. In Site B, the only site without public financing of drugs, 52% 
of the entire treatment cost was drugs. The pUblic-private non-profit model had the 
lowest cost per patient treated and was less than half of that found in the public-
private for-profit model. DOT was the most significant cost in public clinics (84-
85%) and 40-51% of costs in the pUblic-private for-profit sites. The largest cost 
component for the pUblic-private non-profit was the overall supervision of the 
programme (28-29%). The average cost of a health clinic for initial diagnosis and 
monitoring during treatment (excluding drugs and investigations) was higher than 
the average cost of a health clinic visit for observation of treatment due to a longer 
time it takes for diagnosis and monitoring during treatment. 
The average financial cost of a health clinic visit for monitoring ranged between R46 
(site B) and R56 (site F) mainly reflecting the cost of staff time spent on TB patients 
and clinic overheads. The cost of a visit to "treatment supporter" was higher in site D 
than is site C because the NGO involved in the community TB programme in site D 
paid its treatment supporters a higher incentive. Compared to the cost of a clinic visit 
for DOT, the cost of a treatment supporter visit was eight times lower in site C and 
seven times lower in site D. Although both site A and site B used a private 
laboratory for sputum smear tests, the cost was lower in site B than in site A. This 
cost was slightly lower in all other study sites than the National Laboratory Service 
used by the other sites. 
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Average economic cost of a health clinic visit for monitoring ranged between R53 
(site B) and R69 (site D), 100/0 higher than the financial cost reflecting the way in 
which capital items were costed. The economic cost of a visit to "treatment 
supporter" was higher than the financial cost but equal in sites C and D, as it was 
assumed that the opportunity cost of "treatment supporter's" time was the same in 
these two sites and (R300 per patient). The highest economic cost in site C and D 
was the cost of overall supervision for community-based programmes. This cost was 
between 190/0 and 230/0 higher than the financial cost due to the government subsidy 
to the NGOs involved in TB treatment provision. 
The South African TB Control Treatment Guidelines and directly-observed 
treatment system in place in each study site were described in detail in Chapter 6. 
Process indicators for different components of TB treatment (i.e. details on the 
expected number of visits and diagnostic tests) and average costs for each type of 
visit and diagnostic test for a new smear positive pulmonary TB patient, are given in 
Appendix VIII. 
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Table 7.4: Average provider costs of managing a new smear-positive patient from diagnosis to completion of treatment, 2001 Rand (%, of total)3 
Co t category Public-private for-profit model Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Hospital stal 1,7 15 1,886 (34%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
(37%) 
J Jealth clinic visits for 105 (2%) 121 (2%) 139 (2%) 158 (3%) 150 (9%) 195 (9%) 158 (9%) 206 (9%) 151 (4%) 160 (4%) 167 (3%) 173 (3%) 
monitoringb 
I Jealth clinic vIsits for 2,497 2,866 (51%) 2,262 2,574 238 (14%) 309 (14%) 241 (13%) 335 (15%) 3,458 3,653 4,017 4,160 
D Tb (54%) (39%) (40%) (83%) (84%) (85%) (85%) 
Visit to "tTeatment N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 336(19%) 468 (22%) 384 (21%) 468 (22%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
supporteTs" for DOT" 
Sputum smearsc 100 (2%) 100 (2%) 122 (2%) 122 (2%) 142 (8%) 142 (7%) 142 (8%) 142 (6%) 142 (3%) 142 (3%) 142 (3%) 142 (3%) 
Sputum culture' 142 (3%) 142 (3%) 148 (3%) 148 (3%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 39 1 (8%) N.A. 
Drugs' N.A. 391 (7%) 2,970 3,282 391 (22%) 391 (18%) 391 (22%) 391 (18%) 391 (9%) 391 (9%) N.A. 39 1 (8%) 
(52%) (52%) 
X-raysc 101 (2%) 101 (2%) 94 (2%) 94 (2%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Supervision of community- N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 488 (28%) 635 (29%) 488 (27%) 614 (28%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
ba cd programme 
1 raining for" treatmcnt N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 9 (0.5%) 11 ( 1%) 9 (0.5%) 11 (1%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
supp rtcrs" 
Total cosl p r pat; III 4,660 5.607 5,735 6,379 1,755 2, 152 / ,8/3 2, /68 4./43 4,347 4,718 4,867 
(/00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100% (/00%) (100%) 
• Co t data from 200 1. USS I RS .S7 (200 I) ; N.A. = not applicable. 
b ( , peel d number of \ i~i~ hospItal day· for ea h slle I a follows : 7 hospital days for site A; 3 visits for monitoring at each site except at site A where there are only 2 sueh visits; 130 visits for T (sites B •• and F). 123 visit for 0 T (. ite A). 
lid 10 \ j lIS Ii r DO (lie and D). 120 vi its to 'treatment supporter' (siles and D). 
I: pe led numb r of diag ~tlC ICS . for h ite 4 putum mears ( lte A). 7 sputum smears ( ite B), and 4 sputum smears (sites D-F); 1 sputum culture (sites A and B); 3 X-rays (site A and B). 
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7.3.3 Patient costs 
There were no patient costs associated with TB treatment in the public-private for-
profit model because the treatment is workplace-based. The cost to the patient in the 
purely public model was between 2.6 and 3.3 times higher than the public-private 
non-profit model reflecting less time that a patient had to spend getting the treatment 
in the community and lower transport cost (Table 7.5). 
Average financial costs included travel costs associated with visits for monitoring 
and DOT. They ranged between R14 (site D) and R225 (site F). The travel cost to 
the patient is sites E and F were between 10 and 16 times the cost to the patient in 
sites C and D reflecting lower transport cost associated with DOT visit to community 
treatment supporters. In addition to the travel cost, average economic patient costs 
associated with TB treatment included time costs. They ranged between R315 (site 
D) and Rl 048 (site F). 
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Table 7.5: Mean patient costs associated with tuberculosis treatment for each site, 2001 US$ Qower and upper limits of 950/0 confidence interval)3 
Cost category Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Visit to clinic for monitoring 
- travel cost 4 (3-6) 4 (3-6) 3 (2-5) 3 (2-5) 5 (5-6) 5 (5-6) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 
- time cost N.A. 13 (8-14) N.A. 11(5-12) N.A. 16 (13-18) N.A. 21 (19-26) 
Visit to clinic for DOT 
- travel cost 14 (12-15) 14 (12-15) II (9-14) II (9-14) 220 (210-231) 220 (210-231) 170 (157-200) 170 (157-200) 
- time cost N.A. 40 (26-57) N.A. 31 (26-35) N.A. 632 (603-652) N.A. 853 (790-961) 
Visit to "treatment supporter" for DOT 
- travel cost 0 0 0 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
- time cost N.A. 264 (202-316) N.A. 238 (206-254) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total cost per patient 18 336 14 315 225 872 174 1,048 
(/6-19) (240-408) (/2-16) (248-320) (201-242) (831 -906) (148-209) (969- 1,191) 
• Cost data from 2001. US$ 1 = R8.57 (2001); N.A. - not applicable. 
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7.3.4 Average societal cost of treatment 
The costs of TB treatment were largely financed by the main provider in each site 
(Table 7.6). The private for-profit providers financed 93-95% of the total cost with a 
small 5-7% contribution required from the Provincial TB Programme. In contrast, 
the provincial TB Programme contributed 24-27% of financing towards private non-
profit sites, with the public sector also paying for another 200/0 of costs. However, in 
budgetary terms this meant that the provincial TB Programme contributed only up to 
twice the amount of funding to the public-private non-profit sites as it did for the 
public-private for-profit sites, reflecting the much lower cost per patient treated (R2 
483) in the public-private non-profit sites versus the public or the public-private for-
profit sites. 
The main differences between financial and economic costs are attributable to the 
cost of subsidised drugs (site A), the opportunity cost of treatment supporter's time 
and the subsidy to the NGOs (sites C and D), and the annualized capital costs (all 
sites) reflecting the opportunity cost of capital. The government subsidy to the 
private provider in Site B has not influenced the cost substantially in this site. 
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Table 7.6: Average societal cost of treatment per patient at each site, 2001 Rand (% of totalt 
Cost category Public-private for-profit model Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Public provider NA. NA. NA . N A. 388 504 399 541 3, 609 3,813 4, 184 4,333 
(22%) (20%) (22%) (20%) (83%) (73%) (85%) (73%) 
Private provider 4, 660 5,216 5,735 6,067 833 1,038 881 9 78 NA. NA. NA. N.A. 
{I 00%) (93%) (100%) (95%) (47%) (42%) (48%) (39%) 
Provincial TB Control N.A. 391 N.A. 312 534 610 534 649 534 534 534 534 
Programme" (7%) (5%) (30%) (24%) (29%) (27%) (12%) (10%) (11%) (9%) 
Patient N.A. N.A. N.A. NA. 18 336 14 315 225 872 174 1,048 
(I%) (l3%) (1%) (13%) (5%) {I 7%) (4%) (18%) 
Total costs 4,660 5, 607 5,735 6,379 1,733 2,488 1,828 2,483 4,368 5,219 4,892 5,915 
(100%) {I 00%) {I 00%) {I 00%) {I 00%) {I 00%) {I 00%) (100%) (100%) {I 00%) (100%) (100%) 
• Cost dala from 2001. US$ 1= R8.S7 (200 I); N.A. - not applicable. 
b Provlflclal TB Programme covered the cost of drugs in alllhe sites except in site B where a reimbursement on a patient day basis was provided. In addition to the drugs. the Programme al 0 covered the co t of diagnostic tes in itcs - F. 
2 5 
7.3.5 Average cost for each model of delivery 
Table 7.7 below summarises the average cost per patient treated for each model of 
delivery of TB treatment. The pUblic-private non-profit model had the 10\ est 
economic cost per patient treated, followed by the purely public model and the 
pUblic-private for-profit model of delivery. The greatest variability in cost per patient 
was within pUblic-private for-profit model and within the purely public model 
reflecting different prices paid for inputs by different sites, different mix of inputs 
used by different sites, and different levels of staff productivity. 
Table 7.7: Average cost of treatment per patient for each model of delivery, 2001 Rand 
(% of totalt 
Public-private for profit Public-private non-profit Purely public model 
model model 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Public provider N.A. N.A. 388-399 504-541 3,609- 3,813-
4,184 4,333 
Private provider 4,660- 5,216- 833-881 978-1,038 N.A. N.A. 
5,735 6,067 
Provincial TB Control N.A. 312-391 534 610-649 534 534 
Programme 
Patient N.A. N.A. 14-18 315-336 174-225 872-1,048 
Total cost per patient 4,660- 5,607- 1,769- 2,483- 4,3/7- 5,219-
5,735 6,379 1,831 2,488 4,943 5,915 
• Cost data from 2001. US$ 1 = R8.57; N.A. = not appllcable. 
Compared with the public sector prOVIsIon, the sites emphasizing community 
involvement in care were almost always associated with a large overall reduction in 
the financial cost per patient treated. On average, this reduction was 790/0 for the 
public sector and 92% for the patient. The average financial cost per patient treated 
in the pUblic-private for-profit model of delivery was between 70/0 and 14%> higher 
than the cost in the purely public model. 
7.3.6 Treatment outcomes 
Table 7.8 shows treatment outcome for all new smear-positive cases in the cohort. 
The successful treatment completion rate ranged between 74% (site F) and 890/0 (site 
E) and the cure rate ranged between 65% (site C) and 87% (site E). The major 
influence on effectiveness were high mortality rates of 12% and 11 % in sites 1 and 2 
respectively, and high defaulting rates of 24% and 160/0 (and so lower cure rates) in 
sites C and F respectively which were the only 2 urban sites. On average the 
effectiveness was better in sites E, A, D and B than in sites F and C. No one model 
performed unambiguously better than the others. 
Table 7.8: Treatment outcome for a 12-month cohort of newly registered smear-
positive pulmonary TB patients 
Treatment outcome Public-private for- Public-private 000- Purely public model 
profit model profit model 
Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
N=95 N=423 N=355 N=50 N=85 N=174 
Completed 83 (87%) 368 (87%) 283 (80%) 41 (82%) 76 (89%) 129 (74%) 
Cured 79 (83%) 321 (76%) 231 (65%) 41 (82%) 74 (87%) 121 (69%) 
Defaulted 1 (1 %) 8 (2%) 59 (16%) 5 (10%) 8 (9%) 41 (24%) 
Died 11 (12%) 47 (11 %) 13 (4%) 4 (8%) 1 (1%) 4 (2%) 
Source: Reports submItted to the Provmclal TB Programmes. 
7.3.7 Cost-effectiveness of TB treatment 
A provider-only perspective shows the most cost-effective TB treatment was the 
pUblic-private non-profit model reflecting both lower cost per patient treated and 
relatively higher treatment completion and cure rates (Table 7.9). The least cost-
cHi ctiv TB treatment as the public-private for-profit model wh re sit achi y d 
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relatively higher successful treatment completion and cure rates, but the a erage 
costs per patient treated were the highest. 
Table 7.9. Cost-effectiveness for each model of treatment provision in 2001 Randa 
Public-private for- Public-private Purely public 
profit model non-profit model model 
Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Cost-effectiveness from the provider 
perspective 
Total cost of treating patient 654 744 251 253 507 56 
Successful treatment completion rate 87 87 80 82 89 74 
Cure rate 83 76 65 82 87 69 
Cost per new smear-positive patient 752 855 314 308 570 767 
successfully treatedb 788 979 386 308 583 823 
Cost per new smear-positive patient curedc 
Cost-effectiveness from the patient 
perspective N.A. N.A. 39 37 102 122 
Total cost of treating patient 80 82 89 74 
Successful treatment completion rate 65 82 87 69 
Cure rate 49 45 115 165 
Cost per new smear-positive patient 60 45 117 177 
successfully treated 
Cost per new smear-positive patient cured 
Cost-effectiveness from the social 
perspective 654 744 290 290 609 690 
Total cost of treating patientd 87 87 80 82 89 74 
Successful treatment completion rate 83 76 65 82 87 69 
Cure rate 752 855 362 354 684 932 
Cost per new smear-positive patient 788 979 446 354 700 1000 
successfully treated 
Cost per new smear-positive patient cured 
. . 
'Cost data from 2001. Average exchange rate prevallmg m 2001 US$1 = R8.57 . 
b Cost-effectiveness indicator estimated as a ratio between the number of new smear-positive patients registered and the number 
of number of new smear-positive patients successfully treated. 
C Cost-effectiveness indicator estimated as a ratio between the number of new smear-positive patients registered and the number 
of number of new smear-positive patients cured. 
d This represents a sum of provider and patient costs for each site. 
From the patient s perspective the most cost-effective TB treatment was the public-
private for-profit model (TB treatment was workplace-based and the employ r 
covered the cost of transport), followed by the public-private non-profit model (IB 
treatment was community-based and accessible to the patient). The least cost-
effective was the purely public model, reflecting long waiting hours and poor 
geographical accessibility of public clinics. From the social perspective, the public-
private non-profit model remained the most cost-effective model of all the models of 
provision. However, from a societal perspective, there were similar ranges for cost-
effectiveness between the public-private for-profit model and the purely public 
model. 
7.3.8 Sensitivity analyses 
The results were robust in sensitivity analyses (Table 7.10) with cost and cost-
effectiveness assumptions most sensitive to valuation of staff time. The relative 
rankings remained the same. Sensitivity analysis using the number of registered 
patients adjusted by the number of the patients who died during the treatment 
showed that results were not sensitive to plausible variability in the effectiveness 
data. Cost-effectiveness in the higher HIV prevalence sites improved considerably 
when compared to other study sites. 
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Table 7.10: Sensitivity analyses 
Scenario Public-private Public-private Purely public 
for-profit non-profit model 
model model 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD SiteE Site F 
Alternative estimates of provider 
costs (staff time) 
• % divergence from base-case 
provider cost estimate 
-15% 
-13% -8% -8% -24% -2 % 
• % divergence from base-case 
provider cost-effectiveness -15% -13% -8% -8% -24% -2 % 
estimate 
Lower limit patient cost 
• % divergence from base-case 
patient cost estimate N.A. N.A. -5% -5% -5% -5% 
• % divergence from base-case 
patient cost-effectiveness N.A. N.A. -4% -3% -1 % -1 % 
estimate 
Upper limit patient cost 
• % divergence from base-case 
patient cost estimate N.A. N.A. +5% +5% +5% +5% 
• % divergence from base-case 
patient cost-effectiveness N.A. N.A. +3% +0.2% +0.6% +2% 
estimate 
00/0 discount rate 
• % divergence from base-case 
provider cost estimate -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% 
• 0/0 divergence from provider 
cost-effectiveness estimate -2% -0.6% -0.5% -2% -1% -0.5% 
6% discount rate 
• % divergence from base-case 
provider cost estimate +3% +3% +3% +3% +3% +3% 
• % divergence from provider 
cost-effectiveness estimate +3% +2% +2% +3% +2% +2% 
Effectiveness adjusted by the 
death rate 
• % divergence from base-case 
successful treatment rate -12% -11% -4% -8% -1 % -2% 
• % divergence from base-case 
societal cost-effectiveness 
estimate (successful treatment 
-4% -8% -1.6% -2.5% rate) -12% -11% 
• % divergence from base-case 
cure rate -12% -11 % -4% -8% -1 % -2% 
• % divergence from base-case 
societal cost-effectiveness 
-8% -1 °'0 -2% 
estimate (cure rate) -12% -11 % -4% 
N.A. = not a plicable. p 
7.4 Public sector financing 
As explained in chapter 6, the provincial TB Control Programmes in the stud 
provinces provided a subsidy to the private providers. This section discusses 
fmancing of the TB treatment in the study models, in particular the role of public 
sector financing in each of the models. First, detailed discussion on subsidies is 
presented. Different level of resources provided by the public and pri ate sector . 
and by the patient, is then presented. The section ends with a discussion on the cost-
effectiveness of different models of delivery of TB treatment from the public 
sector's perspective. 
7.4.1 Subsidies to the private providers 
In site A, the subsidy was in the form of free drugs for all TB patients registered. In 
site B, the private provider was reimbursed for all patients registered with a minimal 
sum of R312 per patient (R2.4 per outpatient visit). Sites C and D received financial 
support for training of treatment supporters, co-ordination and administration of the 
community-based TB treatment, and RIO worth of incentives per patient's month for 
each treatment supporter. These subsidies are presented in Table 7.11 and discussed 
in detail below. 
Table 7.11: Subsidy from the provincial TB Control Programme for each new- m ar 
positive patient (2001 Rand) 
Public-private for-profit model 
Site A SiteB 
391 a 
• the co t f drug at go emmenl tender pnces 
b R2.4 per i it 
312b 
Public-private non-profit model 
Site C Site D 
76c 11Sd 
c R 12 for 0 rdination and admini tration, R4.4 for training of treatment upporters. and R60 Ii r incentive for lreatment 
upp rt rs 
d R4 Ii r c - rdmuti nand admmi tration. R6.8 for training of treatment upporters, and R60 for In cnthe for In: ment 
upp rters 
From the private for-profit provider's perspective in site A, the drugs provided by 
the provincial TB Control Programme lowered the total private provider cost by 
39%. The drugs, for which the provincial TB Control Programme has paid R391 at 
the state tender prices, were priced seven times higher in the private market. If the 
provider in site A were to purchase the drugs from one of the local pharmaceutical 
companies it would cost around R3 000 for a new smear-positive patient. Therefore, 
from the private for-profit provider in site A, the subsidy represents considerable 
saving. In site B, however, where the provincial TB Control Programme reimbursed 
the private for-profit provider with R312 for a new smear-positive patient, the 
overall costs were only reduced by 5%. If the private provider in site B received free 
drugs, as was the case with the private provider in site A, the cost of treating a new 
smear-positive TB patient to the private provider would have decreased by 53%. 
From the private non-profit providers' perspective in sites C and D, the cost of 
subsidy per patient that they received from the provincial TB Control Programme 
was R76 and R115 respectively. This subsidy covered around 9% of the total cost in 
site C and 13% of the total cost in site D. In sites C and D, each private non-profit 
provider received an annual sum of R24 000 for co-ordination costs and an annual 
sum of R2 200 for administration costs, regardless of number of patients registered 
to be supervised in the community. The part of the subsidy that covered training of 
treatment supporters related to the number of treatment supporters trained in a year. 
The part of the subsidy that covered incentives for treatment supporters was the same 
for both providers - RIO per a patient per month. The cost of the subsidy per patient 
treated in the community depended on the total number of patients registered to be 
supervised in the community in a year. Since the TB community-based programme 
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in site C had four times more TB patients under supervision than the community-
based programme in site D, the cost of the subsidy per patient in site D was 1.5 times 
higher than in site C. 
From the provincial TB Control Programme's perspective, it cost between R312 and 
R391 to have a patient treated in sites B and A respectively, and between R1 11--l- and 
Rl 190 (cost to both the public health services and the provincial TB Control 
Programme) to have a patient treated in sites C and D respectively. Compared with 
the treatment in the purely public sector, it was, on average, 12 times less costly to 
have patients treated in the public-private for-profit partnership, and almost 4 times 
less costly to have a patient treated in the pUblic-private non-profit partnership, than 
in the purely public sector. However, as not all TB patients could be offered 
treatment in the PPPs, these estimates only give an indication of what inputs are 
needed for a PPP from a perspective of the government. 
The availability of the treatment at a workplace (sites A and B), and in the 
community (sites C and D) resulted in substantial savings to the patient. There were 
no patient costs associated with the treatment in the employer-based facilities (i.e. 
public-private for-profit partnerships), and the cost to the patient supervised in the 
community was, on average, 3 times lower than in public sector facilities. 
7.4.2 Cost borne by the public sector in different public-private models 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below illustrate the level of resources provided by the public 
sector in each of the pUblic-private models of delivery ofTB treatment. 
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Rgure 7.1: L~vel of the resources provided by the public and private sectors 
In the public-private for-profit model of delive ry, in % 
6% 
94% 
o R"ivate for-profit sector. F\.Jblic sector 
For the public-private for-profit model of TB treatment delivery, around 6% of the 
costs were borne by the public sector, and 94% were borne by the private sector. 
There were no costs to the patient. In this model of delivery, public funding covered 
the cost of drugs (in site A) and the cost of reimbursement (in site B). 
Figure 7.2: Level of resources provided by the public/private sectors and patient in the 
public-private non-profit model of delivery, in % 
13% 
47% 
10 Public sector. Private non-profit sector 0 Patient I 
For the pUblic-private non-profit model of delivery around 47% of the costs were 
borne by the public sector, around 40% were borne by the private pro ider. and 
around 13% were borne by the patient. The main cost to the private non-profit 
providers was the cost of managing the community-based programmes. 
7.4.3 Cost-effectiveness of TB treatment from the perspective of the public 
sector 
In the two pUblic-private models of delivery of TB treatment, increased community 
involvement and availability of treatment at a workplace were almost always more 
affordable and cost-effective to the public sector than purely public sector c1inic-
based approach to TB treatment (see Figure 7.3 below). The cost-effectiveness 
results show that, in comparison to purely public provision, the public-private 
partnership models could reduce cost per patient cured to the public health sector by 
93% (in the pUblic-private for-profit model) and 77% (in the public-private non-
profit model). 
Figure 7.3: Cost per patient cured borne by the public sector in different models of 
treatment delivery (2001 Rand) 
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The new costs associated with the community-based treatment i.. 0 raIl 
supervision training and incentive for treatment supporters) to the public s ctor w r 
small in comparison with the cost-saving realised by reducing the number of patients 
supervised in the purely public clinic. In the public-private non-profit model. the 
main reason for the reduction in cost was that the incentive paid to community 
treatment supporters (R3 per DOT visit on average) were much lower than the 
average cost of a clinic visit (R30 per DOT visit on average), and not outweighed by 
the new cost associated with training and overall supervision of treatment supporters. 
In addition to the cost reduction to the public sector, by providing TB treatment to 
poorer community members and employees, the treatment became more accessible 
and convenient for patients in both study popUlations. From the patient perspective, 
due to the fact that the mining health services provided transport for their patients 
and the treatment was workplace-based, there were no costs associated with 
treatment. For patients supervised in the community, costs were saved because the 
time taken to get to treatment supporter and the travel expenditures incurred to do so 
were lower than those associated with visits to health clinics. Figure 7.4 below 
shows that public-private non-profit partnership model could reduce cost to the 
patient supervised in the community by 640/0. 
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Figure 7.4: Cost per patient borne by the patient in purely public and public-private 
non-profit models of treatment delivery (2001 Rand) 
1400 
1200 
"0 1000 
c: 
CIS 
a:: 800 
.~ 
-
600 
I/) 
0 
U 400 
200 
0 
purely public model pUblic-private non-profit model 
While costs generally fell overall, and from the perspective of the private for-profit 
providers and patients, it is important to highlight that costs increased from the 
perspective of the provincial TB Control Programmes and the NGOs specialising in 
TB care. This shows that the introduction of new, more efficient approaches to 
delivery of TB treatment care may require extra investment in TB Control 
Programmes and NGOs involved in TB service delivery. In particular, a provincial 
TB Control Programme may require resources to be allocated to it in order to 
facilitate overall cost reductions for both patients and the health sector as a whole. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated the cost-effectiveness of selected pUblic-private partnership 
models of delivery of TB treatment in South Africa. Three different models of 
provider partnerships were evaluated and compared for different study popUlations: 
public-private for profit (employer-based), pUblic-private non-profit (non-
governmental organisations), and purely public. Cost and effectiveness data for 2001 
were collected at 6 sites representing the three different models of pro ision. The 
evaluation was undertaken from the perspective of the provider the pati nt nd th 
society. Both financial and economic costs were presented. Effectiveness was 
measured using cure and successful treatment completion rates. Four sensitivity 
analyses were conducted. Finally, a discussion of the public sector financing in each 
of the models is presented. 
The results of the cost-effectiveness show that, from the perspective of the provider, 
the most cost-effective TB treatment was in the pUblic-private non-profit model 
reflecting both lower cost per patient treated and relatively higher treatment 
completion and cure rates. The least cost-effective was the pUblic-private for-profit 
model. From the patient's perspective, the most cost-effective TB treatment was in 
the public-private for-profit model, and the least cost-effective was the purely public 
model. From the social perspective, the pUblic-private non-profit model of delivery 
ofTB treatment remained the most-effective model of all the models of delivery. 
The study results also show that, in comparison with the purely public provision, the 
public-private partnership models could significantly reduce costs to both the public 
health sector and patient by 77% - 93% and 64% - 1000/0 respectively, and increase 
cost-effectiveness of TB treatment. In addition, TB treatment provided through the 
public-private partnerships seems to be more accessible and convenient for patients 
in both study populations (i.e. employees and poorer community members). 
Cost-effectiveness data presented here suggest that the existence of the public-
private partnerships could lead to substantial savings to the public sector. Taking into 
consideration the rising number of TB cases as a result of the HIV / AIDS epidemic. 
the cost per patient treated to the public sector could be reduced by enhanced 
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partnership between the private and public sectors. However, the cost-effectiveness 
study has a number of limitations, as discussed further in chapter 9. Non-randomised 
purposive sampling was used to identify sites that reflected communities and 
locations where PPPs are currently in place. Thus the sites varied significantly by TB 
incidence due to the nature of the PPP target groups. Although efforts were made to 
try and select sites with similar HIV prevalence rates, the nature of the PPP target 
groups and scarcity of data on HIV prevalence made this difficult. As there is a 
higher mortality rate associated with HIV status ofTB patients, it was not possible to 
control for the fact that TB treatment outcomes might have been poorer in sites with 
a higher HIV prevalence rate than in sites with a lower HIV prevalence rate. This 
could underestimate the cost-effectiveness at higher HIV ITB incidence sites. The 
PPPs were all relatively well functioning (with cure rates well above the South 
African average of 55%). The purposive sampling may have led to identification of 
better-functioning PPPs, which may suggest that results are optimistic. The 
conventional practice of using average reported incomes among a sample of patients 
is used to value patient time. This might have under or over-estimated true costs. 
Overall, these public-private partnerships show that there is a strong economic case 
for expanding the private sector (i.e. workplace and community) involvement in TB 
treatment in South Africa. Expansion may require increased investment in the 
public-private partnerships, but they seem to be capable of delivering important 
improvements in the affordability and efficiency of TB treatment, and improving the 
South African health system's capacity to cope with the impact of the HIV I AIDS 
epidemic. 
219 
Chapter 8 
INCENTIVE DESIGN AND DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapters 6 and 7 have presented the methods and findings of quality of care and 
cost-effectiveness evaluations of two different models of public-private partnerships 
for the provision of TB treatment. The main conclusions are that the quality of care 
is superior in both pUblic-private partnership models when compared to the purely 
public sector. In terms of the cost-effectiveness, the main conclusions are that, from 
the provider's perspective, the public-private non-profit sites are the most cost-
effective and the public-private for-profit sites are the least cost-effective. From the 
patient's perspective, however, the most cost-effective TB treatment is in the public-
private for-profit sites, and the least cost-effective is in the purely public sites. The 
findings show that, in light of the TBIHIV epidemic, increased collaboration with 
private providers through partnerships could potentially improve both the quality of 
care and cost-effectiveness ofTB treatment. 
The evidence supports the call for an increased role for the private sector. However, 
as discussed in chapter 2, economic theory suggests that problems are likely to arise 
in any principal-agent relationship as the agent is given scope for opportunistic 
behaviour (McPake at aI., 2002). Principal-agent theory indicates that incentives are 
important for successful public-private collaboration, but due to asymmetries of 
information their operation may be problematic. In addition, previous experience 
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suggests that, because of differences in motivation between public and private sector 
actors, broader involvement of private actors raises additional issues of appropriate 
incentive mechanisms that can be used to achieve converging public-private interests 
than if we were just looking purely at a public model of delivery alone (Mills et aI, 
2001). This chapter focuses on understanding motivations to consider actual and 
potential participation of pUblic/private partners for the provision of TB treatment, 
and based on the motivations, incentive structures suitable for different providers. 
How to design institutions that provide good incentives for economic agents has 
become a central question of economics (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Section 
2.2.7 in chapter 2 discussed the economic theory of incentives in the context of 
agency relationships as its basis. New institutional economic theory suggests that 
problems are likely to arise in any principal-agent relationship as the agent is 
tempted to pursue hislher own goals at the expense of those of the principal due to 
asymmetric information (North, 1990). Though the problems of the principal-agent 
relationship are unavoidable in health care, creating appropriate incentives for agents 
and monitoring and sanctioning of agent behaviour are some of the ways for solving 
the market failure (Mills et aI., 2001). How different providers in the health care 
system are paid can have an impact on their behaviour, and therefore on the 
achievement of the objectives of the health system. 
The aIm of this chapter is to explore motivations of partners within existing 
partnerships and incentive mechanisms attributable to different models of public-
private partnerships. It also aims to explore potential private partners in the provision 
of TB treatment, and incentive structures for broader pUblic-private partnerships. 
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In the first part of this chapter, the methods used for identifying and exploring 
motivations and incentives are presented. Analysis of interview data and methods for 
ensuring validity and rigour of the qualitative data are then explained. In the second 
part, the motivations for participation in existing partnerships are highlighted, and 
incentives of existing partners in pUblic-private TB arrangements are explored. 
Potential private partners are then identified and obstacles to private provision of TB 
treatment explored. Finally, potential partners' motivations for partnership with the 
government and the incentive structures that may be needed for a well-functioning 
partnership are presented. 
8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Using a convenience sample, a total of fourteen semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Department of Health officials (n=5), private for-profit providers 
(n=3), private non-profit providers (n=2), and potential partners (n=4). This included 
national policy-makers, provincial TB control programme managers, medical service 
directors in the mining and textile industries, NGO directors, private commercial 
clinic managers, and independent practitioner association directors. The main 
justification for the chosen sample size is that the interview schedule was long and 
conducting interviews time consuming. There was no fixed framework for 
interviews and they were open-ended and exploratory (see Appendix IX for 
interview schedules). Key areas explored with government officials and private 
providers in partnerships related to: (a) the main characteristics of the partnership: 
(b) motivations for participation in partnership with the government/private 
providers; and, ( c) incentive mechanisms attributable to different partnerships. 
These interviews were also used to identify private providers who might potentially 
become partners in the provision of TB treatment. Using a snowball technique, four 
private providers who represented potential partners were then identified and 
interviewed. They included independent family practitioner associations, employer-
based private providers in the mining industry, employer-based private providers in 
the textile industry, and private commercial clinic companies. Interviews with 
potential partners explored: (a) the main characteristics of the provider; (b) their 
perceptions of obstacles to providing TB treatment; (c) their motivations for wanting 
to enter into a partnership with the government; and, (d) incentive structures that 
would be needed for their involvement in partnership (see Appendix IX for interview 
schedule). The first round of interviews was carried out between March and August 
2002, and the second round was carried out during October 2002. 
8.2.2 Analysis of interview data 
All interviews were taped and transcribed by the author. Transcripts were analysed 
using qualitative software NudIST l which is found to increase rigour and detail but 
not at the expense of conceptual thinking (Lewando-Hundt et aI., 1997). The 
decision to use qualitative software NudIST was made because it was felt that it 
would minimise dependence on analysis via the arrangement of pieces of paper, and 
increase the accessibility of the data for interpretation by other researchers. 
1 Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising 
223 
Informal analysis of the interview data started early in the research process and many 
themes emerged during these earlier stages of analysis. Conversations with my 
supervisor about the output of the interviews also helped during the fieldwork phase. 
Transcription of interviews was undertaken during the interview period. A further 
process of interview data analysis then began by coding the transcripts using 
NudIST. Text was coded to the following themes: main characteristics of the 
partnership; motivations for getting involved in partnership; incentive mechanisms 
attributable to different existing models of public-private partnership; obstacles to 
providing TB treatment in the private sector; motivations of potential private 
partners for partnership with the government; and, incentives that may be needed for 
a well-functioning partnership. After this initial open coding, each set of themes was 
examined in greater detail and where necessary the introduction of new themes or 
sub-themes took place. Presentation of results in this chapter followed the themes. 
8.2.3 Ensuring validity and rigour 
A common criticism of qualitative research is that data collection and analysis is 
non-standardised and subjective and therefore may lead to bias due to the 
researcher's expectations. Several steps were takes to enhance validity in this study. 
First, in order to ensure completeness and clarity, all interview schedules were 
circulated to my supervisor and colleagues for comments and tested prior to use. 
Second, in order to enhance the validity of the data and analysis, interviewees were 
mailed a brief follow-up questionnaire asking for their reactions to the interviews. 
Lastly, once the data had been coded, the author held follow-up telephone interviews 
with respondents to ensure that she interpreted what they had said correctly. 
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8.3 Results 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, the findings on the 
motivations of existing partners for participating in partnerships in the provision of 
TB treatment are summarised. The incentive mechanisms attributable to different 
partnerships are also discussed. Ihe second part focuses on potential private 
partners, discussing obstacles to providing TB treatment in the private sector. the 
motivations for partnership, and incentives that may be required to support 
development of broader pUblic-private partnerships. 
8.3.1 Motivations of partners within existing partnerships 
Motivations of the governmen tfor partnerships with private providers 
Government officials interviewed for this research gave remarkably similar answers 
to the question of why the government had agreed to the partnership with the private 
provider. Improving TB programme through better compliance, increased cure rates 
and accessibility to treatment, implementing the national IB guidelines and policy, 
and having a unified system of reporting outcome of the treatment were the main 
motivations for the government to subsidise both the mining companies and the 
NGOs in the provision of TB treatment. Integrating private providers' efforts in IB 
treatment with the government TB control programme activities, and increasing the 
knowledge of TB in the community are the additional motivations for government to 
have the private providers on board. 
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In the case of private for-profit providers, the mining companies have the resources 
to treat a lot of TB cases and the government wants to have a unified TB control 
programme. 
"] ~hin~ .it is important that the state maintains control, and the cost of 
mazntaznzng control is you provide the fixed dose combination drugs according 
to what you want your schedule to be and that way you keep control of quality 
and exactly what the regimens are" (Government official, Western Cape) 
"] think the main thing is you can't handle or can't implement an)' programme 
if all partners are not part of your programme ... it doesn't help to say it is us 
here and you there because we are working with the patients and everything is 
for the benefit of your patients. So, it is better to have partnership. That is what 
] am trying and doing with all the partners within the TB programme ... to have 
one bigfamity to address the problems" (Government official, North West) 
"the bottom line is that it decreases the infectiousness in the community. It 
cures our patients and though we use their manpower to do that we benefit all 
the way. And they also benefit, it is a win-win situation" (Government official, 
Free State) 
Declining resources in the public sector motivated the government to start looking at 
other options. One of the options is a community-based TB treatment programme 
run by the local NGOs. This option of delivering TB treatment is more cost-effective 
than the purely public provision of TB treatment, and is more convenient for the 
patient (Sinanovic et aI., 2003). By providing financial support to the NGOs to run 
community-based TB programmes, TB patients have the option of where they want 
to be supported for the duration of their treatment which potentially could improve 
compliance. The NGOs are also seen as an important player in strengthening the TB 
programme with various responsibilities such as advocacy and health education, 
follow up of the treatment interrupters, direct treatment observation, and training. 
"with t~e increas.ing number of TB clients that we are seeing per year, real~1' 
~e are JUs~ creatzng ?ottlenecJ;s at services providers, and because the budget 
zs nO.t gettzng any bzgger we ve got to look at other options of how we can 
provzde the support to our TB clients. It really comes down to rands and cents 
and economy of scale and all the rest of it" (Government official, \Vestern 
Cape) 
"we are definitely more efficient because we can't handle such a large number 
ofpatients in our clinics" (Government official, Free State) 
"] think one has to go from a cost point of view. These community DOT 
programmes are definitely the cheaper option to the service provider" 
(Government official, North West) 
The private providers were also asked about the government's motivations for 
partnerships. The two mining companies mentioned that the government recognised 
that the mining companies have a role to play, because they are large employers, and 
need to fulfil the obligations of the law where TB in a mine setting is occupational 
and they, therefore, had to provide treatment to their workers. The following quotes 
best illustrate their opinions about the government's motivations. 
" ... because we have got programmes in place that work. Because we employ 
a lot of people, we treat a lot of TB cases and we've got the infrastructure and 
the money to support these programmes" (Medical services director, mining 
company A) 
"I think they realise we are a big player in this area. We are treating not just 
our people but lots of contractors and dependents. We treat our own people so 
if they don't get statistics from us, their figures are obviously totally wrong. I 
mean, because then they only report on what they treat which will exclude the 
mining sector. And we know that the mining sector has got a high TB 
incidence rate" (Medical services director, mining company B) 
However, the interviews found that perceptions did not always correspond to facts. 
Whilst the mining companies are legally bound to provide TB treatment to their 
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employees, one of the respondents explained that the financing and provision of IB 
treatment is the responsibility of the government. 
"v:ell, whose problem is TB? Is it really a mining problem? It is a notifiable 
dIsease. I think it is the state's problem. The other half of my feelings is that it 
is also a mining problem. If you look at their TB policy they cannot refuse in 
treating anybody so in other words we can actually take our 248 TB patients 
per day and dump them on the clinic and they must treat which will be chaos. 
But it will also be chaos for us. So, yes, there has to be a partnership on both 
sides" (Medical services director, mining company C) 
The NGOs mentioned that the government had realised that TB cannot be controlled 
without a collaboration with other stakeholders such as community-based NGOs. 
However, they also recognised that the government sees them as just another service 
provider. 
"what the health department wants out of the NGOs is to make sure that they 
get their money's worth in having service providers. I don't think there is 
motivation, human consideration in it for benefit to the patient. It is just cold 
hardfacts" (Director, NGO A) 
Motivations of different private providers for public-private partnerships 
The interviews found that the main motivations for the two mining companies are 
profit and access to information. This is achieved by improving their own IB 
programmes through measuring the treatment outcomes more accurately by using 
the government guidelines, controlling TB epidemic amongst their workers (and in 
the community), and keeping incidence rate as low as possible. 
"we want to prolong our worker. It is a mutual relationship. They will 
continue to work while they are healthy and we will keep them health,r" 
(Medical services director, mining company A) 
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"we are able ~o m.easure our outcomes more accurately and we benefit from 
open ~om:nunlcatlon and education. Getting up-to-date information on new 
org~nlsatlon protocols, and getting involved with people working in the same 
subject, and getting invited to seminars and so on. And, I believe, that the 
programme that has been put together by the Department of Health IS a 
comprehensive one" (Medical services director, mining company B) 
Another view is more divided: 
"that is a difficult one because I would like to get more money out of them, that 
is for sure. I am part of their work group, this is a five-year plan to stop TB 
and so it is on the agenda already so I really would like to get either the 
treatment (drugs) or at least an increase in our subsidy. But that is not the 
only thing - it is a learning curve for both of us. I think we work well 
together" (Medical services director, mining company C) 
When asked who initiated the partnership with the private for-profit providers, one 
of the directors of the medical services in the mining company mentioned that: 
"it was the government's initiative because, you know, if they had to take over 
all our TBs and treat them, it will be a loss to them. It will also be a loss to us 
because, I mean we cannot provide transport, put everybody on a bakkie, take 
them to the nearest clinic where they sit all day and then go back to work 
maybe next day. It will be a loss for both of us if we have to take our people to 
a clinic for treatment" (Medical services director, mining company C) 
Private non-profit providers (community level NGOs) mentioned that their main 
motivations are assisting the government in reaching its objective - controlling the 
TBIHIV epidemic - by involving the community to take ownership of the TB and 
HIV problems. They mentioned a combination of altruistic and financial 
motivations. Whilst community development and the care for the patient are the 
main motivations for getting involved in the partnership, financial support for their 
community-based TB programme related activities is equally important. 
"it creates awareness ofTB amongst everybody" (Director, NGO B) 
"] think it is more cost-beneficial to the health service providers, and there is 
definitely a reduced cost for the patient because they are do not have to tra\'el 
or take time from work. Because this is one of the things ] feel is so often 
overlooked. We all shout about the cost to the service provider, but what is the 
cost to the patient" (Director, NGO A) 
When asked about the private providers' motivations for the partnership, the 
government officials mentioned that the mining companies' reasons for the 
partnership were to improve their TB programme. Another view is that the 
legislation forces them to provide TB treatment: 
"they are bound by law to do so. They have got no choice. Who would go on an 
extra expense which is costing them millions if they had a choice?" 
(Government official, North West) 
The government officials, however, were not very clear about the motivations of the 
NGOs: 
"well, ] hope it is not profit! And] hope it is actually for the well being of the 
client. And the interest of the client and from a more holistic point of view, so 
yes, we hope it is that" (Government official, Western Cape) 
H] think that the less formal organisations like the care groups do it because 
they care. But] think an organisation like SANTA does it for the money. And 
unfortunately the prospect of incentives has made that many unemployed 
people join NGOs to render service so that they can have most probab~\' a job 
or they hope for a job in future. So] am not convinced that a nOll-profit 
organisation like SANTA doesn't do it for the money. " (Government official, 
North West) 
230 
Data presented in this section suggests that private providers are influenced by both 
financial and non-fmancial set of motivations contained in the partnership with the 
government. From the government's perspective, improving the quality of TB 
treatment, compliance and accessibility were the main motivations for participation 
in partnerships with private providers for the provision of TB treatment. 
8.3.2 Incentive mechanisms attributable to different public-private partnerships 
The interviews found different incentive structures used in the existing public-
private partnerships for the provision ofTB treatment. They are summarised in Table 
8.1 below. 
Table 8.1: Incentive structures in existing partnerships 
Financial Non-financial 
Mining • Profit maximization by • Regulation (The Occupational 
companies minimising workdays lost due Disease in Mines and Works 
to illness Act of 1973) 
• TB treatment drugs provided by • Improving their TB programme 
the TB Control Programme by using the government 
• Reimbursement per patient day treatment guidelines 
by the TB Control Programme • Controlling TB epidemic 
• Training 
Non- • Direct government subsidy • Assisting the government in 
governmental (funding of community-based controlling TB epidemic 
organisations TB programmes) • Good relationships with the 
government 
In the pUblic-private for-profit partnership (i.e. mining companies), the go ernment 
provides a con1bination of financial and non-financial incentives. Pro ision of fr 
drugs and financial subsidies (reimbursement per outpatient visit and inpati nt d y 
are the main financial incentives provided to the mining companies for provision of 
TB treatment to their workers. Non-financial incentives provided to the mining 
companies are training on the national TB treatment guidelines, inviting 
representatives of the mining companies to participate in planning TB control 
activities, and creating an informal partnership with the public sector for the 
provision of TB treatment. 
The mining companies that are reimbursed per outpatient visit and inpatient day 
complained that the reimbursement that they receive is unrealistically low and that 
they would instead prefer free drugs: 
H ... because I don't think R2.40 per outpatient is enough and I definitely don't 
think that anybody can stay in a hospital for R24 a day. I mean, if there is a 
hospital that can afford patient care for R24 a day, they will be very full" 
(Medical services director, Mining company C) 
The main incentive mechanism in the partnership with the non-profit providers 
appears to be financial. In this partnership, the government provides a direct annual 
subsidy to the community-based NGOs. The subsidy includes the payment of the 
district co-ordinator's salary, a portion of general administration costs, training costs 
and the payment of incentives to "treatment supporters". Non-financial incentives 
provided to the NGOs include inviting representatives of the NGOs to participate in 
planning TB control activities and improving the relationships between the public 
and private non-profit sectors. 
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What response do different incentives create? 
In the case of one of the private for-profit providers, it was found that a low le\"el of 
the provider payment (i.e. reimbursement per outpatient visit/inpatient day) created 
an incentive to control costs by reducing the length of stay in the hospital or not 
admitting TB patients to a mine hospital in the first place. It could have also 
potentially created an incentive to reduce the number of procedures per patient. 
Finally, this type/level of reimbursement could potentially create an incentive to 
reduce the number of cases detected and treated. The private provider clearly 
expressed a preference for free drugs in future. 
For the companies receiving free drugs, however, this financial subsidy did not 
create an incentive to control costs: 
HTB treatment (i.e. drugs) that we get for free is actually a bonus. 
Traditionally, we provided it ourselves. And then government came on board 
and said, well you are doing a good job, here is some free treatment. So that is 
really our set up. And as I say, we are a small little set up compared to other 
mines" (Medical services director, mining company A) 
Similarly, another mining company felt that there was more to it then free drugs: 
"to control the TB epidemic is the first prize and to try and keep the incidence 
rate as low as possible. The free drugs was nice, you know, gesture, and I do 
think that is not the drive behind it. Obviously, they almost forced us to do 
exactly what they want and to throw open our books and our protocol and so 
on because we feel they are part of it." (Medical services director, mining 
company B) 
On the other hand, it was found that the subsidy the government provides to the 
conlmunity-based NGOs is project related which could potentially create incentives 
to spend the whole annual subsidy on a particular project regardless of \\hether it is 
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spent in the most cost-effective way, as the NGOs are expected to return any unspent 
subsidies. However, their perceptions differ from this argument. 
"you either going to provide a good service or you are not" (Director NGO 
A) , 
"we have provided support to TB patients voluntarily in the past, and with or 
without the subsidy, we will continue rendering a good service" (Director, 
NGOB) 
The evidence on the quality of care indicates that both models of public-private 
partnerships have superior quality of care when compared to the purely public sector. 
It can be argued that the drugs provided to the mining companies and direct 
subsidies to the NGOs have a positive impact on the quality of TB treatment, and 
that there are no major incentives to compromise with this aspect of service 
provision. In addition, the cost-effectiveness data presented in this study suggest that 
the existence of the public-private partnerships could lead to substantial savings to 
the public sector. This is particularly significant with the non-profit providers, 
suggesting that the use of a direct subsidy to the NGOs as an incentive structure 
could improve efficiency of the health system. 
In summary, it appears that the existing public-private partnerships provide an 
incentive to encourage private sector participation, and thereby improve the quality 
of care and cost-effectiveness of TB treatment. If private providers see a positive 
benefit for their business and this outweighs possible drawbacks they are more likely 
to want to be involved. Drawbacks can include the opportunity cost of time spent in 
training, being monitored and providing information to the IB control programmes. 
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8.3.3 Potential partners in the provision of TB treatment 
One of the key influences on the likely nature of the partnership is the nature of the 
market in which pUblic-private partnerships take place (Palmer, 200 I). Indicators of 
the nature of the market examined in this study include the potential private partners, 
obstacles to providing TB treatment in the private sector, and their motivations for 
partnership with the government. Each of them is briefly discussed below. 
Potential private partners 
Although working better with the private providers that are already in place is one 
way of improving the provision of TB treatment, involving new private providers 
may be useful in certain situations. These providers are, in some instances, 
particularly well placed to undertake activities such as provision of TB treatment -
they may already be present in a targeted district, or may be heavily utilised by a 
targeted popUlation. One of the objectives of this study was to identify a range of 
private providers who might potentially become partners in the delivery of TB 
treatment in a resource-limited setting. Table 8.2 overleaf summarises the main 
characteristics of four different private providers of TB treatment identified through 
interviews with government official and private providers. 
Table 8.2: Characteristics of potential different private providers 
Type of private Location Type of services Population served 
provider provided 
Commercial clinic Conveniently Primary health care, Cash paying patient 
company placed on the edge occupational health medical aid patient 
of residential and care and dental and capitation 
industrial areas sefV1ces patients 
Independent Poorer urban areas Primary health care Medical aid patients 
practitioners capitation patients 
association and cash paying 
patients 
Employer-based Mining company Occupational health Company employees 
health care provider care (mainly low income 
(mining industry) workers) 
Employer-based In the areas where Primary health care, Textile industry 
health care provider the greatest optical, dental and employees and their 
(textile industry) concentration of social workers dependents (mainly 
the textile industry services, and low income workers) 
workers are either occupational health 
working or living care 
Obstacles to providing TB treatment in the private sector 
The interviews with potential private providers explored the obstacles to private 
providers' participation in the provision of TB treatment. It was found that obstacles 
fall into three main categories: 
(1) lack of access to diagnostic facilities and unavailability of drugs; 
(2) inadequate knowledge and awareness of the national TB control guidelines; and, 
(3) poor referral system and poor communication between the public and private 
sectors. 
The cost of diagnosis and treatment of TB in the private practitioners setting is 
extremely high and is not covered by the health insurance companies as discussed in 
chapter 5. Despite the fact that diagnosis and treatment ofTB is free of charg in the 
public sector there is demand for it in the pri ate practition rs setting. Thi 
intensified by the HIV epidemic that is not limited to the poorer members of the 
society who are dependant on the public sector. Access to using the public sector 
diagnostic facilities and drugs would make it possible for the private practitioner to 
provide treatment and follow the patient from diagnosis to completion of treatment. 
A further obstacle mentioned was the lack of knowledge of the national TB 
treatment guidelines which is a major obstacle to providing a good quality treatment. 
When asked when last time contacted by officials from the Department of Health to 
inform them about the national TB treatment guidelines, all four potential private 
partners said they had not been contacted in the last 5 years. 
The third type of obstacle mentioned was poor communication with the public sector 
officials and poor referral system. The interview found that this was mainly 
influenced by their experience with previous interactions with the public sector (e.g. 
through the provision of family planning services which were subsidised by the 
government). One respondent spoke of poor motivation amongst the health workers 
in the public clinics: 
"they are de-motivated. They are overworked and, they think they are 
underpaid. While there is a big staff shortage it is enough to make them 
difficult" (Director, employer-based provider - textile industry) 
One of the private providers talked quite critically of the government's capacity to 
manage interactions with the private sector: 
"011 the state side, they are just not up to managing and it becomes a 
bureaucratic nightmare that we have to H'ade through" (Director, employer-
based provider - textile industry) 
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To summarise, obstacles to providing TB treatment in the private sector exist both 
on the side of the private providers lacking necessary knowledge about the TB 
treatment guidelines and on the public sector side lacking resources and capacity for 
interaction with private providers. In addition, TB treatment is costly to treat and 
private insurance for TB treatment is virtually non-existent. It appears that private 
providers are not willing to provide TB treatment. On the other side, there is 
reluctance by the government officials to get involved in interactions with private 
providers mainly because of their own lack of capacity for contract management. 
However, there appeared to be interest on both sides to improve the situation _ 
government by organising workshops on the TB national guidelines and private 
practitioners by attending those workshops and putting TB on the agenda. 
Motivations of potential private providers for partnerships with the government 
The previous section noted that private providers had a number of reasons for not 
providing TB treatment. However, all potential private providers identified in this 
study are located in areas where the incidence of TB is very high. As medical 
schemes do not cover TB treatment, most of them refer around twenty TB patients a 
month to a nearest public clinic for diagnosis and treatment. The sense of frustration 
of having to refer TB suspects to the public clinics, and not being able to provide a 
full treatment to their own patients, is evident. When they were asked whether they 
would consider providing TB treatment in partnership with the public sector. all of 
the respondents said that whilst they are not prepared to provide IB treatment alone 
they would consider doing that in partnership with the government. 
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The question of what motivates private providers for wanting to get involved \,,-ith 
the public sector in the provision of TB treatment is likely to be detennined to some 
extent by whether private providers are operating for-profit or not for-profit, and 
whether they are self-employed individuals or part of a larger company structure. 
Potential private providers interviewed for this study gave various answers to this 
question. All of them mentioned both financial and non-financial motivations for 
partnership. Examples of reasons for financial and non-financial motivations for 
PPPs by potential partners are shown in Table 8.3 overleaf. 
Table 8.3: Motivations of potential partners 
Potential partner 
Commercial clinic 
company 
Independent 
practitioners 
association 
Employer-based 
service provider 
(mining industry) 
Employer-based 
service provider 
(textile industry) 
Motivations 
"firstly financial because we are a private set up JI 
"it will make it more accessible for people to get their treatment It 
"we need to be paid for that service" 
"we are looking at holistic care for our client base. 17wt is the 
only reason why I think we would go that route " 
"it is nice to see a patient and treat the patient until the very end" 
"well, I think there is obviously a cost saving if they do provide us 
with standard TB drugs as a minimum. That is purely sort of a 
monetary one, and in a non-profit organisation we are told to keep 
our costs down just as the state is" 
"we are involved with the community allarge and we do realise 
that TB knows no boundaries. And it is not as ifwe can shut off the 
community from the mine or shut the mine offfrom the community, 
so we are inter-related in that way and obviously need to try and 
help the community at large" 
"providing a more comprehensive care for our members and 
certainly reducing the costs to us " 
"from a personal perspective, it is contributing to a bigger plan, 
meeting national health goals" 
"also for the patient it is less costly. If she has to arrive late at 
work every day for six months, it can put her under pressure" 
"you know, there are many advantages to it, the industry doing this 
for their workers, the union doing that for their workers. Remember 
that we are in a globalised environment now. There are advantages 
of having a social benefit programme for employees and for the 
unions" 
In summary, it was found that there are many potential providers who are not 
providing TB treatment to their patients but refer them to the public sector. Main 
obstacles to providing treatment are the lack of access to diagnostic facilities and 
unavailability of drugs, inadequate knowledge and awareness of the national TB 
control guidelines, and poor communication between the public and private sectors . 
They have both financial and non-financial motivations for partnership with the 
government. Based on the motivations, type of the provider location and th 
population they s rYe, incenti e mechanisms that may be need d fI r a \\ 11-
functioning partnership could be devised. The next section summarises the incentive 
mechanisms that the potential private providers interviewed for the study found to be 
necessary for a well-functioning partnership for the provision of TB treatment with 
the government. 
8.3.4 Incentives structures for broader public-private partnerships 
It has been shown that private providers face obstacles to providing TB treatment 
and that therefore they are not willing to provide TB treatment alone but in 
partnership with the government. Potential partners were asked what incentive 
structures incentives would encourage them to provide TB treatment. Table 8.4 
below summarises their answers. 
Table 8.4: Incentive structures for broader involvement of private providers 
Financial Non-fmancial 
Commercial clinic • Provide free TB treatment • Provide training on TB 
company and drugs treatment guidelines 
private • Make appropriate payment • Provide access to use the 
practitioners for each patient treated public sector diagnostic 
facilities and equipment 
Employer-based • Provide free TB treatment • Provide training on TB 
providers drugs treatment guidelines 
• Provide access to use the 
public sector diagnostic 
facilities and equipment 
• Build a good relationship 
with the government 
In addition to the financial and non-financial incentives shown in the table abo e 
both the private practitioners and commercial clinic companies mentioned other 
benefits that they would derive by being able to provide TB treatment. They include 
broadening the service range, maintaining their client base, and attracting clients th t 
otherwise would not go to those pro iders. Most of these pro iders work in ar as 
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where the TBIHIV epidemic has become very prevalent making the availability of 
TB treatment even more relevant. The commercial clinic companies as well as the 
private practitioners, therefore, have a financial incentive to have TB treatment 
available in their practice not only because that would keep the existing patients but 
also would attract more patients, such as family members of the existing patients. 
They would provide TB treatment as long as they are paid by someone to do it. 
Although the commercial companies mentioned improved accessibility as one of 
their motivations for getting involved in providing TB treatment, their main 
motivation remains purely financial. One of the private practitioners mentioned the 
importance of 'holistic care' approach that would potentially create a lot of job 
satisfaction for doctors: Hit is nice to see a patient and treat the patient until the velY 
end" (Private practitioner, Western Cape). 
One of the factors that influence the degree of competition in a market is its 
contestability or the threat of other providers moving into the market (Harding and 
Preker 2003). The interviews found that this is particularly relevant for the private 
practitioners and commercial companies. Private practitioners mentioned that the 
growing number of the commercial clinic companies offering competitively priced 
services compared to those offered by private practitioners practices (discussed in 
chapter 5) are seen as their major competitors in the market. With a growing number 
of private practitioners the competition for a limited number of patients who either 
have private medical insurance or are willing to pay out-of-pocket for private health 
care is becoming a threat to private practitioners. Therefore, a large and growing 
private sector, and the competition that is creates, may be another motivation for 
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them wanting to get involved in the provision of TB treatment (provided they are 
paid for it). 
For the employer-based providers, the main financial incentive for partnership with 
the government is the cost saving that could be achieved through free drugs and 
access to use the public sector diagnostic facilities and equipment. They are either 
already providing TB treatment (as in the case with the mining company), in which 
case the drugs and access to the public sector resources would reduce their 
production costs significantly, or are finding it attractive to be able to provide the 
service to the employees and their dependants (as in the case of the textile company) 
through government subsidies. Other motivating factors mainly relate to the 
regulatory framework and political awareness. For the employer-based providers 
delivering primary health care in the textile company, the benefit of providing TB 
treatment is primarily of social and political nature, as they see political advantages 
in having a model ofTB treatment delivery for low-income workers. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the motivations for participation in existing public-private 
arrangements and incentive structures attributable to different partnerships for the 
provision of TB treatment in South Africa. The motivations of potential new private 
sector partners, focusing on apparent obstacles to provision of TB treatment in the 
private sector, were discussed. From the government's perspective, improving the 
quality of TB treatment, compliance and accessibility were the main motivations for 
participation in partnerships for the provision of TB treatment. Whilst the main 
nlotivation for the mining companies was profit maximisation by reducing the 
number of workdays lost due to TB, and improving their own TB programmes by 
following the national treatment guidelines, assisting the government in controlling 
the TBIHIV epidemic and financial support were the main reasons for the 
community-based NGOs to form a partnership with the Department of Health. 
For potential private partners, the lack of access to diagnostic facilities and 
unavailability of drugs, poor communication between the public and private sectors, 
and inadequate knowledge of the national TB treatment guidelines are the apparent 
obstacles to provision of TB treatment. However, there is a considerable interest 
amongst the private providers who do not provide TB treatment to participate in 
partnerships with the government, provided they are given right incentives. 
Incentive structures in the existing partnerships as well as those that may be needed 
for a well-functioning partnership are context specific and depend on the type of the 
provider, past experiences and regulatory framework. In the existing partnerships, 
incentives include both financial and non-financial incentives, and range from free 
drugs to training. Potential incentives that may be required to support development 
of broader PPPs in the provision of TB treatment include access to use the public 
sector diagnostic facilities/equipment and free anti-TB drugs, service agreement, 
and, in the case of private for-profit providers, a set fee per patient treated. In 
addition, training in the national TB treatment guidelines and a good working 
relationship with the government are found to be important. 
In conclusion, private providers in the existing and potential partnerships appear to 
have both financial (cost-savings for the non-profit, and profit-maximising for the 
for-profit private providers) and non-financial motivations (training, good 
relationship with the government, access to use the public sector facilities) for 
participation in partnership for the provision of tuberculosis. However, although 
there must be sufficient (financial and non-financial) motivation for a partnership to 
be successful, the level of competition between private providers, regulatory 
framework, and social and political awareness become increasingly important. A 
range of incentives, therefore, could be used to encourage private sector participation 
in partnership with the government for the provision of TB treatment. While 
recognising that 'getting incentives right' is important in any principal-agent 
relationship, monitoring and evaluation of the partnerships, however, may not 
always be easy. As highlighted by the literature on incentives and contracting, other 
factors, such as levels of trust and perceptions of relative risks, may potentially play 
an essential role in underpinning efficient public-private relationships. 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
This thesis explored the feasibility of expanding TB treatment by enhancing 
partnerships between the private and public sectors in African settings. It examined 
two existing models of pUblic-private partnerships, enabling it to highlight some of 
the practical strengths and weaknesses of different models of provision of TB 
treatment. Previous chapters have presented data on the quality of care and cost-
effectiveness from three case studies of the provision of TB treatment - two public-
private partnership models and a purely public model of treatment delivery - and 
incentive mechanisms attributable to different models of private sector participation 
in TB treatment. A literature review in chapter 2 gave rise to a framework which 
synthesised many potential factors for increased involvement of the private sector in 
the provision of TB treatment. 
In line with some of the literature on the public-private mix in health care and the 
role of the private sector, the feasibility of increased public-private partnerships will 
depend upon the nature of the services itself as well as upon contextual 
circumstances. The three case studies highlighted different models of public-private 
provision of TB treatment for different study populations making it possible to 
consider what influences the performance of each model. This chapter considers the 
main limitations of the methodology the study used. Findings highlighted by a 
comparison between the models, and incentive mechanisms attributable to different 
nlodels of public-private partnership, are then discussed. 
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9.2 Methodological and data issues 
The study used a multiple case study approach. Case studies were able to examine 
different models of pUblic-private partnership for the provision of TB treatment, 
using documentary sources, performance data and interviews to access both facts 
and perceptions about the public-private partnerships. They were able to deal both 
with more concrete factors such as quality of care and cost-effectiveness (which can 
be objectively compared), and other more subjective concepts such as motivation 
and incentives. However, attempting to compare the performance of a range of 
different models of provision also has limitations. They are as follows: 
1. DOTS-based models of public-private partnership for the prOVISIOn of TB 
treatment available for the study were limited. Two models of public-private 
prOVISIon were studied, together with purely public provision of TB treatment. 
Lifecare and SANTA models, described in detail in chapter 5, were excluded since 
they provide hospital-based TB treatment. Whilst contracts between the government 
and these two private providers have been used for many years to provide hospital-
based tuberculosis care, the epidemic of TB associated with HIV is such that 
hospital-based TB treatment is no longer feasible (as discussed in chapter 6) and is 
not promoted by the WHO recommendations. Moreover, both the Lifecare and 
SANTA contracts have been subjected to scrutiny, and may not be a feasible policy 
option in the future. Finally, relative hospital efficiency of contracting out to 
Lifecare versus direct provision of hospital services has previously been assessed by 
Broomberg et al (1997). They evaluated hospital performance in terms of production 
costs and quality of various aspects of care for four tracer conditions (caesarean 
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section, nonnal delivery, appendectomy and hernia repair), but did not specifically 
assess the perfonnance of the provision of TB services. Public-private models of 
provision of TB treatment with other private providers, such as traditional healers 
and private practitioners, are not available in South Africa, unlike in other settings 
such as India, Vietnam and Nepal. The study, however, included the existing models 
that are relevant to current policy options. In addition, the aim of the study was not 
to generalise widely but to explore and understand better the relationships between 
providers, influences on behaviour and performance in depth. Three models were 
chosen as three separate case studies to show differences in models. 
2. There is a concern about the extent to which the models under study are truly 
comparable. In terms of workload, they are different, as the number of newly 
registered pulmonary TB patients varied from 50 to 423. This might have influenced 
the perfonnance. However, non-randomised purposive sampling has been used to 
select sites that reflect different workload within each model of provision in order to 
do pair-wise comparison (i.e. between different sites in a same model). In addition, 
the model of the pUblic-private partnership should depend on the type of patient and 
on the circumstances. For instance, the model that involves community-based NGOs 
is suitable for poor community members, old and unemployed people. On the other 
hand, the employer-based model is designed for low-income workers (such as 
miners) and for employed but without a comprehensive insurance. The study models 
are comparable in that they follow the same TB treatment protocol, are similar in 
terms of key social, economic and demographic characteristics, and provide care to 
the lower-income populations. 
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3. Non-randomised purposive sampling was used to identify sites that reflected 
communities and locations where PPPs are currently in place. Thus the sites varied 
significantly by TB incidence due to the nature of the PPP target groups. Although 
efforts were made to try and select sites with similar HIV prevalence rates, the nature 
of the PPP target groups and scarcity of data on HIV prevalence made this difficult. 
As there is a higher mortality rate associated with HIV status of TB patients, it was 
not possible to control for the fact that TB treatment outcomes might have been 
poorer in sites with a higher HIV prevalence rate than in sites with a lower HIV 
prevalence rate. This could have underestimated the cost-effectiveness at higher 
HIV ITB incidence sites. The PPPs were all relatively well functioning (with cure 
rates well above the South African average of 55%). The purposive sampling may 
have led to identification of better-functioning PPPs, which may suggest that results 
are optimistic. 
4. The major caveat to using the study results in making policy recommendations is 
that it was based on a limited number of study sites (i.e. two sites in each model of 
delivery). There are three main reasons for such a small number of sites. First, a 
large amount of quantitative and qualitative data from document reviews, open-
ended questions and semi-structured interviews needed to be collected, analysed and 
pulled together into a coherent story. This required a significant time effort. Second, 
it was sensible to select fewer sites and focus more on understanding better the 
relationships between providers and influences on their behaviour. Last since there 
is a range of complex factors influencing evaluation results, a smaller number of 
sites allowed for a more thorough analysis. However, choosing such a small sample 
of sites should not have influenced losing any rigour. 
5. The last major limitation relates to the valuation of patient time cost. While time 
spent making clinic visits does represent an important opportunity cost, whether this 
is lost productive time or lost leisure time, placing a monetary value on such time is 
difficult unless it can be unambiguously related to income losses. In these 
evaluations, the conventional practice of using average reported incomes among a 
sample of patients is used to value time (Gold et al 1996). This may under or over-
estimate true costs. Nevertheless, the results suggesting that patient costs were 
reduced with the public-private models of delivery can be argued to be robust for 
three reasons. First, they hold in sensitivity analyses accounting for the variability in 
the survey data collected. Second, even if time costs were valued as zero, the results 
hold. Lastly, it seems likely that in the pUblic-private non-profit model patients chose 
an option that would minimize the costs associated with their treatment, and this is 
the assumption underlying the analysis. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed in the research. The 
qualitative approach adopted had both strengths and weaknesses. Strengths were its 
ability to accommodate the variety of factors that needed to be considered. 
Weaknesses mainly include the reliance on interview data which raises the question 
of the influence of the interviewer's own role in the research process and how it is 
likely to have affected the study's findings. 
In some cases it was possible to triangulate findings methodologically by drawing on 
data on performance or cross-checking perceptions with facts, and where this was so 
. h b . d t For 1·nstaI1CC checks could be made of need to employ extra It as een came ou. , 
2~() 
assistants to deal with all the reporting requIrements of the partnership versus 
whether assistants had ever been employed, but there are many examples where such 
triangulation was not possible e.g. in response to questions about more subjective 
issues such as motivation. Because there was not an opportunity to obsen'e the day 
to day interaction between private and public providers over a long period of time, 
an account of the nature of the relationship had to a large extent rely on what was 
said about it by those involved. 
Transcribed questionnaires were sent out to all the respondents who were asked to 
comment on the way the data collected through the interviews were transcribed and 
interpreted. Around half of the respondents replied, some with minor suggestions on 
several issues. Triangulation of analysis, however, was not carried out partly for 
logistical reasons and partly due to questions about the usefulness of triangulation in 
this type of study (Silverman, 1993; Seale, 1999). The way in which the interview 
data were analysed and written up must be acknowledged to be a single unique 
commentary on the phenomenon under investigation and the analysis of a second 
researcher was likely to produce a second unique commentary. How these two 
competing narratives would then be reconciled may have been problematic. 
In conclusion, the reliance on both quantitative and qualitative methods strengthens 
the study as the two approaches complement one another. As Coast (1999) 
summarises: "the strengths of qualitative research is its ability to aid understanding, 
provide explanations and explore issues, particularly those of a complex nature. Its 
weakness, in comparison to quantitative research, is that it does not provide 
empirical data which are statistically generalisable to whole populations ". 
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9.3 Discussion of findings 
The review of theoretical and empirical literature has provided a framework for 
assessing the potential for increased involvement of the private sector in TB 
treatment. The review has shown that there are two, often implicit, main alternative 
rationales for the role of the public sector: to provide 'insurance' where insurance 
markets fail, and to finance and ensure provision of an essential cost-effective 
package of services. These two rationales imply very different roles for the 
government, the first suggesting it should protect the population from catastrophic 
costs; the second that it should limit itself to primary and selective hospital care. 
Governments in poorly resourced countries cannot do both adequately. The 
background and context of the pUblic-private mix in South Africa provided in 
chapter 3 suggest that the public sector cannot effectively control TB epidemic 
without drawing on the private sector. South Africa's public sector is faced with 
legacy of fragmented services, inequity and a weak human resource. The private 
sector, on the other hand, is large, employing the majority of personnel and other 
health resources. This, combined with the TBIHIV epidemic, leads the public sector 
to depend on the stronger private sector to meet increased demand for TB and HIV 
related services. 
In order to ensure access to poor people who are the most seriously affected, 
diagnosis and treatment for TB treatment in South Africa is provided free of charge 
in the public sector. However, the government is not the only provider of TB 
treatment. There are three groups of private providers which are involved in the 
provision of TB treatment in South Africa: the private for-profit group, through 
contractor hospitals, private practitioners and private hospitals; employer-based 
health care providers; and, the non-profit private sector. The provincial TB control 
programmes have partnerships for directly observed TB treatment with providers 
from all the groups. This study has evaluated the performance of two models of 
public-private partnership, and compared it with the pure public provision of TB 
treatment. The findings of the performance evaluation, in terms of quality of care 
and cost-effectiveness, are discussed below. 
9.3.1 Performance of each model 
Public-private for-profit partnership model 
In terms of structural quality, the pUblic-private for-profit model of delivery of TB 
treatment scored higher than the public sector model of delivery in all categories 
except 'patient environment'. The mining companies have very good resources 
which impact on the technical quality of care. A lack of health education material on 
display or available to take home as well as a clear system for patient 
complaints/suggestions mechanism contributed to a slightly lower score in the 
category. In terms of process quality, the public-private for-profit and public models 
of delivery achieved almost the same score, reflecting a very good knowledge of the 
treatment guidelines for both private and public sector health care providers. As far 
as the outcome quality of care is concerned, the public-private for profit model 
scored higher than the purely public sector. However, it must be acknowledged that 
the outcome quality is difficult to measure as there may be other factors that affect 
TB treatment outcome, and compliance to treatment is only one of them. 
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The relatively good quality of care had an effect on the compliance rate (on average 
87% successful treatment completion rate) and cost-effectiveness ratios. Although 
the average cost per patient treated in this model of delivery was the highest when 
compared to other models, the relatively high compliance rate improved the cost-
effectiveness of TB treatment. One of the reasons for such a good compliance is the 
system of 'parading' which is in place in the mining companies where the patient has 
no choice but to adhere to the treatment (described in chapter 6). The ethical side of 
this system is, however, doubtful. Whilst the successful treatment completion rates 
in the mining companies are high (mainly due to the system of 'parading'), the cure 
rates are much lower when compared with other models. This was influenced by the 
relatively higher HIV incidence amongst TB patients, and the relatively higher 
number of HIV-related deaths amongst TB patients, in the mining community. 
Consequently, when the effectiveness is measured using the cure rate, the cost-
effectiveness worsened. From the patient's perspective, the model is the most cost-
effective of all the study models, because there are no patient costs associated with 
TB treatment. 
Public-private non-profit partnership model 
In terms of quality of care overall, the public-private non-profit model of delivery of 
TB treatment scored higher than the purely public model for the following reasons: 
better accessibility, patient's adherence to treatment, management and staffing, and 
active defaulter tracing in place. Involvement of NGOs in the provision of TB 
treatment is of a vital importance as they have an active role in health promotion in 
the community and many patients seek treatment from/through them. By providing 
directly observed TB treatment close to where patients live, the costs of seeking care 
such as travel costs are significantly reduced. This study confinns that involving 
NGOs in the provision of TB treatment can improve access to direct observation of 
treatment and improve treatment success rate over 80%, as shown is previous studies 
in India and the Philippines (Rangan et aI., 2003; Mantala 2003). 
Another important area where NGOs playa significant role is retrieval of defaulters. 
To perform this function, close coordination with local national TB control 
programme staff, through the general medical services, is essential. In a review of 
the DOT experience, Volmink et al (2000) acknowledge that reminder letters to 
clinic defaulters, assistance of patients by lay health workers, monetary incentives, 
and increased supervision of staff all contribute to higher treatment completion rate. 
NGOs can playa role in formulating, developing and revising infonnation, education 
and communication materials that are appropriate for the local context. These factors 
have a major influence on treatment compliance which was reflected in cost-
effectiveness. This model of the provision ofTB treatment is the most cost-effective 
from the perspective of the society. Previous economic studies have shown a 
reduction in costs and improvement in cost-effectiveness of DOTS through 
decentralisation and strengthened community-based care (Islam et aI., 2002; Floyd et 
aI., 2003; Moalosi et aI., 2003; Nganda et aI., 2003; Okello et aI., 2003; Sinanovic et 
aI., 2003). Costs associated with community-based DOT were 40-500/0 lower than 
public health facility treatment, and cost-effectiveness of community-based DOT 
was approximately 50% higher. This study confirms that community-based 
approaches to the directly observed treatment of TB can be cost-effective in various 
African settings. 
Purely public sector model 
This model of the provision of TB treatment achieved the lowest overall quality of 
care indicator. Why is quality of TB treatment so much lower in the purely public 
sector than in the pUblic-private partnerships? Three explanations can be proposed. 
First, government objectives may be primarily focused on access, which means that 
the number of people who gained access to care is more pressing than quality. 
Second, resources available and quality of care are often linked. The poor quality of 
TB treatment in the purely public sector could be connected to the lack of resources 
(e.g. human resources, amenities, and convenience). The third is the institutional 
framework within which the government operates, which makes it structurally 
unresponsive to patient demand and preferences. In this context, budgets are set 
historically without reference to TB patient loads. 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the purely public model was the second most cost-
effective model from the provider's perspective and the least cost-effective from the 
patient's perspective. The study findings are in line with other studies that evaluated 
cost-effectiveness of TB treatment from a patient's perspective (Saunderson 1995; 
Floyd et aI., 1997; Sinanovic at aI., 2003), demonstrating that cost to the patient is 
the highest in ambulatory settings. The availability of the treatment at a workplace 
and in the community resulted in substantial savings to the patient. There were no 
patient costs associated with the treatment in the public-private for-profit 
partnerships, and the cost to the patient supervised in the community was 
substantially lower than in public sector facilities. 
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The theoretical and empirical literature highlighted that the pnmary economIC 
rationale for introducing or expanding the role of the private sector in the health 
system, in instances where the public sector provides most health care, is the 
promotion of allocative and technical efficiency. The public-private models of the 
provision of TB treatment evaluated in this study appear to be an attractive economic 
option for both providers of health services and patients. They improve affordability 
and cost-effectiveness of care compared with the purely public model of service 
delivery, and the quality of care that has been achieved is higher. 
9.3.2 Public sector financing 
The literature review in chapter 2 argued that greater attention needs to be paid to 
establishing and improving relationships between the public sector and private 
providers. As discussed in chapter 3, the South Africa's health sector objectives of 
PPPs for the provision of services are improved access and quality of care, improved 
service delivery in areas of need, and promotion of public health role of private 
practitioners. South Africa has a long history of public-private partnerships within 
the health system. This includes the contracts with both profit and non-profit 
providers supporting the provision of tuberculosis (e.g. Lifecare, SANTA), 
psychiatric and secondary level hospital care for public patients. However, despite 
South Africa's high total health care spending (8.5% of GDP), its health status ranks 
poorly with respect to countries spending as much or even less on health care 
(McIntyre et aI, 1995; McIntyre and Gilson, 2002). This study has shed light on how 
the public and private sectors can work together more effectively (in the provision of 
TB treatment) in order to improve overall health systems performance. Maximising 
the use of existing resources through PPPs, and avoiding duplication of resources, 
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could potentially improve efficiency in the public sector and lower the costs of 
private provision of TB treatment. Moreover, better quality of TB care in the public 
sector could be achieved by improving access to treatment, reducing the time spent 
waiting for and receiving care, and improving success rate through the use of the 
private sector infrastructure, human resources and expertise. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that public sector resources are constrained and further 
private sector market expansion limited adding to the pressure to increase the levels 
of interaction between the sectors. 
The relationship between the public and private sectors with respect to servIce 
delivery is traditionally viewed by health economists in terms of two key functions, 
that of financing and provision (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Bennett et aI, 1997), 
by which the responsibilities of the public and private sectors are delineated. A 
traditional view is that TB control is a public health concern for which the state has a 
prime responsibility (World Bank, 1993; Jack, 2001). Another view is that the 
priority public sector role is to provide insurance where insurance markets fail (i.e. to 
protect the popUlation from high health care costs), and that the private sector should 
dominate in primary care (Hammer and Berman, 1995). Furthermore, the ongoing 
health sector reform in developing countries is characterised by increasing private 
provision and financing of health care services. In order to capture the full 
complexity of relationships between the public and private sectors in PPPs, which 
involves the overlapping and sharing of functions with respect of financing and 
provision, this study has found that there may be relationships in which the financing 
function cannot be solely attributable to one or the other sector. The private sector 
(i.e. mining companies and NGOs) may raise capital financing to meet infrastructure 
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requirements, whilst the public sector provides support through subsidies, drugs and 
training. The boundaries that exist between both financing and provision by the 
public and private sector are, therefore, blurred. PPPs for the provision of IB 
treatment capture the overlapping of functions with respect to both financing and 
provision, whilst unpacking the complex nature of shared functions. 
In terms of financing of the PPPs, the public sector finances a small fraction of the 
service provision cost in the public-private for-profit model (either through the 
provision of free anti-TB drugs or reimbursement per patient day). From the public 
sector perspective it is the least costly model of partnership to finance, as most of the 
resources employed in these partnerships are those of the private provider. As far as 
the public-private non-profit model is concerned, the public sector finances around 
half of the NGO's service provision cost (through subsidies). However, this model is 
almost twice as cost-effective as the purely public sector model. 
New institutional economics assumes that high transaction costs is one more reason 
for a dominant government role in provision. Williamson (1985) argued that the 
appropriate institutional form for producing and delivering goods and services 
depends on which form minimises costs. Transaction costs are incurred because of 
the risks involved in exchange: each party concerned has limited information about 
how their partner will behave and whether future circumstance will change. 
Transaction costs involve the costs of establishing partnerships, of acquiring 
necessary information, and of monitoring. The costs of partnerships identified by 
respondents included setting up information systems, staff training and transport. No 
attenlpt was made in this study to quantify these costs. There are a number of 
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reasons for this. First, transaction costs are difficult to measure numerically and are 
much more frequently described by comparative algebra rather than enumeration 
(e.g. 'greater than' or 'less than'). Second, it is often difficult to differentiate the 
extra transactions costs associated with partnerships from the costs of production. 
For instance, some of the information collected for the purposes of monitoring 
partnerships may also be used for management purposes. Third, a more detained 
specification of the service that needs to be provided and a more formal way of 
formalising interaction between public-private partners both increase transaction 
costs. Fourth, some transaction costs, such as setting up of information system, may 
reduce over time. As more information becomes available, the degree of uncertainty 
reduces, which can also decrease transaction costs. Finally, transaction costs could 
be reduced if public and private partners develop more trusting relationships and 
negotiate more flexible and longer-term contracts (Ashton, 1998). 
The highest transaction cost reported by the private sector partner was staff time 
spent on reporting to the public sector partner. Often extra assistants had to be 
employed to fulfil all the administration requirements of the partnerships. To some 
extent, the cost of additional staff time required for reporting has already been 
included in the cost of service provision. However, these costs were small 
comparative to the cost-savings private partners achieved through partnerships. On 
the public sector side, no additional staff had to be employed to cope with the extra 
work. This does not mean that there were no transaction costs associated with setting 
up partnerships. It must be stressed that, the more that the public sector partner (i.e. 
provincial TB Control Programmes) controls private partners and shifts risk to them, 
the higher transaction costs and less the interest in enhancing partnerships between 
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the private and public sector for the provision of TB treatment. On the other hand, an 
informal partnership based on a long-term relationship is likely to reduce incentive 
for efficiency. However, if the nature of the service provided through the partnership 
is such that specifying and monitoring performance is easy, than the argument for a 
closer relationship of co-operation between the private and public partners is greater 
(Mills et aI., 2001). 
9.3.3 Motivations and incentive mechanisms for each model 
Economic theory suggests that problems are likely to arise in any principal-agent 
relationship as the agent is tempted to pursue hislher own goals at the expense of 
those of the principal. Though the problems of principal-agent relationship are 
unavoidable in health care, creating appropriate incentives for agents and monitoring 
and sanctioning of agent behaviour are some of the ways for solving the market 
failure (Mills et aI., 2001). How different providers in the health care system are paid 
can have an impact on their behaviour, and therefore on the achievement of the 
objectives of the health system. The transition from public to public-private sector 
treatment of TB raises a range of issues related to motivations, incentives and 
structuring relationships to achieve desirable outcomes. The study findings suggest 
that private providers in the existing PPPs have both financial, as predicted by the 
theory, and non-financial motivations for participation in partnership for the 
provision of TB treatment. The examination of the motivations highlighted that 
whilst the main mechanisms for both models of the existing pUblic-private 
partnership appear to be a combination of financial and non-financial incentives, the 
private non-profit providers are more influenced by financial incentives. One of the 
explanations for this could be the fact that the mining companies have a strong 
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motivation to keep their workforce healthy, in a partnership with the public sector or 
on their own. As discussed in chapter 5, the South African mining industry employs 
just under 400 000 people, mainly migrant workers from rural South Africa or 
neighbouring countries. Tuberculosis incidence rates among silica-exposed gold 
miners are over 3 000 per 100 000 employees, almost 10 times higher than those 
among the general population. It was estimated that up to 30% of mineworkers in 
certain mines are HIV positive. The combination of TB as an increasing 
occupational hazard for miners and the HIV epidemic has made mining companies 
realise that they must implement workplace TB and HIV control programmes to 
manage the disease, and accept responsibility for the consequences of unsafe 
working and living conditions in South African mines. The structurally crucial role 
of mining in the South African economy should be noted, despite understandable 
concerns with the generalisability of the results outside the mining industry. Existing 
models ofPPPs available for study in other sectors were limited. 
In addition to their more altruistic motivations, the community-based NGOs (the 
private non-profit provider in the partnership), on the other hand, appear to be 
financially dependent on the government funding. Motivations for PPPs of the 
government appear to be similar to those of the private providers, with improving 
TB programmes through better compliance and increased accessibility to treatment 
being the main motivations for participation in the PPPs. 
Swan and Zwi (1997) suggest two possible mechanisms for increasing the delivery 
of publicly financed, privately provided services: (a) the provision of financial 
incentives (fee for services. target payments) fully remunerating private providers for 
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delivery of a service; and, (b) contracting out. This study has found that potential 
private providers have no incentive to provide TB treatment. However, if certain 
incentive mechanisms are in place then partnerships with the public sector is a \vay 
for them to provide TB treatment. The study has found that incentive mechanisms 
necessary for potential partners' participation are as follows: 
1. Free provision of drugs; 
2. Free access to use the public sector diagnostic facilities and equipment; 
3. Free or subsidised provision of continuing education for private practitioners; 
4. Government financing of certain privately provided services; 
5. Committees to facilitate public and private sector co-operation; and, 
6. Lump sum annual subsidies. 
The experience with the use of incentives in the UK as a means of increasing the 
emphasis on prevention and health promotion in general practice shows that 
designing an incentive scheme that will achieve given objectives is far from easy. 
As Iliffe and Munro (1993) comment: "incentives probably influence the activity of 
some general practitioners all the time and all general practitioners some of the 
time. But no incentive package yet offered influences all general practitioners all the 
time". Others argue that incentives may have had adverse effects (Hannay et aI., 
1992; Hughes and Yule, 1992; Iliffe and Munro, 1993). While in all cases 
remuneration has to be set at a level sufficient to compensate the doctor for the cost 
of provision, an ideal incentive system would be individualised as every person has a 
slightly different set of responses and motives (Hughes and Yule, 1992). 
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It must be highlighted that such context- and provider- specific incentiYes would, 
however, require a high level of information and monitoring capacity. Moreover, it 
has been argued that once private for-profit providers such as private practitioners 
reach a target income the effectiveness of financial incentives is likely to decline. 
Effectiveness is likely to be greatest, therefore, where private providers are under-
utilised (Swan and Zwi, 1997). Public funding could be used to reimburse partially 
or fully private providers for the provision of either specific TB services particularly 
poorly covered by the public sector in the provider's area (e.g. TB defaulter 
retrieval) or a complete range of TB services to a defined popUlation (e.g. TB 
treatment at the workplace). By encouraging the provision of service at no charge, 
this approach might facilitate increased coverage in areas of particular need where 
ability/willingness to pay is limited. 
Both private providers and government officials interviewed in this study mentioned 
a contract as an incentive needed for a well-functioning partnership. Principal-agent 
theory indicates that incentives are key to the appropriate design of contracts, but 
due to the asymmetries of information their operation may be problematic. How 
appropriate are contracts in developing country context? Mills (1997) maintains that 
contracting out cannot substitute for good public sector management. Contracts are 
tools which have to be managed, and in certain respects this may be more demanding 
on managers than direct provision, requiring new skills. Contracting out is also not 
seen to be a solution to very limited budgets: if governments cannot afford to fund 
direct provision adequately, it is highly unlikely that they will be able to adequately 
fund contracts. In fact, contracts may simply protect an arbitrary selection of services 
from cuts. Lastly, it should be recognised that some of the circumstances that may 
make public sector provision inferior to contracted out services could change. For 
instance, paying staff above the market rate or borrowing funds to finance 
investments would make direct provision more attractive. 
The major difficulty with devising an incentive compatible contract in the agency 
relationship is that of measuring performance, as health outcomes are problematic to 
measure and may not be directly attributable to performance of the individual health 
care provider, but rather to their team or to other determinants of health status. 
Rewards or reimbursement mechanisms could relate to observable tasks and 
characteristics (Forsberg et aI, 2001; McPake et aI., 2002). In this case, there is an 
incentive for regulated firms and individuals to neglect other tasks and 
characteristics. It may also be difficult to measure the behavioural response to 
changes in payment systems. For example, in Uganda, the switch from reimbursing 
hospitals on the basis of bed numbers to bed occupancy resulted in longer lengths of 
stay (Ssengooba et aI., 2000). Unless there is effective monitoring of contracts, the 
contractor has the incentive to manage production in such a way as to skew observed 
characteristics to meet the target. The challenge for contracts designers, therefore, is 
to decide whether it is better to "rely on incentives related to tasks and 
characteristics which are observed with more certainty, but with less impact on 
performance, and those tasks and characteristics which are observed with less 
certainty but are more likely to impact behaviour" (McPake et aI., 2002). Finally, 
since health outcome is not easily observable by third party payers, contract 
reimbursement is almost never linked to health outcome. Although it is desirable that 
contracts have such incentives, it is rarely the case, mainly because health outcome is 
not primarily dependent on health service inputs (McPake et aI., 2002). 
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However, this study has found that measuring performance of the public-private for-
profit partnerships with the mining companies appears to be quite simple mainly 
because the mining companies have a very strong financial incentive to provide a 
good quality TB treatment to their employees. It is in the profit-nature of their 
business to keep their workforce healthy. The monitoring of this partnership involves 
reporting registered TB cases and their treatment outcomes on a quarterly basis, and 
notifying the local authority of the incidence of TB and TB-related deaths on a 
weekly basis. The provincial TB programme manager also visits the private provider 
several times a year. It should be stressed, however, that this approach to monitoring 
of partnerships with for-profit providers such as private practitioner and commercial 
private clinics may not be ideal as these providers have different motivations for 
participating in partnerships with the public sector. As discussed in chapter 5, 
management and monitoring of the contract with Lifecare was seen as a problem. 
This was partly because the contract specification was weak, making monitoring 
difficult, and partly because information on which to monitor was lacking. 
Moreover, the payment arrangement involved per diem method which might have 
provided Lifecare with an perverse incentive to prolong length of stay in its 
hospitals. This points to capacity weaknesses in provincial departments of health and 
highlights the importance of government capacity to design and monitor such 
contracts. 
Whilst monitoring the mining companies appears to be straightforward (as they have 
an incentive to provide a good quality treatment to their workers), the main 
challenge for the government is how to measure the performance of partnerships 
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with the NGOs. In the absence of a set of clear guidelines on how to monitor and 
measure performance of the NGOs, the government relies on measuring their 
performance through monthly financial statements and quarterly reporting of cases 
supervised in the community. It has been recognised that it would be difficult to 
measure NGO's performance using treatment outcomes mainly because poor 
treatment outcomes could be due to other reasons that are beyond the disease. At this 
stage, there is no method whereby the NGO's contribution to community-based TB 
treatment (which includes more that just directly-observed TB treatment) can be 
linked to outcome. In addition, NGOs are responsible for the supervision of a 
relatively small number of TB patients that makes it even more difficult to make any 
judgements about the outcomes. This study has found that building good 
relationships based on trust, between public providers and the NGOs is almost as 
important as measuring the performance (or could be a good substitute to 
performance measuring). As one of the government officials explained: 
we've got a common role that we are aiming to achieve. Does it make a difference to 
try and split and measure each separate? I think it is a question that will be 
answered as we go along" (Government official, Western Cape) 
In addition, the capacity of the government to design an adequate tool for measuring 
performance is lacking. 
"being a one-man show, it is very difficult and we are not doing efficient monitoring. 
We should be going out far more often to look at what they are doing, to ~o audits 
for what they are receiving mone)', and to see wheth~r t.hey ~;e actually dOlllg w~zat 
they say they are doing. But it is vel}' much a capacity Issue (Government offiCiaL 
W estern Cape) 
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As shown in the literature review th f'" 
, e concept 0 trust IS lncreasmgly seen as playing 
an essential role in underpinn' f~' bl" " . lng e dClent pu lc-pnvate mteractIOns (Deakm and 
Wilkinson 1995; Goddard and Mannion 1998; Gilson, 2003). This study has found 
that the level of trust could potentially play an important role in public-private 
partnerships, particularly when efficient monitoring and performance evaluation is 
difficult to achieve. That would, however, largely depend on factors such the type of 
the provider, regulatory environment, past experiences, and the nature of each 
relationship. 
Finally, the various forms of incentive management have different implications for 
risk distribution that have efficiency implications. For instance, if a payer 
organisation faces significant risk associated with the reimbursement mechanisms, it 
may respond by conserving inefficient levels of reserve to ensure that crises are 
avoided under all possible scenarios. If a provider organisation faces high levels of 
risk it may also devise inefficient measures to protect itself. The ideal for a public-
private partnership is contractual arrangements that create sufficient risk transfer in a 
competitive environment and thus maximises efficiency without resorting to a 
regulatory set-up. The partnership with the mining companies is taking place within 
the regulatory environment in which the mining companies are obliged to provide 
TB treatment to their employees. Regardless of whether the government provides 
them with the free drugs/reimbursement or not they will continue to provide the 
treatment. Although they have to comply with the national TB treatment guidelines 
and time-consuming reporting requirements, they perceive no risk involved in the 
partnership with the government. The only risk would be on the government side 
where, in a case that the law changes, the mining companies decide to pull out of the 
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entire process. In that case it is the patient who would bear the risk, as the mining 
companies are not financially dependent on the government funding. 
Partnership with an NGO is more risky than with a mining company because the 
NGO may be almost entirely dependent on the financial subsidy from the 
government, and it does not have the same incentives as the mining companies. In 
addition, due to the nature of the monitoring system it is difficult to justify whether 
the funding provided to the NGOs is a good use of public money. The past 
experiences with a national NGO SANTA have made the government aware of 
potential irregularities in the reporting system and problems with mismanagement 
and misuse of funds. At the same time, the partnership with the government poses a 
high risk to NGOs in terms of funding. Since the service agreement that they have 
with the government is renewable every year, and taking into considerations the far-
from-ideal monitoring mechanism, their major concern is that the financial subsidy 
could be easily terminated. It is important to stress, however that having to review 
their service agreements annually creates incentives for the NGOs to be efficient and 
competi ti vee 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the findings from the three different models of provision 
of TB treatment evaluated by this study, as well as some of the major limitations of 
the methodology and data used. The two models of pUblic-private partnerships 
provide superior quality of care and more cost-effective treatment for TB than the 
purely public model. This means that the cost per patient treated to the public sector 
could be reduced, and quality of care improved, by enhanced partnership between 
the private and public sectors. Private providers in existing and potential partnerships 
have both financial and non-financial motivations for collaborating. Therefore, a 
range of incentives, both financial and non-financial, could be devised to encourage 
private sector participation in the provision of TB treatment. Despite some 
limitations and issues around generalisability of the findings, this study has 
generated new evidence on the nature of TB treatment delivery in South Africa 
including models of PPP and the performance of PPPs. There was a particular focus 
on quality of care and cost-effectiveness, and the incentive mechanisms for private 
sector participation in PPPs. 
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIO~S 
10.1 Introduction 
The study aimed to redress the lack of empirical data on the perfonnance of private 
providers in developing countries by evaluating different models of public-private 
partnerships in the provision of tuberculosis. Chapters 5-8 addressed the first four 
objectives of the study by providing a comprehensive overview of the nature of the 
provision of TB treatment; presenting the findings of the perfonnance of different 
public-private partnership models in the provision of TB treatment; and, outlining 
incentive mechanisms for private sector participation under different partnership 
forms in South Africa. This chapter starts by presenting a systematic summary of the 
methods used for the study objectives. Using the conceptual framework, developed 
by drawing on a review of literature relating to public-private mix, incentives and 
tuberculosis treatment, and employed throughout the study, conclusions are made, 
generalisability of the study findings discussed, and the study contribution to 
knowledge outlined. The chapter then addresses the final objective of the study by 
making recommendations on how policy-makers in South Africa and elsewhere 
could best approach a policy on the enhanced role of the private sector providers in 
TB treatment, and what is likely to be appropriate for different models of public-
private partnership. Finally, suggestions for future research in this area are made. 
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10.2 Summary of the methods used 
This thesis has addressed the first four study objectives in the following ways. Using 
document review and interviews with key infonnants, chapter 5 provided an 
overview of the National TB Control Programme and the nature of TB treatment 
delivery in the public sector. A review of private sector provision, including private 
for-profit and private non-profit providers was given. The review included 
characteristics of providers, organisation of TB service delivery, roles and 
responsibilities to TB treatment, and cost and utilisation of TB treatment. 
Background and context for the structure of the public-private mix, and the TBIHIV 
background, were also provided. Chapter 5 also described different arrangements 
between public and private providers of TB treatment in South Africa. Partnerships 
with the non-profit sector (non-governmental organisations); the mining companies 
and other employer-based occupational health services; and, the for-profit sector 
(private practitioners and traditional healers) were discussed. What fonn the 
partnerships take and who is responsible for monitoring them was also described. 
Employing quantitative methods, chapters 6 and 7 presented the performance of two 
different models of provider partnerships for different study populations: public-
private for-profit (employer-based) and public-private non-profit (non-governmental 
organisations). These models were compared with purely public provision of TB 
treatment. The quality of care was evaluated in tenns of structure, process and 
outcome (chapter 6). The cost-effectiveness of TB treatment was estimated for each 
model of delivery (chapter 7). The evaluation was retrospectively undertaken from a 
provider perspective (the costs of providing TB treatment borne by the organisation 
delivering the services and the Provincial TB Programmes) and a societal 
perspective (including patient's travel and time cost). The financing required for the 
different models from the perspective of the Provincial TB Programnle, provider, 
and the patient were also estimated. 
Chapter 8 explored motivations for partnerships and incentive structures in existing 
and potential future partnerships. Qualitative data on the motivation for participation 
in existing pUblic-private partnerships, and incentive mechanisms necessary for 
private participation in TB treatment were generated through semi-structured 
interviews. Potential private partners, their obstacles to providing TB treatment, and 
the incentive structure that may be needed for a well-functioning partnership are 
identified. 
10.3 Thesis conclusions 
This research therefore can conclude the following: 
The nature of TB treatment delivery including models of PPPs 
A rapid increase in the detection of TB in a high HIV / AIDS environment and the 
emergence of MDR-TB has led the South African government to identify TB as one 
of the national health priorities. Whilst there is a good commitment at all levels of 
government to the TB Control Programme, the main constraint to effective TB 
control in South Africa are managerial and organisational weaknesses at the district 
level. In addition, the DOTS strategy is not completely implemented with the results 
that patients are not adequately treated which contributes to high interruption rates 
and a rapidly-growing MDR-TB epidemic. Diagnosis and treatment for TB is 
provided free of charge in the public sector, ensuring access to poor people who are 
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the most seriously affected. Whilst the public health sector is predominant in the 
provision of TB treatment across the country, it is not the only provider of TB 
treatment. Private sector providers who provide TB treatment could be classified into 
three major groups: (1) the private for-profit health sector which includes contractor 
hospitals, private practitioners and private hospitals; (2) employer-based health care 
providers; and (3) the non-profit private sector, represented by the NGOs. Public-
private partnerships remain a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa, and are 
seen as one component of the public sector's overall strategy for the provision of 
public services. Different public-private arrangements for the provision of TB 
treatment exist in South Africa. They range from formal contracts with the for- and 
non-profit hospitals to informal, historical partnerships with the employer-based 
service providers to formal/informal arrangements with the NGOs. Small-scale 
partnerships with private practitioners/hospitals and traditional healers are emerging. 
However, models of provision with these private providers were not available for 
study in South Africa. Most of the existing PPPs are public-employer-based service 
providers in the mining sector and public-NGOs. 
Quality of care for the treatment of TB 
The quality of care is superior in both models of public-private partnerships selected 
for the study when compared to the purely public sector model of delivery, and 
therefore shows that, in light of the TBIHIV epidemic, increased collaboration with 
private providers through partnerships could potentially improve the quality of care 
and increase access to care. There are many factors that influence different quality of 
care between the models. The nlining companies provide TB treatment to their 
employees within a very well resourced private health system in which the 
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employees have a strong economic rationale to complete the treatment. In addition, 
the mining companies are bound by law to provide TB treatment to their employees. 
The NGOs, on the other hand, have a strong ideology of care and support. They 
develop alternative strategies for community-based TB treatment and make the 
treatment accessible to poorer community members. Lastly, the relatively poor 
quality of TB treatment in the purely public model of delivery could be directly 
linked to insufficient funding, poor working conditions for doctors and nurses, and 
the flight of skills to the private sector or overseas. 
Cost-effectiveness of TB treatment 
The results of the cost-effectiveness show that, in comparison with the purely public 
provision, the pUblic-private partnership models could significantly reduce costs to 
both the public health sector and patient, and increase cost-effectiveness of TB 
treatment relative to expansion of purely public services. In addition, TB treatment 
provided through the public-private partnerships seems to be more accessible and 
convenient for patients in both study popUlations (i.e. employees and poorer 
community members). From the provider's perspective, the study results show that 
the most cost-effective TB treatment is in the public-private non-profit model 
reflecting both lower cost per patient treated and relatively higher treatment 
completion and cure rates. The least cost-effective was the public-private for-profit 
model. From the patient's perspective, the most cost-effective TB treatment was in 
the public-private for-profit model, and the least cost-effective was the purely public 
model. Finally, from the perspective of the society, the pUblic-private non-profit 
model of delivery of TB treatment remained the most-effective model of all the 
models of delivery. Cost-effectiveness data presented here suggest the cost per 
patient treated to the public sector could be reduced by enhanced partnership 
between the private and public sectors. 
Motivations of different partners and incentive structures for well-functioning 
partnerships 
Private providers in the existing and potential partnerships have both financial and 
non-financial motivations for participation in partnership for the provision of 
tuberculosis. The main financial motivations for the for-profit and non-profit are 
profit-maximising and cost-savings respectively. Training, controlling TB epidemic, 
and good relationship with the government are the main non-financial motivations 
for participation in partnership for the provision of TB. Whilst incentives in the 
existing partnerships range from free drugs to training, incentives that may be 
required to support development of broader PPPs in the provision of TB treatment 
include access to use the public sector diagnostic facilities and drugs, and in the case 
of private for-profit providers, a set fee per patient treated. Training in the national 
TB treatment guidelines and a good working relationship with the government are 
also found to be important. A range of incentives, therefore, could be used to 
encourage private sector participation in partnership with the government for the 
provision of TB treatment. While recognising that 'getting incentives right' is 
important in any principal - agent relationship, monitoring and evaluation of the 
partnerships, however, may not always be easy and other factors, such as levels of 
trust and perceptions of relative risks, may potentially play an essential role in 
underpinning efficient pUblic-private relationships. It must be acknowledged that 
incentive structures in the existing partnerships as well as those that may be needed 
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for a well-functioning partnership are context specific and depend on the type of the 
provider, past experiences and regulatory framework. 
Overall, these pUblic-private partnerships show that there is a strong economic case 
for expanding the private sector (i.e. workplace and community) involvement in IB 
treatment in the process of scaling Up. The cost per new patient treated to 
government could be reduced by enhanced partnership between the private and 
public sectors. Expansion of PPPs may require increased investment in the public-
private partnerships, but they seem to be capable of delivering important 
improvements in the affordability and efficiency of TB treatment, and improving the 
South African health system's capacity to cope with the impact of the HIV / AIDS 
epidemic. 
10.4 Generalisability of results 
The importance of the findings depends on the extent to which they can be 
generalised. In terms of quality of care and treatment effectiveness, there may be 
certain key inputs that explain the comparative success of public-private 
partnerships. First, there is strong management capacity and important resources 
have been devoted to this. For example, the mining sector has good resources and 
this has direct impact on the technical quality of care. Second, motivation to achieve 
high cure rates (or at least high successful treatment completion rates) exists on both 
sides - that of a patient - worker (because of the parading and job security) and that 
of the employer (productivity). This may not exist in the public sector context and 
may not be the case with other companies. Third, the NGOs responsible for the 
overall n1anagement of community-based care work in close partnership (with a 
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servIce agreement in place) with general health services, and are accountable to 
them. Fourth, government health services have supported the partnerships with the 
private providers. These factors may be required if the performance of these 
partnerships are to be replicated elsewhere in South Africa. In terms of costs, the fact 
that DOT visits were the most important cost driver means that results will hold if 
purely public clinic DOT visits are as or more costly than they are in the 
partnerships. All these factors have been discussed in greater detail in chapter 9. 
It is also important to consider where the employer-based and community-based 
approaches are of greatest relevance. Arguably, the employer-based TB treatment is 
most appropriate in companies which employ a large number of people, where 
occupational health clinics exist and where TB is an occupational health problem, as 
it is in the mining industry. It may not be generalisable to industries where TB is not 
an occupational disease and which do not employ a large number of people, although 
large companies like Eskom and Mercedes Benz have started projects which involve 
workplace-based DOT. In the case of the community-based TB treatment, it is most 
appropriate in areas where public sector clinics are already working at capacity; 
where clinic-based care is not achieving high cure rates; where geographical access 
to health facilities for patients is poor; and where more affordable but still cost-
effective approaches are required due to health service budget cuts and/or increases 
in the number of TB cases. The different ways in which community-based TB 
treatment can be implemented depend on the level of socio-economic development. 
the degree of social mobilisation for TB among other health activities, and the 
particular cultural setting (Maher et al 1999). While the principles of community 
contribution of TB are generalisable (e.g. close links between the general health 
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services, TB control programme and community-based NGOs), the details of how 
this model of service delivery is designed and implemented will depend largely on 
the specific setting. 
Potential difficulties with more widespread implementation of the models of PPP 
implemented in the provinces of Free State, North West and Western Cape need to 
be acknowledged. Policy-makers may be unconvinced that subsidising mining 
companies' health services for providing TB treatment to their employees, and 
payment of financial incentives to lay people for involvement in community-based 
TB treatment, is a suitable use of government funds. However, the study analysis 
indicates that, even if the government subsidised the mining sector medical services 
and funded community-based TB treatment directly, it would still reduce costs and 
improve quality of care compared to the purely public sector. The provincial 
government of the Western Cape has already signed service agreements with NGOs. 
Finally, although this study was designed to evaluate public-private partnerships in 
South Africa, it can address questions of importance to a number of other African 
countries. Whilst the context of tuberculosis treatment provision in South Africa is 
specific, there are many other countries that experience the TBIHIV epidemic, and 
have a variety of private providers who may potentially get involved in the provision 
of TB treatment. However, a key difference between South Africa and other 
countries in Africa is the availability of formally trained and registered private health 
care providers. Whilst the majority of private health care providers in South Africa 
are formally registered providers, in many other African countries private health care 
providers are often unregistered and untrained. In addition, whilst there are many 
private for-profit providers in South Africa, non-profit private providers such as 
NGOs and church related facilities dominate in other countries. 
10.5 Thesis contribution 
There are several ways in which this study contributes towards addressing some of 
the key research gaps and unanswered questions concerning private sector 
involvement in the provision of TB treatment and pUblic-private mix identified in 
chapter 2. First, this study offers a set of data about the nature of TB treatment 
provision in South Africa, focusing on the characteristics of different service 
providers, the extent of their involvement in TB treatment, and the interaction 
between public and private providers. The four main providers of TB treatment: the 
NTCP operated by and through public health services at district level; employers, 
such as mining companies which provide TB treatment either in-house or contract 
out to managed health care companies; contracted out private-for-profit hospitals; 
and, non-governmental organisations providing community-based TB treatment. 
Second, the study documents practical efforts involving the private sector by 
reviewing models of partnerships between public and private providers of TB 
treatment. Models of pUblic-private partnership in health are scarce, especially in 
developing countries. The study shows that whilst the public health sector is 
predominant in the provision of TB treatment across the country, experiments 
involving private providers are considerable and growing. The study provides data 
on pUblic-private partnerships at a national level. 
Third, the study provides infonnation on the perfonnance of the existing models of 
public-private partnership in tenns of quality of care and cost-effectiveness, on their 
own and compared with that of the purely public sector. The data in this thesis do not 
shed light on the nature and perfonnance of public-private partnerships in generaL 
but do contribute an insight into how different models of PPPs for the provision of 
TB treatment perfonn in South Africa in light of the HIV / AIDS epidemic. The study 
shows that perfonnance is similar to that arising from the developing country 
literature. However, their relative importance and consequences in African context 
may be greater. 
Fourth, the study documents different motivations for participation in public-private 
partnerships for the provision of TB treatment, and based on the motivations, 
proposes the most appropriate incentive structures suitable for different providers. In 
line with the literature on response to incentives by health care providers, private 
providers in the existing and potential partnerships appear to have both financial and 
non-financial incentives for participation in partnership for the provision of TB. 
They include free TB treatment drugs, payment for each patient treated, profit 
maximisation by minimising workdays lost due to illness, direct government 
subsidy, training on TB treatment guidelines, access to the public sector diagnostic 
facilities and equipment, controlling TB epidemic, regulation, and a good 
relationship with the government. In addition, the level of competition between 
private providers, regulatory framework, and social and political awareness also 
determine the success of partnership. In line with previous studies on private 
providers, this study highlights that involving private providers in the provision of 
services generates efficiency gains, and confirms the need for strong govenlmcnt 
capacity to negotiate, implement and monitor partnerships. Given the weak capacity 
in most of the African countries, this is perhaps even more important than in a 
developed country setting. 
Fifth, the study considers options on the suitable pUblic-private mix in the financing 
and delivery of TB treatment. It shows that a variety of pUblic-private partnerships 
may arise, depending on the motivation of both the government and private 
providers to work together. For instance, a partnership with employer-based medical 
services could be appropriate where there is a large number of TB patients, or 
general public services are not easily accessible, as was demonstrated by the public-
private for-profit case study. A community-based approach is appropriate in urban 
and peri-urban areas, and where community-based NGOs operate. A model 
involving private practitioners would be appropriate in urban areas. The most 
appropriate approach to partnerships with the private sector in a developing country 
setting is therefore highly context specific and may range across the whole spectrum 
of private providers (i.e. for-profit and non-profit). 
Finally, the study'S principal contribution to knowledge has been to provide 
evidence on the value of linking employer-based health care providers and 
community-based NGOs to the TB programmes in a developing country setting. 
This forms the empirical information base for policy-making. 
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10.6 Policy recommendations 
Based on the findings of the study, recommendations on how policy-makers in South 
Africa and elsewhere could best approach a policy on the enhanced role of the 
private sector providers in TB treatment, and what is likely to be appropriate for 
different models of pUblic-private partnership, are developed. 
1. The role of public-private partnerships as a component within the health system 
must be clarified. The study shows that a well co-ordinated and appropriately 
targeted partnership between government and the private sector may improve equity 
(in terms of access and quality of care), efficiency (in terms of affordability and cost-
effectiveness), and bring TB sufficiently under control. In the light of the public 
sector budget constraints, and the perception that the public service delivery is 
inefficient, implementing PPPs could promote efficiency and potentially maximise 
the use of existing resources. Although private providers largely focus on the need to 
minimise costs of the private care provision (due to market saturation and falling 
insurance coverage levels), there is a need to avoid duplication of resources and to 
make better use of existing resources across sectors. This could potentially be 
achieved through PPPs. The feasibility of different models of pUblic-private 
partnerships for the provision of TB treatment will depend upon the contextual 
circumstances such as the existence of appropriate socio-economic conditions, 
including the extent of coverage by third party payment schemes; the size and 
distribution of the private sector providers, and their degree of organisation: and, 
government institutional and financial capacity. Working with the NGOs and 
employer-based medical service providers through partnerships seems to be more 
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feasible in the short term than contracting out private practitioners, as partnerships 
make fewer demands on government. 
2. Partnerships between the public and private sectors should be seen as 
complementary to public services as the different models serve different target 
groups. Through partnership with the government, mining companies and 
community-based NGOs can take most of the responsibility for their own employees 
and associated communities respectively. Employer-based TB treatment is 
appropriate in companies that employ a large number of people and/or where 
occupational health clinics exist. The NGO model is well-suited to areas of high 
unemployment and where geographical access to health facilities for patients is poor. 
The NGOs play an important role in community contributions, since these 
organisations are closer to the community than the formal health care sector. This 
model of delivery is likely to be particularly successful because NGOs are already 
working with general health services and are part of the health care system. The 
mining companies, on the other hand, already have the infrastructure and good-
working systems in place. The public sector services can cope with those not in 
employment, including children and the indigent. Partnerships with community-
based NGOs and employer-based medical services should be established where the 
government does not have the capacity to provide services or because they lead to 
greater access, quality of care and more cost-effective service. Thus, PPPs help 
expand the provision of TB treatment in areas of operation through supplementing 
clinic-based provision so that the health system in general is better able to detect 
more TB cases, improve quality of TB treatment and reduce the cost per patient 
cured. The study findings suggest that the cost savings could accrue to the overa II 
health system if PPPs are used more widely. Secondly, freeing up higher-cost 
nursing staff to attend to professional level work is more efficient than using their 
time for DOT. Thirdly, increasing both detection and cure rates would potentially 
reduce the number of new TB cases and their associated costs to the health system. 
Similar approaches to PPPs could be extended to improve the provision of services 
for STI and HIV/AIDS. 
3. In order to achieve and sustain the targets that the South African DOTS strategy 
has set up, the public sector should initiate pilot projects involving partnerships 'with 
private practitioners in urban areas. Recent analysis of TB control goals found that 
despite broad coverage through public programmes, proportionate increases in case-
detection rates were not achieved. Proj ections suggest that at current rates, even if 
there were 100% coverage by DOTS, only half of new infectious cases would be 
detected. Key reasons for this are that patients do not have access to public health 
facilities or seek care from providers not linked to national programmes or the public 
health system - such as private doctors working in their own facilities or for 
employer health services. A variety of provision and financing models needs to be 
considered in developing country health systems. Even with strengthened public 
health provision, the resulting outcomes may not be as expected. The findings of the 
study show that in urban areas both NGOs and purely public sites had greater default 
rates. This may well improve by using PPPs involving other types of private 
providers such as private practitioners. Whilst a number of pilot projects involving 
private practitioners in the provision of STls have been established in South Africa, 
these types of arrangements in the provision ofTB treatment are limited. 
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4. Provincial TB Control Programmes should establish a body with representation 
from the public and private sector to identify potential partners and take a joint 
responsibility for quality control. The main tasks of this body would enable dialogue 
between the public and private sectors in order to find ways of collaboration. This 
could be achieved through establishing opportunities for engagement bet\veen the 
public and private sectors, such as offering relevant training to private providers on 
the national TB treatment guidelines. One of the most important determinants of the 
success of a partnership is the "buy-in" of all the participants to it. Thus, ensuring 
that both public and private partners believe in and are committed to collaborative 
efforts is of key importance to their success. A starting point of authentically 
engaging all parties in the process is creating a clear understanding of each one's role 
in the overall relationship. Furthermore, one cannot envisage the private sector take 
on the risk, and feel responsible for the outcomes, unless it has a sense of ownership 
of the programme. Private ownership may have an intrinsic effect by providing 
appropriate incentives to the service providers. 
5. In order to achieve a particular public-private partnership for the provision of TB 
treatment, policy-makers must recognise the dynamic nature of the relationship 
between public and private providers. In addition, it has to be acknowledged that the 
public sector has to compete with the private sector for resources, human resources 
in particular. The public sector is faced by human constraints, and engaging the 
private sector in the provision of TB treatment seems a viable option to deal with 
competition. 
6. Provincial TB Control Programmes must devise incentive mechanisms in a way 
that the PPPs promote key goals of efficiency and accessibility. Approaches that 
involve private sector need to recognise the incentives they face and work within 
these to encourage better practice and improve quality of care. Different set of 
incentives would be appropriate for different private providers. Training, free access 
to the public sector diagnostic facilities and drugs, and payment of a set fee for each 
patient treated, are potential incentive mechanisms for private practitioners and 
employer-based service providers. For NGOs, direct subsidies, training, and good 
relationship with the government would be important incentive structures. More 
complex mechanisms could involve contracting and financing private providers 
(such as private practitioners) to provide TB treatment. Other mechanisms are 
franchising and accreditation, where the private provider ensures the quality of the 
TB service provided. In the case of accreditation, private providers would be 
expected to provide detailed information on the TB service provided and their 
facilities are subject to inspection for evidence of quality indicators. All these 
mechanisms require careful monitoring and feedback on performance. 
7. Provincial TB Control Programmes should develop guidelines for monitoring and 
evaluating the performance of PPPs to ensure that private partners, in collaboration 
with the national TB programme, deliver care consistent with the DOTS strategy. 
Whilst the provision of subsidies and free TB treatment drugs might be appropriate 
incentive structures for private providers to deliver high quality of care to T8 
patients through partnerships, it is important that the public sector maintains control 
by ensuring that all providers of TB treatment follow the national T8 treatment 
guidelines. The use of a regulated PPP should be constrained to situations where the 
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problems of information asymmetries largely can be overcome. This would be 
appropriate where the type of service provision is subject to reasonably objective 
measurement, both in financial terms and actual service delivery. Regulation of the 
private sector is only a long-term strategy that requires substantial capacity within 
government, resources and information processing, and it appears that an appropriate 
set of incentives would be more feasible. 
8. To ensure the long-term sustainability of public-private partnerships within the 
broader system, the public treasury should secure funding for those models of PPPs 
that provide good quality and cost-effective TB treatment. According to the 
economic theory on the role of government, and in light of the study findings, a 
priority role for the public sector is to finance TB treatment and secure that TB 
treatment is provided to all those in need. It can directly provide services to those 
who are unemployed, children and the indigent. However, in order to benefit from 
the efficiency of the private sector, different models of PPP could be designed, and 
appropriate incentive mechanisms devised for each model, to provide and finance 
TB treatment to those who are employed, low income workers, and poor community 
members. Employer-based medical services and community-based NGOs, both in 
partnership with the public sector, provide better quality of care and more cost-
effective TB treatment when compared to purely public TB treatment. 
9. Provincial TB Control Programmes should formalise interactions between the 
public and private sectors through contracting. Public funding might be used to 
reimburse fully private providers for the delivery of either specific sen'ices 
particularly poorly covered by the public sector in the provider's area or a complete 
2~8 
range of services to a defined population. Contracts could be established with private 
providers for the provision of TB treatment when no alternative is available. Bv 
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encouraging the delivery of service at no charge, this approach might facilitate 
increased coverage in areas of particular need where ability/willingness to pay is 
limited. Contracting, however, has a central paradox of promising to relieve a heavy 
burden on government resources, but consequently needs much more of the 
resources focused on regulation and financing. Contracting is not an answer for poor 
capacity. It is a technique for institutional re-organising in the public sector context 
and in certain task networks. To ensure that this tool works properly there must be: a 
clear rationale for negotiations between parties; equal managerial capacity in both 
parties; and a competitive environment for bidding for and awarding contracts. If 
these conditions are met, there is a possibility of realising significant efficiency gains 
and better quality in services. However, where these conditions are not all present, 
risk will be unequally distributed which will then introduce an unfair agent 
relationship and sabotage successful exchange and implementation from the very 
beginning. It is absolutely necessary that as the goals and rationale behind contracts 
become more explicit, and as the government strengthen its capacity, contracts 
continue to be scrutinised and questioned to see if they have resulted in the gains 
they promised. 
10. The National Department of Health should develop a legislative framev.;ork 
around PPPs in the provision of TB treatment, and build strong technical capacity 
within the public sector to draw and manage contracts with private providers. This 
would involve providing guidance and relevant training to managers at provincial 
level on the tasks associated with managing partnerships. \'1anaging PPPs is 
.' \() 
challenging as they embody a complex set of relationships between public and 
private actors and require careful monitoring. Monitoring contract perfonnance 
requires institutional capacity (Palmer, 2002) which is lacking in most of the 
developing countries. Building the capacity is, therefore, one of the main challenges 
facing policy-makers in South Africa and other African countries. 
10.7 Agenda for future research 
The study findings suggest that pUblic-private partnerships for the provision of TB 
treatment are worthy of serious consideration by planners and policy-makers in the 
three study provinces, and in similar areas in South Africa. Some adaptation of the 
study models may be necessary and the types of incentive mechanisms need careful 
consideration, but in general experience in this area strengthens the case for the 
promotion of public-private partnerships in health care that is already underway in 
South Africa. 
The central question which arises from the conclusions drawn in this study relates to 
how to scale-up pUblic-private partnerships for the provision of TB treatment. It has 
been highlighted that for achieving the South African target of detecting 70% of 
infectious cases and curing 85% of those detected, additional funding is likely to be 
required for new kinds of interventions, such as public-private partnerships. There is 
a need to estimate future resource requirements for a scaled-up response of 
tuberculosis treatment, assessing the role of public-pri\'ate partnerships in alternative 
financing strategies, in order to inform the policy makers of the likely impact of the 
dual HIV/TB epidemic on the cost and potential impact of different moJels of the 
.290 
provision of TB treatment. Methodology on modelling to estimate required levels of 
future resources for TB control for different PPP models is needed. 
HIV -related TB cases are a burden on the already scarce resources in developing 
countries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa where the epidemic is the highest. 
Information on expenditure suggests a large and growing private health sector in 
most developing countries. The World Health Report 2000 shows that private 
expenditure on health accounts for a major portion of total expenditure in almost all 
of the high TB burden countries (World Health Organisation, 2000b). Moreover. 
almost all of this private expenditure is out-of-pocket, suggesting considerable 
utilisation of private practitioners and private pharmacies in a fee- for-service basis. 
Identification and estimation of the expenditure on TB treatment, and levels of 
coverage, in both public and private (for-profit and not-for-profit) sectors In 
developing countries is needed. This will lead to greater elaboration of options 
related to different financing and delivery of services structures. 
Given the scale of the HIV / AIDS epidemic in many developing countries, and its 
impact on TB caseloads, the existing levels of resources are likely to have to increase 
in future, and additional funds will be required to cope with the problem. There is a 
need for an assessment of the resources required to provide TB diagnosis and 
treatment over the next five to ten years in the specific context of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The implications that the HIV epidemic has for TB control and its 
resource requirements have not yet been estinlated on a country-level. Modelling of 
the likely impact of HIV / AIDS epidemic on TB treatment and its impact on required 
levels of future resources will add to a limited knowledge about resource 
requirements for TB treatment. 
Options on the suitable public-private mix in the financing and delivery of TB 
treatment involving private practitioners and traditional healers have not yet been 
given adequate consideration by most national tuberculosis programmes. This study 
has found that there is much larger potential to involve an array of actors in the 
provision ofTB treatment. One of the study recommendations is for the public sector 
to initiate pilot projects involving private practitioners in the provision of TB 
treatment in urban locations. Identification and evaluation of additional models of 
public-private partnerships for TB interventions which have the potential to be 
scaled up (such as private practitioners) is needed. 
As discussed in this thesis, one of the reasons for good compliance at the workplace 
in a mine setting is the system of 'parading' where the patient has no choice but to 
adhere to the treatment. Research into the ethical side of this approach is needed. In 
addition, knowledge is lacking about the barriers to adherence that patients face and 
ways of improving compliance that are needed and appropriate in different 
contexts/settings. 
Finally, the study provides an insight into the appropriate incentives structures 
needed for a well-functioning partnership. Reforms in health care systems of 
developing countries frequently focus on 'incentive compatibility' or 'getting 
incentives right' but a body of convincing empirical research on the effects of 
various incentives mechanisms on proyider behayiour in dC\'l?loping countries is 
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lacking. Future studies should explore in more depth different incentive mechanisms 
most appropriate for different private providers. Issues around the incentiYe 
response, how different providers respond to different incentive mechanisms. and 
approaches to more effective monitoring of partnerships should be examined. 
10.8 Conclusion 
This thesis evaluated the performance of different models ofPPPs in the provision of 
TB treatment, and explored incentive mechanisms for private sector participation. A 
common framework was used to analyse quality of care, cost-effectiveness and 
incentives in different PPPs. A multiple case study approach was used. employing 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. The small number of existing DOTS-
based models ofPPP available for the study together with the limited number of sites 
on which the policy recommendations were made, and differences in HIV prevalence 
rates in these sites were the main research limitations. Nevertheless, the thesis 
reached its aims and objectives. The main study findings are that the quality of care 
is superior in both models ofPPPs when compared to the purely public sector model 
of delivery; PPPs could significantly reduce costs to both the public health sector and 
patient, and increase cost-effectiveness of TB treatment; and that private providers 
have both financial and non-financial incentives for participation in partnership. 
They have the potential to improve the affordability and efficiency of TB treatment, 
and improve the South African health system's capacity to cope with the impact of 
the HIV / AIDS epidemic. 
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APPENDIX I 
Interview schedule for key informants 
1. Who are the main providers ofTB treatment? What are they main characteristics? 
2. Are there formal/informal interactions between the public and private sectors in the 
provision of TB treatment? 
3. What relationships do private providers have with the provincial departments of 
health? 
4. What are the existing partnerships for the provision ofTB treatment? 
5. What is the current policy in public-private partnerships for the provision of TB 
treatment? 
6. What is the annual national budget for TB activities? 
7. Is there a strategy for involving private providers in TB control activities? 
8. Are there national guidelines on how to interact with the private sector in the 
provision ofTB treatment? 
9. How do you see private practitioners getting involved III the prOVISIOn of TB 
treatment? 
10. Describe the institutional and regulatory environment within which different private 
providers provide TB treatment. 
11. What is the role of other stakeholders/professional bodies? 
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APPENDIX II 
Differences between the National TB Control Programme and the Chamber of 
Mines' guidelines 
National Minine: industry 
Case finding 
RSP 
• 
Passive 
• 
Contact tracing 
• 
Diagnosis 
Sputum smear • 
Sputum culture • 
• 
• 
Identification • 
Drug susceptibility testing • 
Admission criteria 
Smear positive • 
Clinically indicated • 
Re-treatment TB • 
Treatment§ 
NewTB • 
• 
Re-treatment TB • 
Treatment frequency • 
Smear negative TB 
• 
Directly observed 
• 
• 
Multi-drug resistant TB 
• 
CXR 
At diagnosis • 
Follow up • 
Treatment outcomes • 
RSP = Radiological screenmg programme 
NTM = non-tuberculosis mycobacteria. 
No • 
Yes • 
No (except for children) • 
Yes (2 smears) • 
1 sputum for culture if smear • 
negative at diagnosis and 
unresponsive to a course of 
antibiotics 
Failure to convert smear • 
Re-treatment TB • 
No • 
Failure to convert smears and • 
for all re-treatment cases at 
diagnosis 
No • 
Yes • 
Yes (initial phase) • 
2RHZE/4RH • 
2RHZES/IRHZE/SRHE • 
S days/week (initial) • 
S or 3 days/week • 
( continuation) 
Yes, if no response to broad- • 
spectrum antibiotics and CXR 
compatible 
Yes (intensive phase) • 
Yes, if possible (continuation • 
phase) 
Individualised/standard • 
Yes, if~ 1 smear is negative • 
No • 
As per definitions • 
CXR = chest radiograph . 
H= isoniazid. R = rifampicin. Z = pyrazinamide. E = ethambutol. S = streptomycin. 
§ Fi ed dose combination tablets should be used fro RHZE, RHE and RH 
Yes (at least annually) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (3 smears) 
All patients with 
suspected pulmonary TB 
should have 1 sputum 
specimen submitted for 
culture 
Failure to convert smear 
Re-treatment TB 
Yes (NTM) 
Same 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Same 
Same 
S days/week (initial) 
S days/week 
( continuation) 
Same 
Yes 
Yes 
Same 
Yes, on all patients 
Yes 
Same 
APPENDIX III 
Sample letter requesting consent from individual/organisation 
Organisation 
------------------
Attn. _________________ _ 
Date 
Dear 
-------
The University of Cape Town, in collaboration with the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, is undertaking a study to evaluate public-private partnerships in the 
provision of TB treatment in South Africa, in light of the HN / AIDS epidemic. It also 
explores the motivation and incentives for existing and potential new public-private 
arrangements for TB treatment. It is hoped that this study will add to our better 
understanding of the private sector, and shed light on the most appropriate approaches for 
involving private providers in TB treatment in South Africa. 
Different models of partnerships which will be studies and compared are: 
• Public-private for-profit (mines) 
• Public-private not-for-profit (NGO) 
Private and public provision will also be studied, to provide a comparison with the above 
models. 
Information to be collected will include: 
• The current dimensions of public and private health providers' involvement in TB 
control 
• The cost and quality of care of TB services provided 
• The capacity of the public sector to monitor partnerships for TB control and of the 
private sector to provide TB services 
• Organisational and individual incentives to form a public/private partnership in TB care 
It is hoped that the research will improve understanding of the role of the private sector in 
TB control in South Africa. More specifically, it is expected that the research will 
strengthen knowledge with regards to the public and private providers of TB services. 
331 
Finally, the range and type of private providers who might potentially become partners in 
delivery and financing ofTB services, their motivations, the desirability of partnerships with 
them and how to manage relations with these different groups will be identified. 
Your organisation is one of those that potentially could play an important role in TB control 
activities/policy making in the Western Cape. We would like to request your participation in 
this study by agreeing to be interviewed about public-private mix issues in TB control. Your 
identity, and the one of the organisation you represent, will be kept confidential. We will 
provide you with overall results of the study. 
We hope that you will respond favourably to this request. Thank you. 
Sincerely yours, 
Edina Sinanovic 
Principal Investigator 
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Consent to Participation in the Study: 
Tuberculosis treatment in high TBIHIV settings: evaluating public-private 
partnerships in South Africa 
Principal Investigator: 
Edina Sinanovic, Researcher, University of Cape Town 
I have read the summary of the research project and I understand what will be required of 
the organisation if we take part in the study. My questions concerning this study have been 
answered by Ms Sinanovic. I understand that at any time __________ may 
withdraw from this study without giving a reason. 
________________ agrees to participate in this study. 
Signed .................................................. . Date ................................... . 
Name ________________ ___ 
Title _________________ _ 
On behalf of ___________ _ 
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APPENDIX IV 
Quality of care criteria and scores for TB services 
Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Category 1: Infrastructure Total 9.63 9.63 5.42 8.94 8.94 6.89 
1. Electricity Score 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) None 0.1 
(b) Power fails more than 6 times/year and no backup system 2 
(c Power fails up to 6 times/year and no backup system 4 
(d) Power failures occur - there is a working backup system 8 
(e) Reliable power supply or automatic backup system 10 
2. Toilet Score 10.00 10.00 2.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 
(a) No toilets 0.1 
(b) Less than 3 toilets per 100 patients per day 2 
(c) Adequate toilets (3+ per 100 patients) but no wheelchair access toilet 8 
(d)Adequate toilets including one wheelchair access 10 
3. Functioning refrigerator Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) None 0.1 
(b) Alternative fuel supply, no spare cylinder 1 
(c) Alternative fuel supply with spare cylinder 9 
(d Electric 10 
4. Emergency kit Score 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 3.00 
(a) o emergency kit available 0.1 
(b) Emergency kit on site but incomplete or inaccessible 3 
(c) Complete emergency kit available and accessible 10 
5. Drug torage Score 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) o drug cabinet or room 5 
(b) "Lockable" cabinet/room 10 
6. leanline s Score 10.00 10.00 2.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 
(a) More than one area of the facility is dirty 2 
(b) ne area of the facility is dirty 7 
(c) II area in the facility are clean 
'area of the facility" = e.g. toilets, floors, rooms, corridor, waiting space 
10 
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Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Category 2: Access Total 8.77 9.68 6.44 7.27 5.98 6.44 
1. Size of building for patient load Score 10.00 10.00 3.00 7.00 3.00 7.00 
(a) Overcrowded every day 3 
(b) Overcrowded on peak days only 7 
(c) Facility crowded on peak days, rarely overcrowded 9 
(d) Facility never crowded 10 
2. Range of TB services Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) TB treatment only 6 
(b) TB treatment and laboratory investigations 8 
(c) TB treatment, laboratory and radiology investigations 10 
3. Emergency instructions after hours Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) No after-hours instructions/contact/phone 8 
(b) Instructions clearly visible 10 
4. Facility opening times Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) Facility opens less than 40 hours over fewer than 5 days 3 
(b) Facility opens less than forty hours but over 5 days 6 
(c) Facility opens at least 40 hours over 5 days or more 8 
(d) Facility opens more that forty hours over 6 days and/or includes some 
evenmgs 10 
5. Availability of TB treatment after hours Score 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 6.00 6.00 
(a) Limited and within working hours 6 
(b) After hours during the week days 8 
(c After hours during the week days and on weekends 10 
6. Po ition in relation to community served Score 10.00 10.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
(a) Facility is within 2k.m for less than 40% of population served 1 
b) Facility is within 2krn for 40-80% of population served 6 
(c Facility is within 2krn for 80% of population served 10 
7. Tran port for TB patients Score 5.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
a) ot a ailable 3 
b) ailable occasionally 5 
(c) AvaIlable all the time 10 
5 
Site A Site B Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Category 3: Management and staffing Total 7.70 7.70 7.02 7.02 2.92 2.92 
1. Continuing education (seminars, conferences, courses, etc) Score 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
(a) o formal continuing education 3 
(b) Informal, infrequent (every two months or longer), continuing 
education 7 
(c) Formal, structured continuing education programmes available to all 
categories of staff 10 
2. Patient load per full time equivalent (FTE) consulting staff Score 10.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 
(doctor, primary health care nurse) 1 
(a) Over 45 or under 15 patients are seen per day per FTE staff 7 
(b) Between 40-45 or 15-28 patients are seen per day per FTE staff 10 
(c) Between 28 and 40 patients are seen per day per FTE staff 
3 Patient load per FTE professional staff (doctor, primary health Score 10.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 
care nurse, professional nurse, enrolled nurse) 1 
(a) Over 45 or under 15 patients are seen per day per FTE staff 7 
(b) Between 40-45 or 15-28 patients are seen per day per FTE staff 10 
(c) Between 28 and 40 patients are seen per day per FTE Score 3.00 3.00 7.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 
4. Quality assurance at the facility 3 
(a) No mechanism for quality assurance at the facility 7 
(b) Informal or ad hoc approach to quality assurance 10 
c) Comprehensive approach to quality control Score 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
5. Record y tern 1 
a) ot possible to link a TB patient to hislher record 10 
(b Possible to link a TB patient to hislher records Score 10.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 
6. ctive defaulter tracing in place 0.1 
(a) o system in place 3 
b) Restricted (system in place but no resources) 5 
(c Yes, for some patients (e.g. patients supervised in the community) 10 
(c) Yes, [or all patients 
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Site A Site B Site C SiteD SiteE Site F 
Category 4: Drugs and diagnostic testing Total 9.31 10.00 6.57 7.54 8.10 7.54 
1. Standard TB Control Programme Practical Guidelines Score 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) No copy of the Guidelines is available 2 
(b) A copy of the Guidelines is available 10 
2. Essential TB drugs Score 10.00 10.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) Essential TB drugs not available 0.1 
(b) At least one essential TB drug not available for a week 5 
(c) All essential TB drugs at the clinic are available 10 10.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
3. Diagno tic testing Score 
(a No diagnostics tests are available in the facility 0.1 
(b) Either laboratory or radiology tests available only in the facility 5 
(d) Both Laboratory and radiology tests available in the facility 10 10.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
4. TB screening Score 
(a) No active case finding in place 7 
(b) Active case fmding in place 10 
5. Turn around time for sputum smear test results (time taken 
between taking a specimen from the patients and receiving the results at 7.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 10.00 7.00 
the health facility) Score 
(a) More than 3 days 0.1 
(b Between 48 hours and 3 days 7 
(c) Less that 48 hours 10 
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Site A Site B Site C SiteD Site E Site F 
Category 5: Patient environment Total 5.64 8.03 6.64 7.36 8.18 6.69 
1. Waiting time Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 5.00 5.00 
(a) Over 60 minutes 3 
(b) 45-60 minutes 5 
(c) 30-45 minutes 8 
(d) Under 30 minutes 10 
2. Waiting area Score 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) Some patients have to wait outside with no shelter from sun/rain, no 
seating 3 
(b) Some patients wait outside but with shelter AND seating 7 
(c) Patients are all accommodated inside but some have to stand/sit on 
floor 8 
(d) Patients are seated inside on most days 10 
3. Patient privacy Score 6.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 
(a) No audial or visual privacy 1 
(b) Visual privacy but little/no audial privacy 6 
(c) Complete audial and visual privacy 10 
4 Patient complaints/suggestions Score 9.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 
(a) No mechanism for complaints/suggestions 8 
(b) Possible to complain but not simple/anonymous 9 
(c) Clear system for complaints/suggestions 10 
5. Health education material Score 3.00 3.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) one on display or available 3 
b) Inappropriate materials on display only 4 
(c Appropriate materials on display only 8 
(d) Appropriate materials on display and available to take horne 10 
6. afety Score 2.00 10.00 2.00 2.00 10.00 2.00 
(a) First sputum specimen is collected in the clinic (e.g. consultation 
room, toilet waiting room, etc) 2 
c if t sputum specimen is collected in a well ventilated area or outside 
\I. ithout others watching 10 
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Site A SiteB Site C Site D SiteE Site F 
Category 6: Technical quality of care Total 8.94 8.94 8.30 8.30 8.94 8.61 
1. Knowledge of the most common symptoms of pulmonary TB by 
health care providers (doctor, nurse and treatment supporter) Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) Poor (less than 3 symptoms mentioned) 0.1 
(b) Adequate (between 3 and 5 symptoms mentioned) 8 
( c) Very good (all 7 symptoms mentioned) 10 
2. Knowledge of the first diagnostic test for confirmation of 
pulmonary TB by health care providers Score 10.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) Poor (not sure) 0.1 
(b) Adequate (mentions both the sputum test and x-ray) 8 
(c) Very good (sputum test) 10 
3. Knowledge of the essential drugs for pulmonary TB by health care 
provider Score 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 
(a) Poor (mentions only 2 drugs) 0.1 
(b) Adequate (mentions 4 drugs) 8 
( c) Very good (mentions all 5 drugs) 10 
4. Knowledge of side effects of TB treatment in pulmonary TB by 
health care provider Score 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) Poor (mentions less than 4 side effects) 0.1 
(b) Adequate (mentions between 4 and 8 side effects) 8 
(c) Very good (mentions all 13 side effects) 10 
5. Knowledge of management of side effects of TB treatment in 
pulmonary TB by health care provider Score 8.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
(a) one (gi es 1 correct answer) 0.1 
(b) Poor (gives 2 correct answers) 8 
(c) Adequate (all 3 answers are correct) 10 
6. Information given to TB patients by health care providers Score 8.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 
(a Poor (mentions 1 out of3 listed in the questionnaire) 0.1 
b) Adequate (mentions 2 out of3 listed in the questionnaire) 8 
(c) Very good (mentions all 3 listed in the questionnaire) 10 
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Site A SiteB Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Category 7: Clinical treatment Total 8.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 3.00 3.00 
1. Proportion of patients who completed the treatment Score 10.00 10.00 6.00 10.00 2.00 2.00 
(a) Less than 70% of patients completed treatment 1 
(b) 71-80% of patients completed treatment 2 
(c) 81-84%of patients completed treatment 6 
(d) Over 84% of patients completed treatment 10 
2. Proportion of patients whose treatment was interrupted for two 
months or more Score 10.00 10.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 2.00 
(a) Over 27% of patients 1 
(b) Between 16% and 26% of patients 2 
(c) Between 5% and 15% of patients 6 
(d) Less than 5% of patients 10 
3. Proportion of patients who had their sputum converted to sputum- 6.00 6.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 
negative at the end of the first phase Score 
(a) Less than 50% of patients 1 
(b) 51-70% of patients 2 
(c) 71-84%ofpatients 6 
(d) Over 84% of patients 10 
4. Proportion of patients who are proven to be cured using 6.00 6.00 2.00 10.00 2.00 6.00 
micro copy at the end of the treatment Score 
(a) Less than 50% of patients 1 
(b) 51-70% of patients 2 
(c) 71-84%ofpatients 6 
(d) Over 84% of patients 10 
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APPENDIX V 
Interview schedule for facility manager 
Date: 
Facility (province): 
Full name, title and position of interviewee: 
Services delivered at the facility 
1. What TB services are provided in this facility? 
2. What proportion ofTB patients are: 
i) hospitalised? 
ii) treated in outpatient department? 
iii) treated in PRe clinic? 
3. Are you implementing DOTS? 
4. Please explain how DOTS works in your clinic? What system is in place? 
5. What are the opening hours of this facility? 
Is there night/emergency cover? 
6. Does this facility offer TB treatment as part of after normal hours services (i.e. evening, 
week-ends, public holiday)? 
7. Do you provide transport for TB patients? 
8. Does your facility have a laboratory? 
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9. What TB diagnostic tests do you offer? 
Available on site Sent away Not available 
Haemaglobin 
Blood Glucose 
Urine Microscopy 
TB Microscopy 
TB Culture 
Other microscopy 
and culture 
10. Does your facility offer X-Rays? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Nearby 3 
if nearby, please specify where (and how far away) 
Professional details and management of staff 
11. How many and what type of health workers are involved in TB diagnosis and treatment 
supervision? 
12. Was this the same before you entered into the partnership? Please describe any 
differences. 
13. Has anyone at this facility received specialised training in management skills and/or 
supervision of staff? 
I ~ 
If Yes, how many? 
I Management 
SupeTVlslOn 
14. Are you a member of any professional organisation(s)/union(s)? 
Which one( s)? 
15. Where did you work before this job, and what are the main differences between 
working conditions here and your previous job? 
,i 
il 
II 
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16. What do you think are the main problem areas with regard to staff conditions at this 
facility? (e.g. salary, working environment, privacy for breaks and administration) 
17. What could be done to improve them? What are the main obstacles to doing this'? 
In-service training 
18. How many of your staff are trained on DOTS ? (if applicable) 
19. Is further training necessary? 
I~ 
If Yes, please specify 
20. Do you feel that you are adequately trained for the job which you are expected to 
perform? 
I~ 
If No, what additional training do you think you would benefit from? 
Service delivery and access 
21. Which are the main groups in the community served by this clinic? 
22. Is it possible for everyone who wants to, to get to this clinic and be treated here? 
I ~ 
If No, what would you say are the main obstacles? 
23. Are there people living in this area who do not come to this clinic? 
I~ 
If no . ... Why? Where do they go to seek healthcare? 
Quality assurance 
24. Do you try to assess whether patients are satisfied with the TB care they receive at this 
facility? 
I ~ 
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If yes .... 
25. Is there a mechanism for "consumer feedback"? (e.g. suggestion box) 
I~ 
26. Is it used by patients? 
Often 1 
Sometimes 2 
Almost never 3 
27. Is there a mechanism for patients to ask questions about the facility or any aspect of care? 
How does it work? 
I ~ 
28. Is it used by patients? 
Often 1 
Sometimes 2 
Almost never 3 
29. Is there any other mechanism for patients to complain should they be unhappy 
with the care they receive or the attitude of a health worker? How does it work? 
I~ 
30. Is it used by patients? 
Often 1 
Sometimes 2 
Almost never 3 
31. Is quality of care assessed in any other way in this practice/facility? If Yes, explain how'? 
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Cost data for TB treatment 
Financial year 
Facility 
• Management (human resources and other) 
• Administration (drug ordering and stock control; patient & other records staff: reception 
area staff, etc) 
• Overheads (electricity, telephones & faxes, stationery, computer consumables, support 
staff - all staff not classified as clinical, admin and management, or maintenance, e.g. 
cleaning staff, gardeners, etc) 
• Clinical personnel 
• Medical and surgical supplies 
• Diagnostic tests (laboratory and radiology) 
• Transport/vehicle running costs (number ofkm travelled in year) 
• Maintenance (building and vehicle) 
• Other costs (including cleaning materials) 
• Buildings (size) 
• Medical equipment (a list of) 
• Furniture and other equipment (a list of) 
• Vehicles (type and make) 
• Training (actual cost of training) 
APPENDIX VI 
Interview schedules for health care providers 
Date: 
Facility (province): 
Full name, title and position held of interviewee: 
Characteristics of provider 
1. What is your most recent qualification? Year? 
2. How long have you worked here? 
3. Where did you work before this job? 
Knowledge of diagnostic criteria and diagnostic procedures followed 
4. How would you describe DOTS? 
5. What are the most common symptoms of pulmonary TB? 
Persistent cough (for 3 weeks and more) 1 
Sputum production/productive cough 2 
Shortness of breath and chest pain 3 
Appetite and weight loss 4 
General feeling of illness 5 
Tiredness and loss of motivation 6 
Night sweats and fever 7 
Other responses (specify) 8 
6. What is the first test you would use to diagnose a pulmonary TB? 
Sputum examination 1 
Chest X-ray 2 
Sputum culture 3 
Tuberculin (Mantoux) test) 4 
Blood complete picture (CP) 5 
Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate (ESR) 6 
Other responses (specify) 7 
7. What special tests for diagnosis of pulmonary TB would you order? 
Micro Dot / Anti Dot 1 
TB culture/sensitivity 2 
Acid Fast Bacili (AFB) 3 
Tuberculin (Mantoux) test) 4 
Other responses (specify) 5 
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8. Do you order TB culture and susceptibility tests on all re-treatment patients? 
I ~~s I; 
9. When do you order chest x-ray? 
All patients 1 
Patients with 2 positive sputum smears 2 
Patients with 1 or 2 negative sputum smears 3 
Patients with haemoptysis 4 
Other (specify) 5 
10. What is the method of confirmation of pulmonary TB elimination? 
Sputum examination 1 
Chest X-ray 2 
TB culture 3 
Tuberculin (Mantoux) test) 4 
Blood complete picture (CP) 5 
Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate (ESR) 6 
Other responses (specify) 7 
Safety and efficiency 
11. Where is the initial sputum specimen collected? 
Outdoors 1 
Well-ventilated area 2 
Examination room 3 
Toilet 4 
Patient waiting room 5 
Home 6 
Other (specify) 7 
12. What is the tum-around time for sputum smear results? Is more than 48 hours, please 
give reasons for the delay. 
13. How long does it take to get TB culture results? 
14. How long does it take to get a chest X-ray report? 
Treatment methodology 
15. Do you follow the South African TB Control Programme Practical Guidelines'? 
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16. Is there a copy of the Guidelines available for staff in this facility? 
17. Ask to see a copy and indicate which version is being used. 
1996 1 
1999 2 
2000 3 
18. Could you please list the essential pulmonary anti-TB drugs? 
Isoniazid 1 
Rifampicin 2 
Pyrazinamide 3 
Streptomicyn 4 
Ethambutol 5 
Other (specify) 6 
19. What (combination of) drugs would you prescribe for a new pulmonary TB case? 
2 months initial phase 
RHZE 120/60/300/200mg* 
(4 tablets for <50kg) 
RHZE 120/60/300/200mg 
(5 tablets for >50kg) 
4 months continuation phase 
RH 150/100mg (3 tablets for <50kg) 
RH 3001l50mg (2 tablets for >50kg) 
R= rifampicin; H=isioniazid (INH); Z=pyrazmanude; E=ethambutol; S=streptomycm 
* Ethamutol 225mg in combination is also acceptable 
Management of side effects 
20. What infonnation do you provide to a TB patient? 
Method of taking drugs 1 
Adverse effects 2 
Precautions 3 
Other (specify) 4 
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21. What are the side affects ofTB treatment? 
Anorexia 1 
Nausea 2 
Abdominal pain 3 
Burning sensation in feet 4 
Orange/red urine 5 
Skin itching/rush 6 
Anaphylactic reaction 7 
Deafness 8 
Dizziness 9 
Jaundice 10 
Vomiting and confusion 11 
V isual impairment 12 
Generalised reaction, including shock and purpura 13 
Other (specify) 14 
22. What advice would you give to a patient undergoing TB treatment, if he/she complains of 
nausea? 
Mentions ... "give tablets last thing at night" 
23. What advice would you give to a patient undergoing TB treatment, ifhe/she complains of 
orange/red urine? 
Mentions ... "reassurance" 
24. What advice would you give to a patient undergoing TB treatment, ifhe/she complains of 
visual impairment? 
Mentions ... "stop the treatment immediately and refer the patient to a specialist physician for 
an examination" 
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Patient education 
25. Do you have a patient education programme on TB? 
26. What health education materials do you use (collect samples)? 
27. Do you trace defaulters? 
I~ 
28. What system is in place? 
29. Do you have resources to do this in practice? 
30. How does it work in practice? 
Follow Up Procedure 
31. How many new TB patients are seen in one month (approximately)? 
32. How often are pulmonary TB patients supposed to visit the clinic? (number of follow-ups 
advised) 
Every (working) day 1 
Every two weeks 2 
Every two months 3 
Other (specify) 4 
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APPENDIX VII 
Outcome quality (TB patient records) 
d TE patient records - Check every 2n patient in TE ref(isterforfollowin~: 
Patient Date of Patient category and Record of 2 month test: 
o. Diagnosis treatment regimen YesfNo 
Correct/incorrect 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
In order to generate the fo llowing indicators: 
1. Adherence to treatment: 
• % of patient population thaI completed treatment 
Result of2 month 
test: 
PositivefNegative 
• % of population commencing treatment that had a 5 month test done 
2. Cure rate: 
Record of 5 month test: 
YesfNo 
• 2 month mear can er ion rate: e.g. did they have the test? what was the result? 
Facility: 
Result of 5 month Treatment 
test: stop date: 
PositivefNegative YeslNo 
• % of population that commenced treatment in chosen period that had 5 months test done and were shown to be cured 
Outcome Remarks 
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APPENDIX VIII 
(a) Patient cost interview 
1. Where do get your daily TB treatment? 
2. How do you get to the clinic/treatment supporter? (e.g. walking, by bus/taxi) 
3. How long does it take to get to the clinic/treatment supporter? 
4. If relevant, what is the cost of a bus/taxi fare one way? 
S. Are you employed? 
6. If yes, what type of employment are you in? (full-time/part-time; formal/informal) 
7. What is your monthly household income? 
(a) RSOO - R1000; (b) R1001- R1S00; (c) R1S01 - R2000; (d) R2001 - R2S00; (e) R2S01 _ 
R3000; (f) More than R3000 
(b) Process indicators for different components of TB treatment 
Expected number of visits and diagnostic tests for a new smear positive pulmonary TB patient 
for each study site 
Public-private for- Public-private 000- Purely public model 
profit model profit model 
Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Hospital day 7 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Visit to clinic for monitoring 2 3 3 3 3 3 
DOT visit to clinic 123 130 10 10 130 130 
DOT visit to "treatment supporter" N.A. N.A. 120 120 N.A. N.A. 
Total DOT visits 123 130 130 130 130 130 
Sputum smear test 4 7 6 6 6 6 
Sputum culture 1 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
X-ray 3 3 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
In addition to 2 sputum smears, sites A and B conducted a sputum culture and a chest 
radiograph for all patients with suspected pulmonary TB. In site A, once diagnosed all 
sputum smear-positive patients were hospitalised for the first 7 days, after which their 
treatment was observed in occupational clinics. In all other sites patients were not 
hospitalised at all, and the treatment was observed in clinics or in the community. Doctor 
made a diagnosis in all study sites. Professional nurses observed the treatment in sites ABE 
and F, and lay workers "treatment supporters" observed the treatment is site C and D except 
for the first 10 days when patients were required to have their treatment observed at a clinic. 
(c) Average provider costs 
Average provider costs associated with TB diagnosis and treatment for each site (2001 Rand) 
Cost category Public-private for-profit model Public-private non-profit model Purely public model 
Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Site F 
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic 
Hospital stay 245 269 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Health clinic visits for 52 60 46 53 50 65 53 69 50 53 56 58 
monitoring 
Health clinic visits for 20 23 17 20 24 31 24 33 27 28 31 32 
DOT 
Visits to "treatment N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 2.8 4 3.2 4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
supporters" for DOT 
Sputum smears 25 25 17 17 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Sputum culture 142 142 148 148 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Drugs N.A. 391 2,970 3,282 39 1 391 391 391 391 39 1 391 39 1 
X-rays 34 34 31 31 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Supervision of N.A N.A N.A. N.A. 488 635 488 600 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
community-based 
programme 
Training for" treatment N.A N.A N.A. N.A. 9 11 9 11 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
su pporters" 
COSl d:lla from 2001; N.A. = not applicable. 
h total cost of treating a new smear-positive pulmonary TB patient from diagnosis to treatment completion was calculated by mUltiplying th av rag c t 
r ach tr atment c mponent by the number of times the cost was incurred (process indicators as shown above), as defined by the National B r atm nt 
Uld lme and then umming these totals. 
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APPENDIX IX 
Interview schedules for existing public/private partners and potential 
private partners 
1. Interview with public partners 
Background 
1. Briefly describe what PPPs for TB treatment exist in your province? Explain the history of 
PPPs for TB treatment in your province. 
2. How did the decision to enter into a PPP rise? 
3. Are you happy with current regulations affecting the practice of primary care private 
providers (specifically for TB)? Do they need changing? If so, how? 
4. Do the PPPs for affect your ability to plan TB services for the whole province/district? 
Characteristics of the partnership 
5. What is the type of partner? (mines, NGO) 
6. What is the nature of service/good provided? 
7. What is the type of partnership (is there a contract in place)? 
8. What is the objective of this partnership? 
9. What are the responsibilities of the private partner? How are they defined? 
10. What reimbursement (payment or other incentive) mechanism is in place? What is the 
exact value of the reimbursement? 
11. What is the duration of the current agreement? Is this a first of subsequent agreement? If 
the latter, what was the duration of the initial agreement? 
12. What is planned to happen at the end of the PPP agreement term? Why? 
13. (if relevant) Before the PPP, what sort of relationships did you have with the private 
provider? 
14. Who initiated discussions over a possible partnership? 
15. What would you say were the province's reasons for agreeing to this type of partnership? 
16. Was any analysis done before deciding to enter into the partnership (e.g. cost estimation)? 
17. Were there any other alternatives open to you to get this service provided? If so, why did 
you reject them? 
18. Overall, do you think the private provider has the appropriate resources (staff, buildings. 
equipment) to deliver an adequate TB service (e.g. as compared to public sector facilities)'? 
19. What do you think has been wrong/good with this partnership? (lessons learned) 
Motivations and incentives 
20. What do you think are private provider's reasons for this partnership? 
21. What are the outcomes you want from this partnership? 
22. What incentives are the best for the outcome you desire? What are your experiences? 
23. Do you think that the compensation the private provider receives from the province is 
fair/too much/too little? 
24. Do you trust the private provider? 
25. How would you describe your current relationship with the private partner? 
26. Has your relationship with the private provider changed over the period of the 
partnership? If so, in what way? 
27. Have there been changes in the incentives in the past? How did that effect the behaviour? 
28. What do you see as benefits of the PPP? (is the use of resources to deliver TB treatment 
more efficient because of the use of the private provider?) 
29. What do you think drawbacks are? 
Partnerships monitoring mechanisms (generalfor all types of partnersh ips for TB treatment) 
30. What are the performance monitoring mechanisms built in to the agreement/contract? 
31. What information do you get from the private partner about what he is doing? In what 
form? How frequently? 
32. What is the main method which you use to measure service delivery? How effective do 
you think it is? 
33. What would constitute a breach of agreement on the side of a private provider? What are the 
penalties? Are they enforceable? And on the side of the province? 
Reimbursement mechanisms 
34. How was the reimbursement mechanisms (or incentive) decided? 
35. How do you think the way the private partner is reimbursed effects hislher behaviour and the 
quality of care provided? 
36. Apart from the incentive to the provider, what other costs are associated with the partnership 
agreement? 
Risk 
37. What do you see as the existing or potential risks in a PPP as well as in the present 
agreement(s) with the private partner? 
38. In your current partnership(s) with the private provider. who do you think would bear the 
risk of the PPP if something goes wrong? 
39. Do you think that a partnership with a non-profit organisation is/would be less "risky" than 
with a for-profit organisation? Why? 
40. What do you think are the main benefits and disadvantages to your organisation of the 
partnership? Do you see other potential benefits which haven't been realised yet? 
Staff and staff capacity issues 
41. What staff is involved in these PPPs? What proportion of their time do they spend on the 
PPPs? 
42. Do you think you have the right skills and experience to manage PPPs? Is ability to go 
into PPPs likely to increase with experience? 
43. Which do you think is more demanding for your staff: to manage PPPs or to manage 
direct provision of TB treatment? Why? 
Future policy regarding partnerships/or the provision o/TB treatment 
44. Would the province be interested in more PPPs with the private providers? If so, why? 
45. Who would be your preferred private providers? (e.g. public, private for profit, private not 
for profit) 
46. Do you think there are many providers of this type interested in partnerships? Would it be 
possible to attract in suppliers not currently working in your area? 
47. If you were going to enter into the partnership with the same private partner again, how 
would you go about it? 
48. What would an ideal PPP for the prOVISIOn of TB treatment look like from your 
perspective? 
2. Interview with private partners 
Background 
1. Describe the organisational structure, and how the provision of TB treatment is organised? 
2. Before the partnership started, what sort of relationships did you have with the Department 
of Health? 
3. Who initiated discussions over a possible partnership? 
4. What were your reasons for wanting this partnership? 
5. What is the objective of this partnership? 
6. Why do you think the government wanted this partnership? What are/were hislher 
motivations? Do you trust him/her? 
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7. Has your relationship with the government changed over the period of the partnership(s)? 
If so, in what way? Would you say that the nature of the partnership is changing O\'er time, if so, 
how? 
8. Do you think the government has any alternatives now to the current partnership to get the 
TB service/good provided? 
9. Who are your competitors in this market? How competitive do you think you are relative to 
your competitors in this market? 
Motivations and incentives 
10. What do you think are province's reasons for this partnership? 
12. What types of incentives are needed for your organisation to provide TB treatment? What 
are your experiences? 
13. Do you think that the compensation that you get from the province is fair/too much/too 
little? 
14. How would you describe your current relationship with the private partner? Why do you 
characterise the partnership like that? 
15. Has your relationship with the province changed over the period of the partnership? If so, 
in what way? 
16. Have there been changes in the incentives in the past? How did that effect the behaviour? 
17. What do you see as benefits of the PPP? 
18. What do you think drawbacks are? 
Scope and nature of the partnership 
19. As the partner, what are your responsibilities in terms of provision ofTB treatment? Are 
those the ones you would ideally want? 
20. What are your responsibilities, as defined in the agreement, with respect to capital items, 
staff and supplies? Overall, do you think you have the appropriate resources (staff, buildings, 
equipment) to deliver an adequate TB service? 
Partnership agreement review mechanisms 
21. Are any performance monitoring or review mechanisms built in to the partnership 
agreement? How time consuming do you fmd this review process? 
22. What do you think would constitute a breach of agreement under this relationship? 
Reimbursement mechanisms 
23. How would you describe your motivation for providing TB treatment? Is the current 
agreement in your view designed with these motivations in mind or would you like to see it 
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addressing different aspects? 
24. What is the reimbursement mechanism (or incentive) specified in the agreement? 
25. How do these reimbursement mechanisms affect the riskiness of the agreement from 
your perspective? 
26. Do you think these reimbursement mechanisms influence the way in which you 
provide TB DOTS service? Do you think for-profit! not-for-profit providers would behave 
similarly? 
27. Apart from the direct costs of providing TB treatment, what other costs are associated with 
the agreement? 
28. In addition, were there any transitional costs e.g. setting up new information systems? 
Attitudes to risk, management systems and responses to partnership incentives 
29. What do you see as the existing or potential risks in any PPP as well as specifically in 
the current partnership agreement? 
30. In your current partnership with the province, who do you think would bear the risk if 
something goes wrong? Is this partnership regarded as posing high, medium or low risk to 
you? 
31. Describe the management systems in place for managing the partnership. 
32. What information do you give the government about what you are doing? In what form? 
How frequently? 
33.Do you think the government uses this information to monitor your performance? 
34. Have you had any problems in managing the partnership? 
Performance of the partnership 
35. What do you think are the main benefits and disadvantages to your organisation of the 
partnership with the government? 
36. What do you think are the effects of this partnership agreement on the costs of services, and 
on the quality of care? 
37. What would an ideal PPP look like from your perspective? 
Attitude to increased use of partnersh ips for the provision ofTB treatment 
38. Would your organisation be interested in more partnerships with the government? If so, 
why? 
39. Do you think there are many private sector organisations and providers interested in 
partnerships with the public sector? 
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3. Interview with potential private partners 
Background 
1. Briefly describe your organisational structure. 
2. Is there a formal interaction between your organisation/facility and public sector facilities! 
district and regional authorities? 
Attitude to use of partnerships to deliver TB treatment 
3. Would you be willing to treat TB patients in your rooms? 
4. Would your organisation be interested in partnerships with the government for provision of 
TB treatment? If so, why? 
5. Would you be willing to follow the NTCP guidelines and complete the register for TB? 
6. How do you see your involvement in the provision of TB treatment with the government? 
7. Do you think that you have the appropriate resources (staff, building, equipment) to deliver 
an adequate TB treatment? Do you think you have the right staff skills and experience to 
manage PPPs? 
8. What would an ideal ppp for the prOVISIOn of TB treatment look like from your 
perspective? 
9. Have you been asked to participate in partnership? If yes, what is the reason for not 
participating? 
Motivations and incentives 
10. What are your reasons for wanting to get into a partnership with the government? What 
are incentives that should be in place to encourage your organisation's participation in 
partnership? 
11. What do you see as benefits for you ofPPP? What do you think drawbacks and risks are? 
12. How would you describe your current relationship with the government? 
Obstacles to providing TB treatment 
13. Do you perceive obstacles to providing TB treatment? If yes, what are they? 
14. Who are your competitors in this market? Do you think there are many private sector 
organisations and providers interested in partnerships with the public sector for the provision 
ofTB treatment? Who are they? Would it be possible to attract in suppliers not currently 
working in this field? 
15. How competitive do you think you are relative to your competitors in this market? 
16. When were you last contacted by officials form the DoH to inform you about 0.1P 
guidelines? When did you last participate in a Continued Medical Education (CME) 
programme on TB treatment and control? Who organised this CME? 
Referrals 
17. If you suspect that a patient has TB, do you make a diagnosis or refer? Officially. where 
are you supposed to refer TB patients to? In practice, is this what you do? 
18. What are the reasons for referrals? Do you think that you sometimes refer TB patients 
that you should be able to deal with here? Why? 
19. How many new cases of pulmonary TB do you refer on an average in a month? Would 
you say, compared to one year ago, that this facility is referring morelless/about the same TB 
patients? (If there is a change, why?) 
20. Do you notify the government (NTPlDoH) when a new TB patient comes to you for 
treatment? 
21. What do you think is the role of private providers in the National TB Control Programme? 
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